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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter contributes to
the literature on the Laffer curve as a means of measuring the sustainability
of public finances. In particular, it proposes to construct Laffer Curves via
policy experiments where fiscal policy is set optimally and fiscal instruments
are jointly varied along the transition to steady-state. This relation is la-
beled as an ‘optimal Laffer curve’. It is shown that the tax revenue and
welfare gains relative to the ‘quasi-static’ policy experiments examined by
the previous literature are dramatic.
The second and the third chapters are instead dedicated to developing
and estimating a DSGE model of the Scottish economy and the rest of the
UK. The second chapter reviews the literature of DSGE models developed in
academia and central banks in recent years, and outlines our model. In the
third chapter, the model is then estimated and its quantitative implications
are explored.
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Abstract
A recent literature on sovereign debt sustainability (see Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011) and Mendoza et al. (2014)) has produced Laffer curve calculations for
Eurozone countries. These calculations have been carried out mainly in a
quasi-static fashion by considering policy experiments where individual tax
rates are permanently set at a new value while keeping all others constant.
However, such fiscal policy design disregards complementarities among tax
instruments as well as the potential for altering tax rates during the transi-
tion to the steady-state in a manner which exploits expectations. Our paper
addresses this issue by considering policy experiments where fiscal policy
is set optimally and fiscal instruments are jointly varied along the transi-
tion to steady-state. Through the Ramsey problem we map the maximum
amount of tax revenues a government can further raise to the welfare costs of
the associated tax distortions. We label this relation as the ‘optimal Laffer
curve’. We show that tax revenue and welfare gains relative to the policy
experiments examined by the previous literature are dramatic.
Keywords: Laffer Curve, Optimal Policy, Fiscal Sustainability, Fiscal Limit, Fis-
cal Consolidations
1.1 Introduction
Since Jude Wannisky’s article in the 1970s, the Laffer curve has been
the object of intense debate and the theoretical reference for a series of tax
reforms. Much of this popularity is due to its simple interpretation and pow-
erful implications. It implies that taxes and fiscal revenues are related by an
inverted-U relationship. Progressive tax hikes are increasingly distortionary
and eventually reduce tax revenues. In particular, the closer an economy is
to the peak of the Laffer curve, the more self-defeating a tax hike will be and
the lower the fiscal space for reducing any deficit.
More recently, the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios in a number of economies,
particularly following the financial crisis and the associated increased risk of
sovereign default, has triggered renewed interest in the Laffer curve as a
means of assessing the sustainability of government finances. A large num-
ber of papers have investigated Laffer curves using a variety of economic
models.1 They seek to answer questions, such as: at which point on the
Laffer curve is a particular country? To what extent might a tax increase be
self-defeating, or a tax cut self-financing? And what is the sustainable level
of government debt?
Despite this intense research effort, Laffer curve calculations have tended
to be relatively mechanical. Typically, the conventional Laffer curve calcu-
lation for an individual tax is constructed by progressively varying its rate
from 0% to 100%, while keeping all other fiscal instruments fixed. Moreover,
a one-off permanent change in a single tax rate is often assumed in con-
structing the Laffer curve. However, these conventional approaches ignore
two crucial issues. First, there is likely to be some degree of complemen-
tarity between fiscal instruments, such that appropriately designing the tax
mix will generate more revenue than an instrument-by-instrument approach.
Second, in a dynamic economy, the profile of fiscal instruments over time is
likely to be important in assessing the discounted revenues generated. This
is due to the fact that the tax elasticity of production factors varies over
time, and tax revenues raised in the distant future matter less in present
value terms.
1Those studies include Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Agell and Persson (2001), Novales
and Ruiz (2002),Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006), Leeper and Yang (2008), Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011) and Mendoza et al. (2014).
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Our paper attempts to address these issues by allowing fiscal policy to
be conducted optimally. Therefore, the policy maker can vary both the level
and the composition of fiscal instruments over time to achieve the maximum
attainable tax revenues for a given welfare loss due to tax distortions. We
then compare tax revenues under optimal policy with those implied by the
conventional Laffer curve calculations considered by Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011) and Mendoza et al. (2014). We show that the increase in tax revenues
raised per unit of welfare loss is dramatic when the policy maker can vary
multiple tax instruments over time. This result holds even when we allow
for debt service costs to rise with debt levels and policy maker myopia. Our
study implies that the previous literature significantly underestimates the
sustainable level of government debt, or equivalently, overstates the welfare
losses of achieving a given level of fiscal revenues.
Locating Our Contribution within the Related Literature
The European sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2011 has generated widespread
interest in measuring the sustainability of government debt. In the new
Handbook of Macroeconomics, D’Erasmo et al. (2015) identifies three main
approaches to assessing fiscal sustainability. The first is empirical based
on the estimation of fiscal reaction functions in the spirit of Bohn (2005).
The latter two rely on calibrated theoretical models which either look at the
government’s optimal default decision (see Mendoza (2013) and Dovis et al.
(2014)) or the fiscal limit (Mendoza et al. (2014) and Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011)). The former approach asks what debt the government is prepared to
support optimally, while the latter what debt it could potentially support.
Whether or not the revenues implied by this final exercise can actually be
attained then depends upon the credibility of the government’s policies.
Our research builds on this latter literature which seeks to compute the
fiscal limit, which is underpinned by the Laffer curve. The peak of the Laf-
fer curve defines the maximum tax revenues which can be generated given
the fiscal experiment considered. It serves as a measure of potential fiscal
sustainability. The literature in this field has carried out fiscal limit calcula-
tions for groups of countries by constructing Laffer curves for appropriately
calibrated model economies.
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) have provided Laffer curve calculations by
considering the steady-state economies calibrated to represent key European
2
countries.2 Their exercise is regarded as the conventional Laffer curve cal-
culation where a curve for each tax instrument is constructed by letting its
rate vary from 0% to 100%, while holding all the remaining fiscal instruments
fixed. Similarly, Mendoza et al. (2014) have undertaken these calculations in
the context of dynamic open economies to account for transitional dynamics
and international spillovers. However, they also assume a one-off permanent
change in a single tax rate as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). As a result,
these calculations suggest that failing to account for transitional dynamics
does not materially affect the construction of the Laffer curve.3
Our paper seeks to reconcile these conventional Laffer curve calculations
with optimal policy results. In doing so, we produce an object we label the
‘optimal Laffer curve’, which plots a Laffer curve in welfare loss-sustainable
debt space. Differently from the existing literature, we let the fiscal pol-
icy underpinning the Laffer curve be determined through an optimal policy
problem. We employ the workhorse Neoclassical model allowing for variable
capacity utilization of capital as in Mendoza et al. (2014).4 In this envi-
ronment, we study the maximum amount of tax revenues a government can
raise for a given level of social welfare when policy is set optimally. In doing
so, we extend the existing literature in a number of ways.
First, our approach takes full account of the dynamic path towards the
eventual steady-state and allows tax rates to vary over time. We find that
exploiting these transitional dynamics can often account for much of the tax
revenue raising capability of the government under optimal policy. We show
that both the steady-state or dynamic analyses with constant tax rates which
2Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) also conduct a robustness check on the significance of al-
lowing for transitional dynamics. In the case of a labor income tax, transitional dynamics,
following a permanent shift in the tax rate, make little difference. While the case of capital
income tax is complicated by the fact the policy maker can exploit the initial holdings of
capital in a non-distortionary way.
3Bi (2012) adopts a different approach to computing the fiscal limit which is closer
in spirit to what we do. She considers a simple stochastic economy without capital and
can analytically compute the peak of the Laffer curve in every period conditional on
the realization of a technology shock. These conditional maximum revenues can then be
combined to generate a distribution of the fiscal limit. Our model is richer, containing both
capital and multiple fiscal instruments such that computing the Laffer curve is non-trivial.
4As shown in Mendoza et al. (2014) and Ferraro (2010), variable capacity utilization
overturns the ability of the policy maker to tax initial holdings of capital in a lump-sum
way. Effectively, the holders of capital choose to decrease their rate of utilization rather
than allow the policy maker to tax them. The policymaker is, therefore, less able to exploit
a predetermined tax base.
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underpin conventional Laffer curve calculations significantly understate the
potential fiscal limit as a result.
Second, we allow tax instruments to be varied simultaneously rather
than, as in the conventional Laffer curve calculations, sequentially varying
one instrument while holding all others fixed. The ability to vary multiple
tax rates over time allows the policy maker to generate significantly higher
revenues by committing to gradually eliminate capital income taxation in the
long run, while, at the same time, slowly switching to labor income taxation.
Third, our optimal Laffer curve, plotted in welfare loss-sustainable debt
space, combines the various tax distortions in a single welfare measure. We
can map existing measures of the Laffer curve into the same space as our
optimal Laffer curve and in doing so we can highlight how policy recommen-
dations change both in steady-state and transition. Our findings suggest
that these policy recommendations will be radically different.
Finally, we consider a number of extensions to our baseline model which
include risk premia on government debt and policy maker myopia. Those
extensions impact on the trade-offs which are so finely balanced in the bench-
mark optimal policy exercise.5 Specifically, risk premia on government debt
gives rise to incentives to stabilize debt quickly, while policy maker myopia
captures the opposite tendency to delay fiscal adjustment. We show that the
potential gains in terms of welfare and/or debt sustainability achieved when
implementing fiscal policy optimally are robust to such extensions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents
the main features of our model economy, while in Section 1.3 we describe
the Ramsey problem solved by the government. Section 1.4 discusses the
calibration strategy and introduces the optimal Laffer curve. In Section
1.5 we contrast our optimal Laffer curve with conventional analyses which
examine one-off permanent changes in a single tax instrument. Robustness
and extensions which include risk premia on debt and policy maker myopia
are considered in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
5Optimal policy in our baseline model will inherit one of the key features of tax smooth-
ing whereby the policies sustaining steady-state debt will ensure that the discounted long-
run benefits of reducing debt exactly match the short-run costs of doing so. This further
implies that where this balancing point is found will define the steady-state level of debt
which, in turn, depends on the initial debt level.
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1.2 The Model Economy
Our baseline model follows the closed economy of Mendoza et al. (2014).
The model economy features exogenous growth, at rate γ, which is driven
by labor-augmenting technological change. Accordingly, all variables (ex-
cept labor, leisure and the interest rate) are rendered stationary by dividing
them by the level of technology.6 This stationarity-inducing transforma-
tion of the model requires discounting the re-scaled utility flows at the rate
β˜ = β (1 + γ)1−σ where β is the standard subjective discount factor of time-
separable preferences, and adjusting the laws of motion of physical and fi-
nancial assets so that date t+ 1 stocks grow by the balanced-growth factor
1 + γ.
1.2.1 Households
The utility function of the representative household in our economy is
∞∑
t=0
β˜tU (ct, 1− lt) , (1.1)
where we assume the period utility function is a standard CRRA function in
terms of a CES composite good made of consumption, ct, and leisure, 1− lt
as follows:
U(ct, 1− lt) = [ct(1− lt)
a]1−σ
1− σ , σ > 1, and, a > 0.
The household’s budget constraint is given by,
(1+τ ct )ct+xt+(1+γ)qtdt+1 = (1−τ lt )wtlt+(1−τkt )rtmtkt+θτkt δkt+dt+et,
(1.2)
where τ ct , τ lt and τkt are proportional tax rates on consumption, ct, labor
income, wtlt, and capital income, rtmtkt, respectively. θτkt δ is a capital tax
depreciation allowance which is based on average rates of depreciation and
only applies to a fraction of the capital stock since θ < 1. Households also
receive a lump-sum transfer from the government, et, which is treated as
6We could have presented the model in its non-stationary form and then undertaken the
transformation of the equilibrium conditions at the end. This is equivalent to undertaking
the scaling by technology when setting up the model, as we do.
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being exogenous and sets to its steady-state value (et = e¯). Finally, the
household saves in the form of physical capital, kt+1, as well as government
bonds, dt+1, which are priced at qt.
Gross investment, xt, is defined as,
xt = (1 + γ)kt+1 − [1− δ(mt)] kt + φ(kt+1, kt,mt), (1.3)
where the depreciation rate depends on the rate of capital utilization mt as
follows,
δ(mt) =
χ0m
χ1
t
χ1
, χ0 > 0 and χ1 > 1, (1.4)
and capital adjustment costs are defined as,
φ(kt+1, kt,mt) =
η
2
{
(1 + γ)kt+1 − [1− δ(mt)] kt
kt
− z
}2
kt,
where η determines the speed of adjustment of the capital stock and z is the
long-run investment-capital ratio which removes adjustment costs from the
steady-state.
The household chooses the path of consumption, leisure, government
bonds, investment and the rate of capital utilization to maximize utility
(1.1) subject to the budget constraint (1.2) and the law of motion for capital
(1.3). Its optimization yields the following set of first order conditions.7 The
consumption Euler equation,
(1 + γ)qt = β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
, (1.5)
consumption-leisure margin,
− U
′
lt
(ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
=
1− τ lt
1 + τ ct
wt, (1.6)
gross investment,
7We use the notation f ′xt(.) to denote the partial derivative of function f(.) with respect
to argument xt.
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U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(1 + τ ct )
[
1 + γ + φ′kt+1(kt+1, kt,mt)
]
(1.7)
= β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
(1 + τ ct+1)
[
1− δ(mt+1)− φ′kt+1(kt+2, kt+1,mt+1)
+(1− τkt+1)rt+1mt+1 + θτkt+1δ
]
,
and, finally, capital utilization condition,
(1− τkt )rtkt = δ′mt(mt)kt + φ′mt(kt+1, kt,mt). (1.8)
1.2.2 Firms
Firms rent labor, lt, and capital services, st, from households at a given
wage, wt, and capital rental rate, rt, to maximize profits,
Πt = yt − wtlt − rtst,
subject to a production function which is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas
form,
yt = F (st, lt) = s
1−α
t l
α
t .
The firms’ maximization problem gives rise to standard first order con-
ditions
F ′st(st, lt) = rt, (1.9)
and
F ′lt(st, lt) = wt, (1.10)
while linear homogeneity implies yt = wtlt + stkt.
1.2.3 Public Sector
The government’s budget constraint is given by,
dt − (1 + γ)qtdt+1 = pbt, (1.11)
where the primary balance, pbt, is defined as,
pbt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtlt + τ
k
t (rtmt − θδ)kt − (gt + et),
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where government consumption, gt, is set to its steady-state value gt = g¯.
1.2.4 Market Clearing
Market clearing in the goods market requires:
F (st, lt) = ct + gt + (1 + γ)kt+1 − [1− δ(mt)] kt + φ(kt+1, kt,mt), (1.12)
while capital market clearing implies that
mtkt = st. (1.13)
1.2.5 The Competitive Equilibrium
The equilibrium of our model consists of a sequence of prices {wt, rt,
qt}∞t=0, government policy {τ ct , τ lt , τkt , dt+1}∞t=0 and allocations {ct, lt, st, xt,
mt, kt+1}∞t=0 such that:
• {ct, lt, xt,mt, kt+1, dt+1}∞t=0 solves the households’ problem given prices
and government policy;
• {st, lt}∞t=0 solves firms’ problem given prices;
• The government’s budget constraint (1.11) holds for all t ≥ 0;
• All markets clear as in (1.12) and (1.13).
The definition above implies that for any government policy {τ ct , τ lt , τkt ,
dt+1}∞t=0, satisfying the government budget constraint (1.11), we have a dif-
ferent competitive equilibrium. In section 1.3, we describe the optimal policy
problem that selects the policy corresponding to the government’s desired
equilibrium. However, before considering such a problem, we need to put
some structure on which instruments the government has access to.
The distortionary taxes in our model act on three margins. The first mar-
gin is the intratemporal consumption-leisure decision obtained by combining
the first order conditions (1.6) and (1.10),
− U
′
lt
(ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
=
1− τ lt
1 + τ ct
F ′lt(mtkt, lt). (1.14)
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The second margin is the intertemporal investment decision which is obtained
by combining equations (1.7) and (1.9),
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(1 + τ ct )
[
1 + γ + φ′kt+1(kt+1, kt,mt)
]
(1.15)
= β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
(1 + τ ct+1)
[
(1− τkt+1)F ′st+1(mt+1kt+1, lt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
−φ′kt+1(kt+2, kt+1,mt+1) + θτkt+1δ
]
.
Finally, combining equations (1.8) and (1.9) gives rise to the third margin,
namely, the capital utilization condition,
(1− τkt )F ′st(mtkt, lt)kt = δ′mt(mt)kt + φ′mt(kt+1, kt,mt). (1.16)
The labor tax, τ lt , can distort the first margin; the consumption tax, τ ct ,
distorts the first and second, while the capital tax, τkt , affects the latter two.
In the case of the intratemporal consumption-leisure and investment deci-
sion, if labor income is subsidized at the same constant rate as the policy
maker taxes consumption (i.e. −τ lt = τ ct = τ), it will eliminate these distor-
tions. Given that those taxes and subsidies are then applied to different tax
bases, this would enable the Ramsey policy maker to generate fiscal revenues
without suffering any distortions.8 It effectively gives them access to a lump-
sum tax and renders the policy problem trivial. Since in the real world a
lump-sum tax is typically not available, we rule out this possibility by fixing
τ ct at a calibrated value consistent with the data, τ ct = τ c.9 Therefore, the
capital and labor tax rates are the only fiscal instruments available to the
Ramsey policy maker. Furthermore, in order to make the analytical solution
of our Ramsey problem more tractable, we remove capital adjustment costs
and capital depreciation allowances by setting η = 0 and θ = 0 as in De-
bortoli and Nunes (2010). We will explore the implications of relaxing these
assumptions in the robustness exercises in Section 1.6.
8Under such a tax policy the policy could also optimally set the capital tax rate to
zero, τkt = 0.
9This is because, typically, τ c 6= τ .
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1.3 Ramsey Policy with Endogenous Capacity Uti-
lization
In this section, we characterize the solution of the Ramsey model with
endogenous capacity utilization. Under Ramsey policy, the policy maker
chooses the sequences of labor and capital taxes and the implied path for
debt, {τ lt , τkt , dt+1}∞t=0, so as to maximize life-time utility. This problem is
time inconsistent and we assume that government has access to a commit-
ment technology.
We seek to make three main points which underpin the construction of
our optimal Laffer curve in Section 1.4. First, the famous Chamley-Judd
result (see Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)) applies to our model. In the
short-run the capital tax rate is positive as the Ramsey planner exploits the
(quasi) lump-sum nature of the tax on the initial capital. However, in the
long-run the capital tax approaches zero as the Ramsey planner attempts to
raise revenues through the least distortative instrument which is the labor
income tax. Second, with endogenous capacity utilization the tax on the
initial stock of capital is bounded. In our model the presence of endogenous
capacity utilization makes the capital base elastic in the short-run, limiting
the extent to which the Ramsey planner can exploit this margin. This is
in contrast to Chamley-Judd where capacity utilization is fixed. Third, the
Ramsey policy features a unit root in steady-state debt. The steady-state
level of debt the economy eventually achieves depends upon the initial level
of debt the policy maker inherits.
To illustrate those three points, we follow Lucas and Stokey (1983) in
writing the Ramsey policy problem in the primal form that solves for allo-
cations only. Once allocations have been determined, prices and policy can
be recovered from the competitive economy’s equilibrium conditions.
1.3.1 The Primal Form
Our Ramsey problem in primal form consists of maximizing utility in
(1.1) subject to four constraints. The first is the resource constraint implied
by the market clearing conditions in the goods (1.12) and capital (1.13)
markets, respectively,
10
F (mtkt, lt)− ct − gt − (1 + γ)kt+1 + [1− δ(mt)] kt ≥ 0. (1.17)
The second constraint is the implementability constraint10
B −
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
[
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(
ct − e
1 + τ c
)
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
]
≥ 0, (1.18)
where B collects all period-0 terms such that
B ≡ {d0 +
[(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0)m0 + (1− δ (m0))
]
k0}
U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)
1 + τ c
.
The resource and the implementability constraints are standard in the
optimal policy literature, while the third constraint is due to the presence of
endogenous capacity utilization. It is obtained by combining the intertem-
poral investment decision (1.15) and capital utilization condition (1.16) after
leading the latter forward one period 11,
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
=
β˜
1 + γ
[
δ
′
mt+1(mt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
]
. (1.19)
However, by leading the capital utilization condition (1.16) one-period for-
ward, we omitted this condition at period-0 in the third constraint.
Therefore, we need to reintroduce the period-0 capital utilization condi-
tion,
(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0) = δ
′
m0 (m0) , (1.20)
as a fourth constraint.
It is convenient to group all terms in the primal policy problem involving
10The derivation of the implementability constraint is shown in Appendix B.1.
11As discussed above, we temporarily remove capital adjustment costs and capital depre-
ciation allowances to make the analytical solution of our Ramsey problem more tractable.
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the utility function together as,
V (ct, 1− lt, φ, λ1t ) = U (ct, 1− lt)
+φ
[
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(
ct − e
1 + τ c
)
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
]
+λ1t
[(
1 + γ
β˜
)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
]
,
where φ and λ1t are multipliers associated with the second constraint (1.18)
and the third constraint (1.19), respectively. This expression can then be
treated as the policy objective in a more compact representation of the La-
grangian describing the underlying policy problem, as follows,12
max
{ct,lt,mt,kt+1,τk0 }∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜t

V (ct, 1− lt, φ, λ1t )
−λ1t
[
δ
′
mt+1(mt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
]
+λ2t [F (mtkt, lt)− ct − g − (1 + γ)kt+1 + (1− δ(mt)) kt]
−φA,
where λ2t is the multiplier attached to the resource constraint (1.17) and
A ≡ B − ϕ
φ
[(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0)− δ′m0 (m0)
]
.
Here, the term A captures all the period-0 constraints including B in the
implementability constraint (1.18) and the period-0 capital utilization con-
dition (1.20), where ϕ is the multiplier attached to this condition.
The first order conditions for t ≥ 0 are:
{ct} : V ′ct(ct−1, 1− lt−1, φ, λ1t−1) + β˜V ′ct(ct, 1− lt, φ, λ1t ) = β˜λ2t , (1.21)
{lt} : V ′lt(ct−1, 1− lt−1, φ, λ1t−1) + β˜V ′lt(ct, 1− lt, φ, λ1t ) = −β˜λ2tF ′lt(mtkt, lt),
(1.22)
{mt} : λ1t−1δ
′′
mt(mt)mt = β˜λ
2
t
[
F ′mt(mtkt, lt)− δ′mt(mt)
]
kt, (1.23)
{kt+1} : β˜λ2t+1
[
F ′kt+1(mt+1kt+1, lt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
]
= λ2t (1 + γ),
(1.24)
{c0} : V ′c0(c0, 1− l0, φ, λ10) = λ20 + φA′c0 , (1.25)
12The details of the Lagrangian function are shown in Appendix B.2.
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{l0} : V ′l0(c0, 1− l0, φ, λ10) = −λ20F ′l0(m0k0, l0) + φA′l0 , (1.26)
{m0} : λ10δ
′′
m0(m0)m0 = λ
2
0
[
F
′
m0(m0k0, l0)− δ
′
m0(m0)
]
k0 + φA
′
m0 , (1.27){
τk0
}
: φ
U ′c (c0, 1− l0)
1 + τ c
F ′k0(m0k0, l0)m0k0 − ϕF ′k0(m0k0, l0) = 0. (1.28)
The above set of first order conditions (1.21)-(1.28) and the four constraints
characterize the solution of the Ramsey problem.
1.3.2 Long-run capital tax of zero
The famous long-run zero-capital tax applies to our model with endoge-
nous capacity utilization. To illustrate this point, we compare the steady-
state solution of the Ramsey first order condition for capital (1.24),
β˜
[
F ′k(mk, l)m+ 1− δ(m)
]
= 1 + γ, (1.29)
to the intertemporal investment decision (1.15) implied by the competitive
equilibrium13
β˜
[
(1− τk)F ′k(mk, l)m+ 1− δ(m)
]
= 1 + γ. (1.30)
Since the Ramsey allocation is a competitive equilibrium, equations (1.29)
and (1.30) imply that the Ramsey capital tax, τk, is zero in the long-run.
1.3.3 Taxation of initial capital
In our model with endogenous capacity utilization, the first order condi-
tion with respect to the period-0 capital tax, τk0 , in (1.28),
φ
U ′c (c0, 1− l0)
1 + τ c
F ′k0(m0k0, l0)m0k0 − ϕF ′k0(m0k0, l0) = 0,
offers an insight of why the initial capital tax is bounded. In particular,
the term, ϕF ′k0(m0k0, l0), appears in the above first order condition because
endogenous capital utilization introduces a distortionary component to the
13With η = θ = 0, the terms associated with capital adjustment costs,
φ′kt+1(kt+1, kt,mt) and φ
′
kt+1
(kt+2, kt+1,mt+1), and capital depreciation allowances, θτkt δ,
disappear in equation (1.15). Therefore, the steady-states of those terms also disappear
in equation (1.30).
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period-0 capital tax. The multiplier, ϕ, measures the costs of adjusting
capacity utilization, while φ represents the benefits associated with lower fu-
ture distortions implicit in the present value of the budget constraint. As the
government increases the capital tax, households will reduce capacity utiliza-
tion. Therefore, when setting initial capital taxation, the Ramsey planner
will need to balance the benefits associated with lower future distortions with
the counteracting short-run costs associated with reduced capacity utiliza-
tion.
This is in contrast to the corresponding condition in Chamley-Judd with
an exogenous fixed utilization rate,
φ
U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)
1 + τ c
F ′k0 (k0, l0) k0 > 0,
where the period-0 stock of capital, k0, is given and the capital tax rate is
effectively a lump sum tax. Therefore, under Chamley-Judd without en-
dogenous capital utilization, it is optimal to set the capital tax rate as high
as needed to drive φ to zero.
1.3.4 The unit root in steady-state debt
While the steady-state rate of capital tax has been shown to be zero,
the long-run value of the labor tax depends on the initial level of debt,
d0. This can be seen from the fact that the Lagrange multiplier of the
implementability constraint, φ, enters the first order condition with respect
to labor supply in (1.22) which pins down the labor tax rate. Since the
value of this Lagrange multiplier captures the burden of initial debt, this
links the Ramsey initial conditions to the steady-state rate of labor taxation.
Therefore, a higher initial level of debt will result in a higher long-run labor
tax to support a higher long-run debt level, ceteris paribus. Intuitively, our
model features a form of tax smoothing which seeks to balance tax distortions
over time, while at the same time satisfying the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint. In steady-state this means that the costs of transitory
tax distortions which could reduce debt are exactly offset by the discounted
value of the gains of that lower debt, such that the policy maker prefers to
maintain debt at that higher level rather than act to return debt to a unique
steady-state value.
Moreover, from the logic of the original Laffer curve, there are two steady-
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states associated with any initial debt level: one with a high and the other
with a low value of the labor tax. Therefore, for a given initial level of
government debt, there will be two potential steady-states which satisfy the
Ramsey first order conditions. We can trace out the set of sustainable debt
levels by varying the initial level of debt and assessing the two possible policy
paths which both sustain that debt. Computing the welfare costs of each
policy path then gives us two points on either side of our optimal Laffer
curve which we will show in Section 1.4.
1.4 Optimal Laffer Curve
1.4.1 Calibration
Before constructing our optimal Laffer curve, we need to calibrate our
baseline model presented in Section 1.2. Our model is calibrated at a quar-
terly frequency on the 15 largest countries in the Eurozone14. In general, our
parametrization tracks closely Mendoza et al. (2014) and D’Erasmo et al.
(2015), not only because we employ the same model for analyzing the fiscal
position of the same group of countries, but also to keep our results directly
comparable with theirs. Our calibration is reported in table 1.1.
Beginning with technology parameters, the labor share of production is
set to 0.61, a value in line with Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Mendoza et al.
(2014). The quarterly rate of labor augmenting technological change, γ, is
set to 0.0022. This reflects a 0.9% annual average growth rate in real GDP
per capita observed in Eurozone between 2000 and 2011. The depreciation
function in (1.4) requires setting two parameters, χ0 and χ1. First, to cali-
brate χ0, we use the steady-state of the capital utilization constraint (1.19)
which implies that χ0mχ1 =
(
1 + γ − β˜
)
/β˜ + δ(m), and we normalize the
long-run capacity utilization rate to m = 1. In order to match the long-run
depreciation rate δ(m) = 0.0164, a value in line with Mendoza et al. (2014)
and D’Erasmo et al. (2015), χ0 is set to 0.0266. Second, given the values of
m, δ(m) and χ0, χ1 = 1.628 which is derived from the depreciation function
(1.4) in steady-state.
14Specifically, those countries include Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland.
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For preference parameters, σ is set to 2 to deliver the commonly used
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5. The leisure utility parameter,
a, is set to 2.675. This returns the average of 18.2 hours per week for a
person aged between 15 to 64 in France, Germany and Italy, reported in
Prescott (2004). The households’ discount factor, β, is set to 0.9942 such
that β˜ = β (1 + γ)1−σ = 0.992. This implies an annual real interest rate of
4.14% as the quarterly gross rate is R ≡ β (1 + γ)σ = 1.0102.
Fiscal variables include tax rates, government expenditures, transfers and
debt. Although in our analysis labor and capital tax rates are solutions of the
optimal policy problem, the initial equilibrium of our model is parametrized
on the basis of the fiscal regime prior to 2008. In particular, tax rates are
set to be consistent with Mendoza et al. (2014), where τ c = 0.16, τ l = 0.35
and τk = 0.20. Government expenditures is set to be 21% of GDP in line
with the OECD definition ‘general government consumption expenditure
as a percentage of GDP’. In addition, public debt to GDP ratio,d/4y, is
calibrated to 66% to reflect the debt level in those countries at 2008. Finally,
government transfers are determined as the residual of government’s budget
constraint in (1.11) such that15
e
y
=
Rev
y
− g
y
− d
y
(
1− β˜
)
= 0.152,
where Rev ≡ τ cc+ τ lwl+ τk(rm− θδ)k. In our baseline model we set both
depreciation allowances, θ, and capital adjustment costs, η, to zero. When
performing robustness we calibrate θ = 0.22 and η = 2 as in Mendoza et al.
(2014).
15Note that the consumption Euler equation in steady state implies that β˜ = (1 + γ)q.
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Parameter Description Value Calibration strategy
Technology
α labor income share 0.61 Mendoza et al. (2014)
γ growth rate 0.0022 GDP p.c. growth EU-15
m capacity utilization 1 steady-state normalization
δ(m) depreciation rate 0.0164 Mendoza et al. (2014)
χ0 δ (m) coefficient 0.0266 set to yield δ(m) = 0.0164
χ1 δ (m) exponent 1.628 set to yield m = 1
Preferences
β˜ discount factor 0.992 Mendoza et al. (2014)
σ risk aversion 2.000 standard RBC value
a labor supply elasticity 2.675 Mendoza et al. (2014)
Fiscal Policy
τ c consumption tax 0.16 Mendoza et al. (2014)
τ l labor tax 0.35 Mendoza et al. (2014)
τk capital tax 0.20 Mendoza et al. (2014)
d
y govt debt to GDP 0.66 Mendoza et al. (2014)
g
y govt consumption to GDP 0.21 OECD
e
y govt transfer to GDP 0.152 govt budget in SS
Table 1.1: Calibration
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1.4.2 Constructing the Optimal Laffer Curve
To construct the optimal Laffer curve we employ the Ramsey policy dis-
cussed in Section 1.3. Compared to the conventional Laffer curve calculations
in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Mendoza et al. (2014), the optimal fiscal
policy underneath our Laffer curve allows for variation of multiple tax in-
struments over time. Specifically, tax plans are constructed accounting for
discounting, expectations and the dynamics of production factor elasticities.
We construct our optimal Laffer curve by iteratively solving the Ramsey
problem conditional on different amounts of initial government debt. We
then recover welfare costs associated with the optimal policy that sustains
these debt levels.16 These welfare costs capture the combined distortions
implied by the fiscal mix optimally implemented by the Ramsey planner.
We then plot each level of government debt (over GDP) against the implied
welfare loss measured in consumption equivalent units.17 This gives rise to
our optimal Laffer curve in Figure 1.1. Such a curve represents welfare costs
of sustaining any amount of government debt when fiscal policy is carried
out optimally. It shows the key elements of a policy maker’s problem: how
much debt can be sustained and at what social cost?
The optimal Laffer curve inherits the bell shape of the conventional Laf-
fer Curve: each amount of debt can be repaid in two ways, one of which
is inefficient. This shape results from the properties of the optimal policy
problem featuring exogenous government spending and endogenous distor-
tionary taxation and debt. This problem is known to be non-ergodic as its
steady-state depends on the initial level of government debt (and capital).
However, such a steady state is not unique. In particular, there are two dif-
ferent steady-states satisfying the Ramsey first order conditions. One gives
the positive sloping side of our optimal Laffer curve, while the other one
features an inefficiently high level of tax distortions and welfare loss which
is on the downward sloping side of the curve.
Finally, from Figure 1.1 some interesting insights can be appreciated.
In particular, under zero welfare cost, our optimal Laffer curve implies a
16The initial government debt corresponds to the present value of tax revenues minus
exogenous public spending. Since government spending is exogenous and fixed, the terms,
such as the initial government debt, the sustainable government debt or discounted stream
of tax revenues, are all equivalent. We can therefore use these terms interchangeably.
17See Appendix D.4 for the computation of consumption equivalent units of welfare.
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sustainable debt to GDP ratio of 96% as opposed to 66% supported by the
initial calibrated tax policies in Table 1.1. That means implementing an
optimal tax policy can generate an additional 33% of GDP in discounted
tax revenues at no welfare cost. In addition, moving along the optimal
Laffer curve gives us a sense of the trade-offs facing a policy maker. The
highest sustainable debt to GDP ratio is about 224%, with the associated
tax distortions being equivalent to a welfare loss of 16.7% of steady-state
consumption.
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Figure 1.1: Optimal Laffer Curve
1.5 Optimal Laffer Curve versus Conventional Laf-
fer Curve
We now turn to explore how our optimal Laffer curve compares to the
conventional Laffer curves constructed following the methodologies of Tra-
bandt and Uhlig (2011) and Mendoza et al. (2014). We aim to assess to
what extent these latter calculations leave potential revenue or welfare gains
unexploited by failing to conduct policy optimally. As Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011) focus on a steady-state economy, whereas Mendoza et al. (2014) on
a dynamic one, we consider these cases separately. Although in the con-
ventional Laffer curve calculation, a dynamic analysis does not seem to be
radically different from a steady-state one, we show that transitional dy-
19
namics can be hugely important when policy is conducted optimally. This is
due to the fact that while the economy may be dynamic, the fiscal policies
considered in conventional analyses are both static and rely on only varying
one fiscal instrument at a time. Relaxing these assumptions can generate
significant tax revenues and/or welfare gains.
1.5.1 Steady-State Laffer Curves
In this subsection, we first compare our optimal Laffer curve with the
steady-state Laffer curve calculation carried out by Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011), ‘Trabandt-Uhlig’ henceforth. Trabandt-Uhlig’s calculation is pro-
duced by considering the economy at its steady-state and constructing two
curves: the capital and the labor Laffer curve. Those curves are obtained by
fixing all tax rates but one and observing how fiscal revenues change as the
latter is varied from 0 to 100%. For most of their analysis transitional dy-
namics are disregarded, that is, following a policy change with respect to the
initial equilibrium of the decentralized economy, all endogenous variables are
analyzed after reaching their new long-run levels. We compare their Laffer
curves calculations and fiscal policy experiment with a steady-state version
of our optimal Laffer curve. We aim to show that there are significant dif-
ferences between conventional Laffer curve calculation and the steady-state
of our dynamic policy problem. Specifically, the latter does not generate
as much tax revenues as the former in the long-run. The reasons why the
Ramsey policy maker chooses to forgo revenues in the long-run underpins
the gains from adjusting policy during the transition, which the steady-state
approach ignores. We begin to explore these trade-offs in this subsection,
and more fully in subsection 1.5.2. It is worth stressing here that what we
will refer to in the following as ’Trabandt-Uhlig-like’ Laffer Curve, is a Laf-
fer curve constructed following Trabandt-Uhlig’s approach. However, as we
operate in the context of a slightly different model18 and calibration, such
a curve will not be immediately comparable with one presented in their pa-
per. This will not impact our analysis which aims at comparing different
approaches in the construction of the Laffer curves.
We proceed as follows. We use our decentralized economy in its steady-
18For example, our model allows for variable capacity utilization whereas Trabandt-
Uhlig’s does not.
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state to produce Trabandt-Uhlig-like labor and capital Laffer curves. A labor
Laffer curve is constructed by varying the labor tax rate and fixing consump-
tion and capital tax rates at their calibrated values, while a capital Laffer
curve is obtained by varying the capital tax rate while holding constant the
other two tax rates at their calibrated values. We then compare these curves
with a steady-state version of our optimal Laffer curve. The latter is con-
structed from the steady-state of our Ramsey model, iteratively solved by
varying the initial level of debt and recovering the welfare cost implied by
the associated steady-state. We plot all three curves in the welfare loss-
sustainable debt space in Figure 1.2, where welfare costs are measured as
losses of constant consumption equivalent units with respect to the decen-
tralized economy and the sustainable debt as a percentage of GDP.19
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Figure 1.2: Comparing steady-state Laffer curves
The tallest and the lowest Laffer curves in Figure 1.2 are Trabandt-
Uhlig-like labor and capital Laffer curves, respectively, while the intermediate
curve represents the steady-state version of our optimal Laffer curve. The
poor performance of the capital Laffer curve reflects the well known fact
that the capital tax is the most distortive tax: a policy based on increasing
19Since the level of GDP varies across policies, for comparability we refer to its level in
the calibrated decentralized economy.
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capital taxation is therefore condemned to be relatively ineffective. For this
reason, we focus on Trabandt-Uhlig-like labor Laffer curve for most of our
comparisons. Figure 1.3 presents the fiscal policies underneath Trabandt-
Uhlig-like labor Laffer curve and the steady-state version of our optimal
Laffer curve. As discussed in Section 1.3, optimal policy in steady-state
prescribes a capital tax of zero, with labor income bearing all the burden
of taxation. In contrast, Trabandt-Uhlig-like policy implies a distortionary
capital income tax of τk = 0.2, which means that a given welfare loss is
associated with a lower labor income tax as shown in the right panel of
Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Comparing implied fiscal policies
The most striking implication of Figure 1.2 is that much of the Trabandt-
Uhlig-like labor Laffer curve lies above the steady-state of our optimal Laffer
curve. In other words, the optimizing policy maker is, in steady-state, sus-
taining a lower level of debt at a higher welfare cost. We now turn to explore
why this is. The first point to make is that the optimal Laffer curve seeks
to maximize welfare given the need to sustain a given level of debt in a dy-
namic economy. Therefore, the policy maker may not commit to achieving
a steady-state that generates as much revenues as Trabandt-Uhlig in order
to raise additional revenues during the transition at a lower welfare cost. To
develop this intuition, we carry out the following analysis. Starting from
22
the peak of the Trabandt-Uhlig-like Laffer curve, we move toward the opti-
mal steady-state associated with such a point, as shown in Figure 1.4. In
other words, we adopt a set of initial conditions implied by the peak of the
Trabandt-Uhlig-like labor Laffer curve, and use our Ramsey problem to solve
for the transitional dynamics toward the optimal steady-state these initial
conditions imply. We find that such a steady-state is far from being appeal-
ing on the basis of static considerations. In particular, the optimal long-run
equilibrium is associated with a large loss of tax revenues. The sustainable
debt over GDP drops from 114% to 94% with only limited long-run welfare
gains. Nevertheless, when transitional dynamics are accounted for, moving
toward this optimal long-run steady-state is the right thing to do. As re-
ported in Table 1.2, the overall tax revenues raised are such that sustainable
debt is same as the peak of Trabandt-Uhlig-like Laffer curve, but welfare
gains are dramatic, amounting to around 9.43% in consumption equivalent
units.
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Figure 1.4: Transiting from Trabandt-Uhlig to Ramsey steady state
The above analysis can be applied to any point of Trabandt-Uhlig-like
curve lying above the steady-state of our optimal Laffer curve. This implies
that Trabandt-Uhlig-like long-run policies are superior in terms of tax rev-
enue raised per unit of welfare loss but only when the policy maker’s ability
to exploit transitional dynamics are disregarded. Trabandt-Uhlig-like poli-
cies are dominated by those implied by the Ramsey model, when we include
23
Capital tax Labour tax Debt/GDP
(1) Trabandt-Uhlig-like peak 20% 49% 114%
(2) Ramsey Laffer correspondent 0% 54% 94%
Transition from (1) to (2) 4% 51% 114%
By transiting from (1) to (2) we sustain same debt but gain 9.43% CE
Table 1.2: Transition from Trabandt-Uhlig-like to optimal steady-state
the revenues generated during the transition to the steady-state. The main
implication of this result is that, if a policy maker was to announce a long-
run policy on the basis of steady-state calculations, she will most likely end
up choosing a highly inefficient one. It follows that focusing on steady-state
calculations alone is likely to be highly misleading. The evaluation of policy
changes radically when the transition is taken into account and the policy
maker is able to exploit that transition.
To appreciate this better, Figure 1.5 contrasts our optimal Laffer curve
where transitional dynamics are accounted for as previously shown in Fig-
ure 1.1 with its steady-state version. We link three points on our optimal
Laffer curve (one from the left side, the peak and one from the right side,
respectively) to their associated steady-states which correspond to specific
points on the steady-state curve.20 It can be appreciated that the points on
the efficient side of the optimal Laffer curve (e.g., the curve’s peak) can im-
ply long-run equilibria falling on the slippery side of the steady-state curve.
Therefore, selecting a policy on the basis of steady-state analysis alone, a
government would end up disregarding a number of policy options which are
in fact optimal. How costly this could be can be seen by the distance be-
tween the optimal Laffer curve and its steady-state counterpart. The policy
maker can more than double the discounted value of tax revenues generated
when they actively exploit transitional dynamics.
20Recall that the steady state of our optimal policy model is dependent on the initial
conditions. Each point in our optimal Laffer curve will have its own steady-state.
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1.5.2 Laffer Curve Comparison in Dynamic Economy
The main message of the previous section was that Laffer curve analy-
ses should account for the potential gains from exploiting the transition to
steady-state. We found that the Ramsey policy maker would not commit
to the kind of static tax revenue maximizing policy implied by steady-state
calculations when economic transition is accounted for. Instead they would
commit to a policy mix with a less optimal steady-state since this maximizes
discounted revenues generated in transition. In this subsection, we explore
these transitional dynamics and the properties of the optimal tax mix. In
particular, we address two issues. The first one is quantitative: how much
additional fiscal revenues can be raised when the government is pursuing an
optimal dynamic policy rather than adopting constant tax rates as assumed
in conventional Laffer curve calculations? The second issue concerns pol-
icy design: how should an optimal fiscal policy be carried out during the
economic transition?
To answer the first question, we need to account for the impact of tran-
sitional dynamics in conventional Laffer curve calculations and contrast this
with the one implied by our optimal Laffer curve. Our benchmark will be the
papers by D’Erasmo et al. (2015) and Mendoza et al. (2014), MTZ hence-
forth. MTZ construct capital and labor Laffer curves in dynamic economies
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which can be regarded as the dynamic counterpart of Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011). Although the dynamic model enables them to account for transi-
tional dynamics, the underlying fiscal policy assumes constant tax rates as
in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Again, it is worth stressing that what we will
refer to in the following as ’MTZ-like’ Laffer Curve, is a Laffer curve con-
structed following MTZ’s approach. However, as we operate in the context
of the same model but of a slightly different calibration21, such a curve will
not be immediately comparable with one presented in their paper.
We plot these curves with our optimal Laffer curve in Figure 1.6. The
capital Laffer curve, again, does not facilitate the efficient generation of tax
revenues. Therefore, we focus on the comparison between our optimal Laffer
curve and MTZ-like labor Laffer curve. The differences in these two curves
are striking. MTZ-like labor Laffer peaks in correspondence of a welfare
loss of 11.55%; at that point the difference between MTZ-like curve and the
optimal Laffer curve in terms of sustainable debt is 82%. This means that
the optimal policy could greatly enhance the amount of tax revenues raised
at no additional welfare cost. In addition, differences in debt sustainability
appear to be of broadly similar magnitude everywhere along the Laffer curve
measuring about 63% of GDP. By inverting this argument, it can be noted
that in sustaining the same level of debt optimal policy typically offers welfare
gains of about 4% in constant consumption equivalent units. Therefore, we
conclude that an optimal policy has strong quantitative implications for debt
sustainability, tax revenues and welfare gains.
To illustrate the second issue as to how the optimal fiscal policy under-
lying our optimal Laffer curve is carried out during transition, we plot the
transitional dynamics associated with a particular welfare loss of 1.53% un-
der both the optimal policy and MTZ’s constant tax rates in Figure 1.7.
We note that with the constant tax rate policy adopted by MTZ there is
very limited variation in the endogenous variables during the transition. In
contrast, under the Ramsey policy, capital tax rates are front-loaded and
coupled with a complementary cut in the labor tax rate. The capital tax
rate then declines until converging to zero in the steady-state, while the labor
income tax rate rises consistently until achieving a relatively high long-run
21I.e., in our baseline model we switched off the capital adjustment costs and the de-
preciation allowance
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value. Given the commitment to abolish capital tax in the long-run and the
relatively low labor taxes during the initial stages of transition, capital keeps
accumulating despite it being taxed at a positive rate. This underpins the
core intuition behind our optimal steady-state: the low tax revenues and the
zero capital tax chosen by the Ramsey planner in the long run imply large
gains during the transitional dynamics. This can be further appreciated in
Figure 1.8 where the highest revenues are raised when both capital and labor
taxes are at ‘intermediate rates’ and the quantity of capital has reached its
maximum. Therefore, we conclude that the striking gains in revenue gen-
eration arise from a combination of the gradual erosion of capital income
taxation, while at the same time increasing labor income taxation. In other
words, the gains are in part due to using one tax instrument to complement
another, as well as allowing tax rates to vary over time. In the following
analysis, we further explore to what extent the tax revenue generated by
the Ramsey policy is due to complementarity of alternative tax instruments.
To do so, we only allow the Ramsey policy maker to implement one tax
instrument.
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Figure 1.8: Optimal fiscal mix (CE=1.53%)
We construct optimal Laffer curves for both labor and capital taxes, re-
spectively, in each case holding other tax rates fixed at their calibrated levels.
In Figure 1.9, we compare the labor and capital optimal Laffer curves with
the corresponding steady-state Trabandt-Uhlig-like and dynamic MTZ-like
28
Laffer curves. The left panel of Figure 1.9 features the labor Laffer curves.
Here we see that the transitional dynamics contained within the MTZ calcu-
lation are negligible as the Trabandt-Uhlig-like and MTZ-like labor income
Laffer curves are largely indistinguishable. In contrast, our optimal labor
Laffer curve lies significantly above these solely as a result of the commit-
ment to decrease and then gradually increase labor income tax. In contrast,
when comparing capital tax Laffer curves plotted in the right panel, it is the
MTZ-like and our optimal Laffer curves which are indistinguishable. This
is partly because without the labor tax instrument being freely available to
complement capital tax policy, capital taxes must sustain steady-state debt
and cannot achieve the preferred policy of committing to reduce the capital
tax rate to zero in the long-run. This brings the two forms of capital Laffer
curve closer together. When comparing the labor and capital optimal Laf-
fer curves with the optimal Laffer curve with both instruments as plotted
in Figure 1.6 at their peak, it can be seen that two-thirds of the gains in
terms of increased revenues are from gradually increasing labor tax during
the transition. The other one-third comes from simultaneously eliminating
capital income tax in the long-run. This finding sharply differs from the
calculations of Chari et al. (1994) who find that, in a model with exoge-
nous capacity utilization, most of the welfare gains of switching from the
calibrated US fiscal policy to the Ramsey policy arise from the first period
capital tax whereas labor tax plays a nearly irrelevant role. In our model
with endogenous capacity utilization, the ability to exploit the capital tax of
the predetermined capital stock is sharply reduced.
1.6 Robustness and Extensions
In describing the basic properties of the Ramsey policy and optimal Laf-
fer curve, we removed frictions such as capital adjustment costs and capital
depreciation allowances. We now consider whether reintroducing such fac-
tors significantly affects the results. Following that we consider a range of
extensions to the basic model. These include introducing a risk premium on
sovereign debt and assuming the policy maker is myopic.
29
−20 0 20 400
50
100
150
200
250
300
CE welfare loss (%)
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
le
D
eb
t/
G
D
P
(%
)
Comparing Labor-Laffer Curves
 
 
Uhlig−Trabandt−like Laffer curve
MTZ−like Laffer curve
Optimal Labour Laffer curve
−10 0 10 20 300
50
100
150
200
250
CE welfare loss (%)
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
le
D
eb
t/
G
D
P
(%
)
Comparing Capital-Laffer Curves
 
 
Uhlig−Trabandt−like Laffer curve
MTZ−like Laffer curve
Optimal Capital Laffer curve
Figure 1.9: Comparing Trabandt-Uhlig and MTZ Laffer curves
1.6.1 On the Role of Adjustment Costs and Depreciation
Allowances
In this subsection, we consider the implication of reinstating capital ad-
justment costs and depreciation allowances. These features of the benchmark
model were temporarily removed for analytical convenience. Capital adjust-
ment costs imply that the capital tax base is less elastic than it otherwise
would be. This means that higher tax revenues can be generated across the
MTZ-like and optimal Laffer curves which account for transitional dynamics.
On the other hand, depreciation allowance reduces the capital income tax
base and tax revenues.
Figure 1.10 plots the MTZ-like and optimal Laffer curves for our bench-
mark model with and without adjustment costs or depreciation allowances.
It is clear from the figure that the relative movements in the Laffer curves
across the three types of curve are similar, such that the presence of capital
adjustment costs or depreciation allowances do not affect our main results.
It remains the case that the gains from conducting fiscal policy optimally
dramatically increases the revenues that can be generated at a given welfare
cost.
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Figure 1.10: Comparing Laffer curves with and without adjust. costs
1.6.2 Risk Premia and Policy Maker Myopia
In previous sections, we have shown how the Ramsey policy can gen-
erate a significant degree of additional revenue relative to conventional ap-
proaches for assessing fiscal sustainability. We find that the gains are driven
by a combination of being able to vary the labor tax over time alongside
a commitment to eliminate capital taxation in the long-run. Implicitly, the
prolonged transition to this time-inconsistent steady-state is entirely credible
and the benevolent policy maker does not suffer any increased debt service
costs when debt levels are high.
In this section, we explore the implications of relaxing these assumptions.
We do so in two ways. First, we introduce bond holding costs as a tractable
way of allowing debt service costs to rise with the level of debt. This over-
turns the unit root in steady-state debt ensuring that the economy returns
to a unique steady-state with an associated debt to GDP ratio. However,
it will remain the case that in the long-run the policy maker commits to
eliminate capital taxation. Secondly, we shall relax the assumption that the
policy maker is fully benevolent and introduce a myopia to policy making
which means they wish to delay distortionary tax increases. On its own
this extension would overcome the finely balanced trade-off implied by tax
smoothing and governments would be tempted to allow debt levels to rise
indefinitely. When it is combined with bond holding costs there will be a
unique steady-state and a non-zero long-run capital tax.
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Risk premium
Following Heaton and Lucas (1996), we assume that there are Ψt = ψ2(
dt+1 − d¯
)2 insurance costs to be paid to a financial intermediary for the
household to insure the unit gross return on government bond against repay-
ment risk. This device introduces, in a reduced form way, a risk premium
on government debt which is increasing in its level. Specifically, it produces
a wedge between the interest rate the government pays and the return ef-
fectively realized by the household. This feature alters the bond-pricing
condition such that:
(1 + γ)qt + ψ
(
dt+1 − d¯
)
= β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
. (1.31)
We assume that the profits of these financial intermediaries are redistributed
to the household in a lump-sum way.
A crucial consequence of this quadratic cost is to remove the unit root in
government debt and therefore break the dependence of the model steady-
state on initial conditions. In particular, in this version of the model, steady-
state debt will be d = d¯/2.22 At the same time, the main features of the Ram-
sey policy (i.e. zero long-run capital income tax and bounded initial capital
taxation) are preserved.23 We calibrate d¯ so that the long-run government
debt over GDP is brought back to its pre-crisis level, i.e. d/4y× 100 = 66%.
We consider this a useful reference as it implies that policy makers will seek
to fully overturn increases in debt observed since 2008 and is roughly in line
with the Maastricht criteria Euro-zone countries are required to meet. In
addition, the parameter ψ in the function of insurance costs is related to the
elasticity of interest rate to a 1% increase in debt over GDP with respect
to its long-run level.24 A recent empirical study by Laubach (2009) places
this elasticity between 3 and 4 basis points while arguing that a standard
22Debt stationarity is shown in Appendix C.4.
23Properties of the Ramsey policy for the extended model are derived in Appendix C.
24The elasticity of interest rate to a 1% increase in debt over GDP with respect to its
long-run level is defined as ηr,d/4y = ∂r/∂ d4y = 4y∂r/∂d, where r ≈ log (R) denotes the
net interest rate. To see how ψ is related to ηr,d/4y, we first note that equation (1.31) in
steady-state implies the following relation that (1 + γ)/R = β˜ − ψ (d− d¯) . Second, we
solve for R and take logs in both side of equation (1.31) in steady-state. When ψ is small,
we obtain the following approximation that ∂r/∂d = ψ/
[
β − ψ (d− d)] ≈ ψ. Substituting
this approximation into the definition of ηr,d/4y, gives ηr,d/4y ≈ 4yψ.
32
RBC model tends to produce endogenously an elasticity of 2 basis points
approximately. In the subsequent analysis, we then conservatively adopt a
central value of 2 which corresponds to ψ = 0.0057.25 Under this setting we
produce an optimal Laffer curve, tracing out the relation between sustainable
debt over GDP and welfare loss when risk premia are accounted for and the
optimal fiscal policy is constrained to achieve a long-run equilibrium where
the level of government debt is brought back to its pre-crisis level. Figure
1.11 plots both the MTZ-like labor Laffer curve and our optimal Laffer curve
with bond holding costs. We can see this maintains the relative position of
the two Laffer curves, and the substantial revenue gains of conducting fiscal
policy optimally remains.
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Figure 1.11: Comparing Laffer Curves with Risk-premium
Government myopia
We further augment the risk-premium model considered above to allow
for an impatient policy maker featuring higher time-discounting than the
private sector. This assumption will leave our model unchanged, but in
25We have also considered the cases where risk-premium elasticity is 1 or 3 basis points,
and set ψ correspondingly to be 0.0028 and 0.0085. These additional results are available
upon request.
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the Ramsey problem the government will discount utility at µβ instead of
β, with µ < 1 representing the gap between household and government
discount factors. We can think of this as capturing the shorter horizon
governments typically face relative to the private sector. More specifically, we
can interpret µ as the probability of a government being in charge in the next
period, and therefore 1/(1−µ) is the government’s expected duration. In this
framework, two important characteristics of the Ramsey steady-state, the
level of debt and the capital tax rate, will depend on µ, such that, both the
capital tax rate and the level of debt in steady state will be increasing in the
gap between government and private discounting, and therefore decreasing
in µ. The myopia on the part of the government would tend to support
policies which lead to an unsustainable path for debt.26 However, in the
presence of bond holding costs, this would lead to increasing debt service
costs. Eventually, these rising costs more than offset the myopia of the
government and the policy acts to stabilize debt. This will be at a level
above d = d¯/2 and will also result in a positive rate of capital tax in the
long-run.27
We set µ to 0.979 such that the Ramsey steady-state will feature a capital
income tax rate matching the decentralized economy, i.e. τk = 0.20. The
calibrated value of µ = 0.979 implies an expected government duration of
12 years. This is quite an extreme assumption of the degree of myopia
experienced by the government given that many of the policies governments
pursue have significantly longer periods of gestation before their full benefits
are realized. In addition, we keep d at the value set above. The long-run
level of debt will rise to about 98.50% of GDP. We construct the optimal
Laffer curve for this model and compare it with the optimal Laffer curve with
the risk-premium only in Figure 1.12. The optimal Laffer curve produced by
the model with the additional assumption of government myopia always lies
beneath the one for the risk-premium alone, meaning that for the same level
of government debt to be sustained, the model with myopia implies larger
welfare costs. However, the marginal increase in costs due to adding myopia
is relatively small at high levels of debt but larger at low levels of debt.
26In essence, the myopia captures the various sources of deficit bias discussed in Alesina
and Passalacqua (2016).
27The results of non-zero long-run capital tax rate and the level of steady-state debt are
shown in Appendix C.3 and C.4, respectively.
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To see why this is the case, Figure 1.13 plots the transitional dynamics
for a number of endogenous variables at different initial debt to GDP ratios
(e.g. 0%, 58% 122%). When the initial debt level is high (e.g. 122%),
in the medium term, policy can still promise to reduce capital taxation to
very low levels, thereby at least initially mimicking the promises inherent
in the benchmark optimal Laffer curve over a more compressed time scale.
In contrast, when initial debt levels are relatively low (e.g. 0% and 58%),
we cannot obtain the combination of falling capital income tax rates and
rising labor income tax rates, which was crucial in generating revenues by
encouraging capital accumulation during the transition.
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Figure 1.13: Myopic policies for different levels of initial debt
1.7 Conclusions
In the conventional Laffer curve calculations, discounted tax revenues are
computed on the basis of varying individual tax instruments between 0% and
100%, while holding all other fiscal instruments constant. These studies are
either carried out in a steady-state economy or a dynamic one but assume a
one-off permanent change in a single tax rate.
Our paper is different from the conventional Laffer curve calculations. We
plot the Laffer curve in welfare loss-sustainable debt space where the welfare
loss captures the costs of the combined distortions implied by varying all
tax rates optimally. As a result, each point on our Laffer curve reflects a
full Ramsey problem, where the policy maker is optimally varying capital
and labor income tax rates to maximize welfare given the need to satisfy
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint conditional on the initial
level of debt. We find that, by committing to gradually eliminate capital tax
and at the same time raising labor income tax, the optimal policy generates
significant revenues during the economic transition. At the peak of the MTZ-
like Laffer curve, the level of sustainable debt implied by the optimal policy
(for the same welfare loss) is about 82% of GDP higher. However, this also
assumed that the fiscal authority is fully credible and benevolent, and it does
not suffer any increased debt service costs when debt levels are high.
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Therefore, in a subsequent robustness analysis, we enrich the model by
allowing debt service costs to rise with debt levels. This reduces the sustain-
able debt levels achievable by both the conventional and our optimal Laffer
curves, but does not overturn the conclusion that there remain significant
gains either in terms of revenues raised or welfare costs from conducting fis-
cal policy optimally. In addition, we further allow for a significant degree of
policy maker myopia. Although the model with myopia implies larger wel-
fare costs than the one with debt service costs only, the marginal increase
in costs due to adding myopia is relatively small, especially at high levels of
debt.
To sum up, our analysis suggests that conventional approaches to com-
puting Laffer curves can significantly underestimate the amount of tax rev-
enues that can be potentially generated or, equivalently, overstate the welfare
costs of achieving a given level of fiscal revenues. In the future research, we
will explore the degree to which time-inconsistency problem affects the rev-
enue generating powers of a policy maker.
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Appendix
A.1 The Decentralized Economy
The equilibrium conditions of the decentralized economy are summa-
rized below. We remove capital adjustment costs and capital depreciation
allowances (i.e. η = 0 and θ = 0) and fix the consumption tax rate, τ ct , at
a calibrated value consistent with the data, τ ct = τ c. This is to facilitate the
derivation of the primal form of our Ramsey problem.
(1 + γ)qt = β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
, (A1)
− U
′
lt
(ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
=
1− τ lt
1 + τ c
wt, (A2)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt) =
β˜
1 + γ
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
[
1− δ(mt+1)
+(1− τkt+1)rt+1mt+1
]
,
(A3)
(1− τkt )rt = δ′mt(mt), (A4)
F ′st(st, lt) = rt, (A5)
F ′lt(st, lt) = wt, (A6)
F (st, lt) = ct + gt + (1 + γ)kt+1 − [1− δ(mt)] kt (A7)
mtkt = st, (A8)
gt = g, (A9)
et = e. (A10)
B.2 The Primal Form of the Baseline Model
In this section, we present the primal form for the baseline model. Before
showing how the Lagrangian function of the primal form is constructed, we
first detail the derivation of the implementability constraint. The derivation
of the other three constraints (i.e. the resource constraint, the capital utiliza-
tion constraint, and the period-0 capital utilization condition) is illustrated
in Section 1.3 of the maintext.
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B.2.1 The Implementability Constraint
To derive the implementability constraint, we start with the household’s
budget constraint,
(1+τ c)ct+(1+γ)qtdt+1+(1+γ)kt+1 = (1−τ l)wtlt+(1−τkt )rtmtkt+[1− δ(mt)] kt+dt+e.
(B1)
In addition, to simplify the notation below, we define
zt ≡ (1 + τ c)ct − (1− τ lt )wtlt, (B2)
RKt ≡
(
1− τkt
)
rtmt + 1− δ (mt) , (B3)
and substitute the Euler equation (A1) into the above household budget
constraint in (B1) to obtain
dt = zt + (1 + γ)kt+1 −RKt kt − e+ β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
dt+1, (B4)
The corresponding expression in period-0 reads
d0 = z0 + (1 + γ) k1 −RK0 k0 − e+ β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)
d1. (B5)
We then substitute for all dt>1 recursively in equation (B5). The transversal-
ity conditions lim
t→∞β˜
t+1U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1) dt+1 = 0 and limt→∞β˜
tU ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
kt+1 = 0, and the first order condition (A3) imply that the consolidated bud-
get constraint at period-0 can be simplified to
d0 +R
K
0 k0 =
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)
(zt − e) (B6)
Finally, we substitute expression (B2) and (B3) back in (B6), and use the
intratemporal consumption-leisure margin in (A2) to substitute out the labor
tax. Therefore we obtain the implementability constraint,
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B −
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
[
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(
ct − e
(1 + τ c)
)
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
]
= 0,
where
B ≡
{
d0 +
[(
1− τk0
)
r0m0 + 1− δ (m0)
]
k0
} U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)
1 + τ c
collects the period-0 terms.
The implementability constraint, the resource constraint, the capital uti-
lization constraint, and the period-0 capital utilization condition are the four
constraints in the primal form of the Ramsey problem for our baseline model.
In the next subsection we derive the Lagrangian function of the primal form
presented in Section 1.3.
B.2.2 Ramsey Problem in the Primal Form
The Ramsey problem in primal form consists of maximizing the utility
function,
∞∑
t=0
β˜tU (ct, 1− lt) ,
subject to four contraints. These are the resource constraint
F (mtkt, lt)− ct − gt − (1 + γ)kt+1 + [1− δ(mt)] kt ≥ 0,
the implementability constraint
B −
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
[
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(
ct − e
1 + τ c
)
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
]
≥ 0,
the capital utilization constraint for t > 0
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
=
β˜
1 + γ
[
δ
′
mt+1(mt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
]
,
and the period-0 capital utilization condition,
(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0) = δ
′
m0 (m0) .
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The Lagrangian function of the primal form is then constructed as follows
max
{ct,lt,mt,kt+1,τk0 }∞t=0
R =
∞∑
t=0
β˜t

U (ct, 1− lt)
+φ
{
B −
[
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(
ct − e1+τc
)
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
]}
+λ1t
[(
1+γ
β˜
)
U ′ct (ct,1−lt)
U ′ct+1 (ct+1,1−lt+1)
− δ′mt+1(mt+1)mt+1 − 1 + δ(mt+1)
]
+λ2t [F (mtkt, lt)− ct − g − (1 + γ)kt+1 + (1− δ(mt)) kt]
+ϕ
[(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0)− δ′m0 (m0)
]

,
(B7)
where φ, λ1t , λ2t and ϕ are the four multipliers attached to the resource con-
straint, the implementability constraint, the capital utilization constraint,
and the period-0 capital utilization condition, respectively.
By grouping all terms in (B7) containing the utility function, we define
the objective function as
V (ct, 1− lt, φ, λ1t ) = U (ct, 1− lt)
+φ
[
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
(
ct − e
1 + τ c
)
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
]
+λ1t
[(
1 + γ
β˜
)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
]
,
the above Lagrangian function can be then rewritten as follows,
max
{ct,lt,mt,kt+1,τk0 }∞t=0
R =
∞∑
t=0
β˜t

V (ct, 1− lt, φ, λ1t )
−λ1t
[
δ
′
mt+1(mt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
]
+λ2t [F (mtkt, lt)− ct − g − (1 + γ)kt+1 + (1− δ(mt)) kt]

− φ
{
B − ϕ
φ
[(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0)− δ′m0 (m0)
]}
(B8)
Where
A ≡ B − ϕ
φ
[(
1− τk0
)
F ′s0(m0k0, l0)− δ′m0 (m0)
]
.
captures all period-0 constraints including B in the implementability con-
straint and the period-0 capital utilization condition. In Section 1.3, we
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present the Lagrangian function in (B8).
C.3 The Primal Form of the Extended Model
This section derives the primal form for our extended model in Section
1.6. Due to the presence of risk premium on government bond, households
pay an insurance, Ψt = ψ2
(
dt+1 − d¯
)2, to a financial intermediary to secure
a unit return on government bond against repayment risk. In addition, the
profits of such as a financial institution, t, are redistributed to households
in a lump-sum way. Therefore, the household budget constraint is modified
as follows,
(1 + τ c)ct + (1 + γ)qtdt+1 + (1 + γ)kt+1 + Ψt
= (1− τ l)wtlt + (1− τkt )rtmtkt + [1− δ(mt)] kt + dt + e+ t.
Since the financial intermediary has zero marginal and fixed costs, Ψt = t
holds in equilibrium. In addition, the Euler equation (A1) is modified to
incorporate the insurance costs as follows,
(1 + γ)qt + ψ
(
dt+1 − d¯
)
= β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
. (C1)
Therefore, the presence of insurance costs alters the implementability con-
straint derived above, while the other constraints (i.e. the resource constraint
and the capital utilization constraint) remain the same as in the baseline
model.
In the following subsections, we derive the new implementability con-
straint for our model with risk premium, and then we will show the La-
grangian function of the primal form Ramsey problem with both risk pre-
mium and government myopia.
C.3.1 The Implementability Constraint with Risk Premia
By substituting the new Euler equation in (C1) into the household budget
constraint, we get:
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(1 + τ c)ct − ψ
(
dt+1 − d¯
)
dt+1 + β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
dt+1 + (1 + γ)kt+1 =
(1− τ l)wtlt + (1− τkt )rtmtkt + [1− δ(mt)] kt + dt + e.
(C2)
We then rearrange equation (C2) as follows
dt = zt − ψ
(
dt+1 − d¯
)
dt+1 + (1 + γ)kt+1 −RKt kt − e
+β˜
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
dt+1,
(C3)
where zt and RKt are defined as in equations (B2) and (B3).
The corresponding consolidated budget constraint at period-0 is given by
d0 +R
K
0 k0 =
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)
[
zt − e
−ψ (dt+1 − d¯) dt+1
]
.
Differently from the baseline model, the government debt that describes the
risk premium cannot be easily substituted away. This implies that we cannot
discard the sequence of budget constraints for periods t = 1, 2, 3, ..., after
consolidating at period-0. Therefore, we have a sequence of implementability
constraints for all periods t ≥ 0 for the extended model.
dt +R
K
t kt =
∞∑
j=0
β˜j
U ′ct+j (ct+j , 1− lt+j)
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
[
zt+j − e
−ψ (dt+j+1 − d¯) dt+j+1
]
. (C4)
Finally, we substitute the intratemporal consumption-leisure margin in (A2),
the capacity utilization condition (A4) and expression (B2) and (B3) into
the sequence of consolidated budget constraints in (C4), we get the imple-
mentability constraint for period t as follows,
{
dt +
[
δ′mt(mt)mt + 1− δ (mt)
]
kt
} U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
1 + τ c
=
∞∑
j=0
β˜j{U ′ct+j (ct+j , 1− lt+j)×[
ct+j −
ψ
(
dt+j+1 − d¯
)
dt+j+1
1 + τ c
− e
1 + τ c
]
+ U ′lt+j (ct+j , 1− lt+j) lt+j}.
(C5)
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C.3.2 Ramsey Problem with Risk-premium and Myopia in
the Primal Form
This subsection outlines the Lagrangian function for the primal form
Ramsey problem with risk premium and myopia. In the latter case, the
government will discount utility at µβ˜, instead of β˜, with µ < 1 representing
the gap between household and government discount factors. In addition, the
presence of a sequence of implementability constraints in (C5) for all t > 0
complicates the setup of the Lagrangian function of this problem. In order
to write the Lagrangian function in a compact form, we follow Aiyagari et
al. (2002) and Rieth (2017) in defining a recursive multiplier, λ3t =
λ3t−1
µ +υt,
with λ3−1 = 0, to be attached to the implementability constraint in (C5).
Therefore, the Lagrangian function is constructed as follow,
max
{ct,lt,mt,kt+1,dt+1}∞t=0
R =
∞∑
t=0
(
µβ˜
)t

U (ct, 1− lt)
+λ1t
[(
1+γ
β˜
)
U ′ct (ct,1−lt)
U ′ct+1 (ct+1,1−lt+1)
− δ′mt+1(mt+1)mt+1 − 1 + δ(mt+1)
]
+λ2t [F (mtkt, lt)− ct − g − (1 + γ)kt+1 + (1− δ(mt)) kt]
+λ3t
{
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
[
ct − ψ(dt+1−d¯)dt+11+τc − e1+τc
]
+ U ′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt
}
−υt
{[
dt +
[
δ′mt(mt)mt + 1− δ (mt)
]
kt
] U ′ct (ct,1−lt)
1+τc
}
,

(C6)
where λ1t and λ2t again, are multipliers associated with the resource con-
straint and the capital utilization constraint. It is important to clarify that
the period-0 capital utilization condition now is embeded in the new the
implementability constraint for the extended model.
The first order conditions for t ≥ 0 are:
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{ct} : λ2t − U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)− λ3tU ′ct (ct, 1− lt)− λ3tU ′′ltct (ct, 1− lt) lt =
−λ1t−1
(1+γ)U ′ct−1 (ct−1,1−lt−1)
µβ˜2U ′ct (ct,1−lt)
2
+λ1t
1+γ
β˜U ′ct+1 (ct+1,1−lt+1)
+λ3t
[
ct − ψ(dt+1−d¯)dt+11+τc − e1+τc
]
− υt1+τc
[
dt +
[
δ′mt (mt)mt + 1− δ (mt)
]
kt
]

U ′′ct (ct, 1− lt) ,
(C7)
{lt} : − λ2tF ′lt(mtkt, lt)− U ′lt (ct, 1− lt)− λ3tU ′lt (ct, 1− lt)− λ3tU ′′lt (ct, 1− lt) lt =
λ1t−1
(1+γ)U ′ct−1 (ct−1,1−lt−1)
µβ˜2U ′ct (ct,1−lt)
2
+λ1t
1+γ
β˜U ′ct+1 (ct+1,1−lt+1)
+λ3t
[
ct − ψ(dt+1−d¯)dt+11+τc − e1+τc
]
− υt1+τc
[
dt +
[
δ′mt (mt)mt + 1− δ (mt)
]
kt
]

U ′′ctlt (ct, 1− lt) ,
(C8)
{mt} : λ1t−1δ
′′
mt(mt)mt = −µβ˜υtδ′′mt (mt)mtkt
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
1 + τ c
+
µβ˜λ2t
[
F
′
mt(mtkt, lt)− δ
′
mt(mt)
]
kt,
(C9)
{kt+1} : λ2t (1 + γ) = µβ˜λ2t+1
[
F ′kt+1(mt+1kt+1, lt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ(mt+1)
]
− µβ˜υt+1
[
δ′mt+1 (mt+1)mt+1 + 1− δ (mt+1)
] U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
1 + τ c
,
(C10)
{dt+1} : µβ˜υt+1
U ′ct+1 (ct+1, 1− lt+1)
1 + τ c
= λ3t
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
1 + τ c
(
ψd¯− 2ψdt+1
)
,
(C11)
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{c0} : λ20 − U ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)− λ3tU ′c0 (c0, 1− l0)− λ3tU ′′l0c0 (c0, 1− l0) l0
=

λ10
1+γ
β˜U ′c1 (c1,1−l1)
+λ3t
[
c0 − ψ(d1−d¯)d11+τc − e1+τc
]
− υ01+τc
[
d0 +
[
δ′m0(m0)m0 + 1− δ (m0)
]
k0
]
U
′′
c0 (c0, 1− l0)
(C12)
{l0} : − λ20F ′l0(m0k0, l0)− U ′l0 (c0, 1− l0)− λ30U ′l0 (c0, 1− l0)− λ30U ′′l0 (c0, 1− l0) l0
=

λ10
(1+γ)
β˜U ′c1 (c1,1−l1)
+λ30
[
c0 − ψ(d1−d¯)d11+τc − e1+τc
]
− υ01+τc
[
d0 +
[
δ′m0(m0)m0 + 1− δ (m0)
]
k0
]
U
′′
c0l0 (c0, 1− l0)
(C13)
{m0} : µβ˜υ0δ′′m0 (m0)m0
U ′ct (ct, 1− lt)
1 + τ c
= µβ˜λ20
[
F
′
m0(m0k0, l0)− δ
′
m0(m0)
]
,
(C14)
The above set of first order conditions (C7)-(C14) and the three con-
traints characterize the solution of Ramsey problem for the extended model.
C.3.3 Non-zero Long-run capital tax
Introducing risk premium does not alter the zero long-run capital tax
result in the baseline model. However, when allowing for policy myopia, the
long-run capital tax becomes positive and increasing in the degree of myopia.
In this subsection, we show how the two extensions of the model affect the
long-run first order condition with respect to capital.
We first substitute υ and δ′m (m) in the long-run Ramsey first order
condition with respect to capital (C10), using the steady-state multiplier of
the implementability constraint and capacity utilization condition to obtain,
λ2(1 + γ) = µβ˜λ2
[
F ′k(mk, l)m+ 1− δ(m)
]
+ (1− µ) β˜λ3
[
(1− τk)F ′k(mk, l)m+ 1− δ (m)
] U ′c (c, 1− l)
1 + τ c
(C15)
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Given that the Ramsey allocation is a competitive equilibrium, combining
equation (C15) and the long-run intertemporal investment decision under the
competitive equilibrium,
β˜
[
(1− τk)F ′k(mk, l)m+ 1− δ(m)
]
= 1 + γ,
we obtain the following expression for the Ramsey capital tax in the long-run:
τk =
(1− µ)
[
λ2 − λ3U ′c(c,1−l)1+τc
]
[F ′k(mk, l)m+ 1− δ (m)][
λ2 − (1− µ)λ3U ′c(c,1−l)1+τc
]
F ′k(mk, l)m
. (C16)
In the absence of myopia, µ = 1, the Ramsey capital tax, τk, is zero in the
long-run, which is consistent with the baseline model. However, under the
assumption of policy myopia, µ < 1, to further show that the Ramsey capital
tax is positive, we need to show that λ2 > λ3U
′
c(c,1−l)
1+τc , which is difficult to
show analytically, but does hold for our benchmark calibration and any other
permutation of parameters we have tried.
C.3.4 Debt stationarity
In the extended model, government debt is no longer a unit root process;
instead it will be mean-revering in the long-run. We show below this is the
case.
The steady-state Ramsey first order condition with respect to debt in
(C11) is
d =
β˜ (1− µ)
2ψ
+
d¯
2
,
which implies that without myopia, µ = 1, Ramsey policy will prescribe d =
d¯
2 . However, under the assumption of government myopia, µ < 1, d >
d¯
2 and
increasing in the degree of Myopia. In both cases, the Ramsey solution im-
plies a unique long-run level of debt independent from the initial conditions.
C.3.5 Bounded period-0 capital tax
In the extended model, the trade-off in the period-0 capital tax optimal-
ity condition remains qualitatively unchanged, when choosing the period-0
capital tax, the government will still trade-off the benefit of reducing debt
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burden versus the cost of household reducing capacity utilization.
D.4 Measuring Welfare Costs
In our Laffer curve calculations welfare associated with alternative fiscal
policies (and revenues) are computed in equivalent constant consumption
units as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). This procedure is a natural
way for quantitatively comparing welfare across alternative policies when
the utility function does not support a cardinal interpretation. We briefly
outline the procedure below. Consider two alternative policy regimes A and
B, we define life-time welfare as:
WA = E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜tU
(
cAt , 1− lAt
)
(D1)
and
WB = E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜tU
(
cBt , 1− lBt
)
(D2)
Let us denote λc the welfare cost of adopting the policy regimes B in
place of the policy regimes A in terms of constant consumption units. Then
λc would be implicitly defined as:
WB = E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜tU
(
(1− λc) cAt , 1− lAt
)
(D3)
For the utility function we employ the above expression can be re-written
as:
WB = E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
[
(1− λc) cAt
(
1− lAt
)a]1−σ
1− σ =
(1− λc)1−σ
1− σ W
A (D4)
and solving for λc we obtain:
λc = 1−
[
WB
WA
(1− σ)
] 1
1−σ
(D5)
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Chapter 2
A DSGE model for Scotland
and the rUK
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model to carry out fiscal devolution analysis within a macroe-
conomic framework. Such a device will allow for the study of the macroeco-
nomic and public finance implications of alternative fiscal devolution settings.
This is a key aspect of the policy debate around Europe as many countries
(among others: UK, Spain and Italy) are currently facing increasing requests
of autonomy from their own regions. Such analysis requires to employ a two-
country model (a region versus the rest of the country) capturing the key
features of sub-national economies. These include: (i) unique monetary pol-
icy, (ii) multiple fiscal authorities (central and local governments); as well
as (iii) significant price pass-through both in the good and in the labour
market.
When designing the model, and when estimating it in the next chap-
ter, we will consider the case of Scotland and the rUK. This case study is
particularly interesting since the policy debate surrounding Scottish fiscal de-
volution and independence, as well as the availability of quarterly national
account statistics, make the position of this country unique. To the best
of our knowledge, no such a model is currently available for Scotland and,
therefore, our DSGE model of the Scottish economy is innovative.
The design of the model draws from the DSGE literature, developed in
policy institutions and academia in recent years (which is reviewed subse-
quently). This modeling approach reflects the new consensus in macroeco-
nomics and accounts for the main features of countries business cycle. As
such, it can offer insights on some of the key academic and policy questions
surrounding fiscal devolution in Scotland, for example: what are the costs
and benefits of the current devolution settlements? Can we decompose the
welfare costs/benefits across individual policy measures e.g. with and with-
out the control of income tax? Would Scotland have been better off without
devolving a particular fiscal instrument? What are the costs associated with
the lost of risk sharing? How the Scottish Laffer curve compares with the
UK’s one? How an independence scenario would affect all the above?
Within this chapter we will also discuss some of the limitations of our
modeling approach. In particular, we do not explicitly model migration be-
tween Scotland and the rUK. This feature is typically not present in the
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DSGE framework and it is not easily introduced; furthermore, migration
statistics in and out of Scotland are limited. Such an assumption, nonethe-
less, will need to be re-assessed in future for its centrality in policy analysis
and in light of the evidence from recent fiscal reforms in Scotland1. Simi-
larly, the oil sector in the UK is modeled in a stylized manner which does
not allow to account for the impact of oil price fluctuations over the private
sector in Scotland. This aspect is likely to be quantitatively relevant. Such
a simplifying assumption is made to limit the scale and the complexity of
the model, which is, in its current formulation, already significant.
Our model will contribute to the economic literature and policy making
along several lines. Firstly, it will provide an original framework able to
capture the nature of the economic linkages between Scotland and the rUK
as part of a fiscal and a monetary union. These include a unique central bank,
strong trade linkages and significant price pass-through both in the goods and
in the labour markets. Recent contributions (among others: Petrova et al.
(2017); Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2017); Aminu (2018)) have provided
DSGE models for the UK economy. However, none of these papers model
Scotland as part of the UK; nor deals with the interrelations between sub-
national economies within the UK. Secondly, our model will provide a useful
device for running policy analysis and counter-factual experiments, to assess
alternative devolution arrangements between Scotland and the rest of the
UK. For the reasons just discussed, and to the best of our knowledge, none
of the models currently available for the UK allows for this type of analysis.
Thirdly, our model will allow future research to shed light on the optimal
design of fiscal federalism.
We begin this chapter by reviewing the literature on DSGE models de-
veloped in academia and in central banks and discuss our model proposal in
section 2.2. We then outline our model in section 2.3. In order to be solved
and simulated in standard software the model needs, however, to be trans-
formed in a stationary recursive form. In section 2.4, we therefore transform
the model in stationary recursive terms and present the set of normalized
equilibrium conditions. In the final section of this chapter we provide some
concluding remarks.
1Recent income tax reform in Scotland might shed light on the extent of the migration
response, if any. These are not captured by the data as yet, since the migration time-series
ends in 2016-17.
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2.2 The literature and our model
In the last twenty years, macroeconomic models have evolved towards
a common framework known as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE henceforth). DSGEmodels combine the Neo-classical workhorse with
a number of nominal rigidities (e.g. staggered prices and wages) and mar-
ket imperfections (e.g. imperfectly competitive product and labour markets)
of the New-Keynesian framework. Successive research efforts have brought
DSGE models to reach the necessary level of sophistication to account for
the properties of main macroeconomic time series and to be a reference tool
for policy analysis. A cornerstone in this literature is the celebrated contri-
bution of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) (SW, henceforth). Their medium-
scale closed-economy model has proved a goodness of fit comparable to the
best Bayesian SVAR and constitutes the new consensus in macroeconomics.
More recently, some authors have extended this framework to open econ-
omy. Specifically, Adolfson et al. (2007) developed what today is the refer-
ence small open economy model. Similarly, Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) were
among the first in successfully developing and estimating a medium-to-large
scale two-country DSGE model.
We begin by reviewing small open-economy frameworks, describing in
detail the model of Adolfson et al. (2007). This model is a key reference for
it constitutes the common skeleton of most recent open-economy literature,
including multi-country models. Accordingly, we find it useful to dig into
the details of its structure, highlighting the role of its main assumptions.
We then discuss some contributions extending and refining this framework.
Finally, we review the literature on multi-country models and outline our
model proposal.
2.2.1 The new open economy model (NOEM)
A baseline model
A central contribution in the new open economy literature has been pro-
vided by Adolfson et al. (2007) (henceforth, ALLV). They built on the SW’s
closed economy framework, adding a full set of open economy features. This
framework is sometimes referred to as "The new open economy model"
(NOEM, henceforth). Their economy is constituted by one endogenously
modeled country (in their case Euro Area) trading with an exogenous rest-
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of-the-word (ROW, henceforth). In the following, we discuss the design of
the model and the rationale behind its main assumptions; whereas in the
next subsection, we present a number of related contributions refining and
extending this framework.
Begin with the supply side of the the ALLV’s economy. This features
three types of firms - importers, intermediate good producers, and exporters
- producing differentiated goods. Beside, there are goods packers whose pur-
pose is to aggregate differentiated goods into consumption, investment and
export baskets eventually consumed by households. All firms operate into
imperfectly competitive markets featuring partially indexed calvo-regime2,
whereas packers operate under perfect competition and flexible price regime.
Each intermediate good firm produces a differentiated good using capital and
labour. These differentiated goods are then combined by good packers with
imported goods to produce the final good baskets for consumption, invest-
ment and export. These imported goods are acquired abroad and sold at
home by importing firms who price them in the domestic currency; exporting
firms are just symmetrical. Importantly, good packers face a sector-specific
and time-varying production elasticities with respect to the differentiated
goods they aggregate; this gives rise to an equal number of time-varying,
sector-specific mark-ups. This is a key feature for the model to replicate the
properties of the exchange rate dynamics and inflation differential assuming
a reasonable degree of price elasticities and without detrending the data3.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the structure of the supply side we just described.
Next to the good markets there is a non-competitive labour market, subject
as well to the partially indexed calvo-regime, where differentiated labour
is supplied by households to a labour packer who rents it, in turn, to the
intermediate good producers. Before turning to the description of the de-
mand side, it is worth discussing the role and the implications of the main
assumptions so far. Firstly, the presence of nominal rigidities allows prices
and wages to respond with some delay to changes in real variables, in line
with the empirical evidence (and due, for example, to contractual rigidities,
menu costs etc.). Secondly, the partial indexation mechanism allows non re-
2Under partially indexed calvo-regime, firms that are unable to re-optimize are allowed
to index their prices at the past period inflation.
3Indeed, time-varying markups have a rather persistent effects on real exchange rate
dynamics, while generating much less fluctuation in quantities and prices.
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Figure 2.1: A summary of the supply side of ALLV’s model
optimizing firms (workers) to partially index their prices (wages) to the last
period inflation determining a stronger persistence in the level of price and
wage inflation. That results in a more general specification of the Philips
curve, where the inflation features both "forward" and "backward" looking
components4. Thirdly, the combined presence of imperfect competition and
calvo-pricing implies that the price and wage mark-ups change over time in
a counter cyclical manner; since firms (workers) cannot re-optimize prices
(wages) in every period, a positive demand shock lowers the markup and
stimulates employment, investment and real output. Finally, local currency
pricing operated by importing firms, together with calvo-regime, determines
an imperfect price pass-through in response to changes in the exchange rate
or in the supply conditions of the rest of the world.
The demand block of the economy is composed by the rest of world (which
imports domestic goods) and by the domestic households who consume and
4However, Chari et al. (2008) noted that this specification, while allowing for a good
empirical performance, has the counterfactual implication that firms update their prices
every period.
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invest. Specifically, domestic goods are demanded abroad depending on their
relative prices, as well as on the dynamics of ROW GDP whose evolution
is governed by an identified VAR model. On the other hand, the domestic
household faces the problem of allocating his income between consumption,
cash holding, investment in capital, as well as in the domestic and in the
foreign bond. Consumption and investment are undertaken buying a com-
posite basket of domestic and foreign produced goods. Both are subject to
real rigidities, for consumption is subject to habits formation, while invest-
ment is subject to adjustment cots. Furthermore, as in SW, investment is
not the only way for increasing capital services; capital utilization can, in
fact, be increased at the cost of a faster depreciation. Again, we briefly dis-
cuss the role of the main assumptions of the demand side. Firstly, the set
of real rigidities constituted by habits formation and investment adjustment
costs play a central role in guaranteeing, respectively, greater persistence
in consumption and in investment. Similarly, allowing for a variable uti-
lization of capital, smooths the adjustment of its rental rate in response to
changes in output. Secondly, imported goods enter both the consumption
and the investment baskets; this is crucial for ensuring that imports variabil-
ity can match its empirical counterpart5. Thirdly, the choice between do-
mestic and foreign bonds balances to a no-arbitrage condition pinning down
the expected real exchange rate appreciation, otherwise known as uncovered
interest rate parity condition (UIP, henceforth). Fourthly, the absence of
contingent bonds trading with the ROW determines an imperfect interna-
tional risk sharing; accordingly, in presence of idiosyncratic shocks, wealth
effects are not neutralized by international transfers. Finally, the model em-
bodies no-optimizing monetary and fiscal authorities. The former adjusts
the short-term interest rate in response to the CPI inflation rate, the out-
put gap and the real exchange rate deviations. The latter, collects a set
of distortionary taxes whose revenues are employed to finance government
consumption under budget balance. In terms of performance, the model dis-
plays a quite satisfactory in-sample fit, with the exception of the real wages
series which is predicted to grow too fast. The posterior predictive analysis
shows that the realized volatility and auto-correlation of most variables are
5Import volatility is typically higher than consumption and closer to investment volatil-
ity (see Uribe (2014)). Including an imported component in the investment production
allows to increase import volatility.
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well captured by the model. Finally, looking at cross correlations, it is clear
that the model has hard time replicating the joint behaviour of domestic
inflation and imports; the model predicts a positive relation while in the
data it appears to be negative. It is interesting to note that the marginal
likelihood comparison favors a version of the model without working capital.
Model extensions and related contributions
Below we review a number of open economy models extending or amend-
ing ALLV’s framework. We briefly discuss in each case the nature of such
extensions and their rationale.
A slight refinement of ALLV’s framework is proposed by Adolfson et al.
(2008), in a model of the Swedish economy. Their contribution is to amend
the UIP condition, which is a key component since it drives the real exchange
rate dynamics. A large piece of empirical evidence is motivating this modifi-
cation. Indeed, standard VAR analyses suggest that, after a monetary policy
shock, the real exchange rate impulse response function is hump-shaped with
a peak after 1 year. Standard UIP, instead, implies a peak within the quar-
ter interested by the shock, followed by a relatively quick mean reversion.
Moreover, DSGE models with standard UIP cannot account for the so-called
’forward premium puzzle’, i.e. a currency whose interest rate is high tends
to appreciate, implying a negative correlation between the risk premium
and the expected exchange rate depreciation. Adolfson et al. (2008)’s ap-
proach is to include the expected exchange rate appreciation within the risk
premium reduced-form formula. The empirical performance of such a "mod-
ified UIP" condition versus its standard version is assessed through marginal
likelihood, impulse response function and out-of-sample forecast. In all cases
the amended version of the model appears to perform better.
In a similar framework6 designed for the Norway’s economy, Bache et al.
(2010) studied the performance of an instrument rule versus an optimal
rule for monetary policy. There are both empirical and theoretical reasons
motivating this exercise. From a theoretical point of view, the use of an
instrument rule is somehow unsatisfactory since it implies an asymmetric
treatment of the central bank with respect to the private sector. With the
6their model differs from Adolfson et al. (2007, 2008) because of the absence of money
in the utility function and of the working capital channel
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former being a less sophisticated, non-optimizing agent unable to exploit all
the available information in the economy. Such assumption appears hard
to justify and requires the introduction of an ad-hoc rule in an otherwise
coherent framework. From an empirical point of view, there are two oppo-
site mechanisms at play. On the one hand, the optimal policy produces a
behavioural rule for monetary policy which is more comprehensive, since it
contains a larger set of variables than the simple instrument rule. On the
other, this comes at the cost of introducing a new set of restrictions on the
reduced form solution of the model; restrictions that are potentially at odd
with the data. Moved from these premises, these authors analyse which of
these specifications provides a better account of the data. In-sample fit re-
sults superior under optimal policy, however, in terms of forecasting accuracy
these models display a comparable performance.
Harrison and Oomen (2010) provide an analysis of the role of structural
shocks in an open economy DSGE model of the UK. They begin by cali-
brating a baseline version of the model7 (e.g. ALLV), containing only seven
structural shocks8. Then they investigate which other shocks are to be in-
troduced to address the most serious deficiencies of the model in fitting the
data. This is a key question, since introducing shocks can potentially change
the behaviour of the model and it affects the variance of core variables. For
this purpose, authors employ spectral analysis9, as well as the study of the
coherence function10, from which they derive three main insights. First,
the variability of the model is generally low as its spectra mostly lies below
the data spectra (this is especially true for investment, inflation and output).
Moreover, the slope of model spectra differs from the data correspondent im-
plying that the model does not capture the persistence in the data (mostly
true for hours worked and real wages). Second, while the baseline model
succeeds in capturing the lower coherence between the output and the main
7It should be noted that their model differs from ALLV in the design of the pricing
regime: rotemberg price adjustment is used in place of Calvo pricing.
8Specifically, these are: productivity, government spending, monetary policy, ROW
demand, ROW interest rate, ROW inflation and ROW export prices.
9The power spectrum of a time-series x(t) describes how the variance of the data x(t)
is distributed over the frequency components into which x(t) may be decomposed.
10The coherence between two series lies in the range (0,1) and gives a measure of the
degree of correlation between the series at any frequency. A strong correlation is indicated
by a coherence measure close to unity. In Harrison and Oomen (2010)’s article macro-
variables coherence is always measured with respect to output.
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macro-variables found in the data at high frequency, it does not match the
strong increase in coherence at lower frequency. Third, shutting off nom-
inal and real rigidities increases output coherence at any frequency, since
main variables tend to co-move and to be driven by few common shocks.
They conclude that further sources of variability should be incorporated in
the model to increase low frequency coherence of main macro-variables with
output. At the same time, lower coherence at high frequencies - generated
by model rigidities - should be retained. They therefore seek to introduce
shocks that affect a relatively small number of equilibrium conditions in the
model and that are, consequently, likely to affect the spectra and coherence
of a small number of variables in a predictable manner. The following shocks
are inserted: preference shock (likely to increase the coherence of consump-
tion and output at low frequencies), shock to capital adjustment costs (for
similar reasons), mark-up shock (allowing the nominal interest rate and in-
flation to become less correlated at lower frequencies) and labour supply
shock (increasing the variability of real wages and hours worked at low fre-
quency). Overall this version of the model seems to capture the properties of
the UK data better for most variables. Improvements are most visible at low
frequencies reflecting the model increased ability to capture the coherence
in the data. However, model performance at high frequency deteriorates,
particularly for consumption and hours worked which become more volatile
than in the data.
After Harrison and Oomen (2010)’s paper, a couple of recent contribu-
tions, ie. Petrova et al. (2017); Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2017); Aminu
(2018), focused on modeling the UK economy within a DSGE framework.
In particular, Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2017) adopted the same frame-
work as Harrison and Oomen (2010), but with the difference of allowing for
a share of households to be non-Ricardian as well as for a full-blown public
sector balance sheet (including public consumption and investment, as well
as a full set of distortative fiscal instruments). This extended version of the
model is employed for fiscal policy analysis; particularly, to investigate the
GDP multiplier implied by distortionary taxation, government consumption
and investment in the UK. They find that government consumption and in-
vestment shocks are the most stimulating in the short-run. In the longer
horizon the capital income tax and the public investment shock result in
the highest multipliers. Furthermore, when the nominal interest rate is at
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the zero lower bound the effectiveness of consumption taxes and public ex-
penditure increases, but decreases that of capital and labour income taxes.
Finally, they show that non-Ricardian households make the fiscal policy more
effective (i.e. generally enhancing the effects of a fiscal stimulus), and that
nominal rigidities improve effectiveness of public spending and consumption
taxes, whereas decrease effectiveness of income taxes.
Aminu (2018)’s paper built over the standard framework by allowing for
a multi-sector model. This features a retail, a non-oil production, and a
petrol production sector, where energy factors (gas and oil) constitute both
an input and an output of the economic production. Such a model is then
employed to examine the impact of energy price shock (oil prices shock and
gas prices shock) on the economic activities in the UK. He finds that the fall
in output during the financial crisis period was driven by domestic demand
shock, energy prices shock and world demand shock. Furthermore, the effects
of the energy prices shock on output in the UK are only temporary.
Finally, Petrova et al. (2017) estimated the Bank of England COMPASS
model using Bayesian techniques with time-varying parameters. Such a
model extends Harrison and Oomen (2010)’s framework by featuring hand-
to-mouth agents, as well as a final good production sector with imperfect
competition and price adjustment costs. The estimation is ran over a sam-
ple dating back to 1975-Q1 and running until 2014-Q4. Given the significant
changes in policy regimes the UK economy has went through, structural pa-
rameters are not expected to be constant over these years. This motivates
allowing for their time-variation. Their results seem to confirm such an in-
sight: their estimation detects the transition to a monetary policy regime
characterized by long-term inflation expectations anchored at the target, an
increased responsiveness of policy rates to inflation and a reduction in the im-
portance of the non-systematic component of monetary policy. Finally, they
show that allowing for time-variation in parameters improves both point and
density forecast performance for most variables and horizons11.
11Petrova et al. (2017)’s paper has important implications for estimating DSGE models
over the UK economy. Specifically, it highlights the importance of allowing time-variation
in model parameters, when the estimation is ran over a long time-series. It should be
noted, however, that this result is not relevant for the estimation of our model discussed
in the next chapter. In fact, because of limitations in the Scottish statistics, our estimation
sample will date back only until 1998-Q1.
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2.2.2 Beyond small open economy: multi-country models
The NOEM allows to capture the key features of countries business cycle
and to account for the main mechanisms through which shocks propagate
within an economy. However, by leaving the rest of the world exogenous, this
framework is unable to deal with the propagation of shocks, policy changes
and business cycle across countries. Since we precisely aim to represent
the interrelations between the Scottish economy and the rest of the UK,
we need to move a step beyond NOEM toward multi-country models. It is
worth stressing that the discussion above stays, nonetheless, central. Indeed,
multi-country DSGE literature mostly built on NOEM, typically using the
shortcut of representing each country in the model as a symmetric ALLV’s
economy. By the time we are writing, multi-country DSGE literature is not
densely populated; there are only a couple of relevant contributions which
we review in the following.
One of the earliest attempt to provide a framework for a multi-country
analysis is the contribution of De Walque et al. (2005). Their model is meant
to represent a two-country, open economy version of the original SW’s closed
economy framework. However, the structure of the supply side is much
more sophisticated including oil among the production inputs and allowing
imported goods to enter different phases of the production process. We
do not enter the details of this model here for the main reason that, while
adding more complexity than Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) (discussed next),
it performs significantly worst, e.g. cross country GDP correlation is nearly
zero. Subsequent literature did not build further on this framework.
Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) estimate a two-country model of the US and
the Euro Area. Both economies are modeled along the lines of Adolfson et al.
(2007)12. Their aim is to develop a framework able to account for the dynam-
ics of the exchange rate and cross country business cycle, while retaining the
ability to match closed economy facts. For this purpose, two assumptions are
proved to be key, these are: local currency pricing (henceforth, "LCP") and
incomplete markets (e.g imperfect international risk sharing). Specifically,
LCP breaks the law of one price13 and, by ensuring that all the components
12The only substantial difference is the absence of money from the utility function and
of the working capital channel.
13Since imported goods are priced in local currency and their price is sticky, short-term
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of the price index are sticky, it is central for matching the real exchange rate
dynamics. On other hand, market incompleteness averts the counter-factual
prediction of (nearly) perfect correlation between the real exchange rate and
the ratio of consumption across countries14. This framework is shown to
do reasonably well in matching the volatility of the real exchange rate, the
CPI inflation, the GDP deflator, the interest rate and the real wage growth.
However, it produces a volatility of output, consumption and investment in
both countries which is higher than in the data. In terms of cross-country
dynamics, the model appears to under predict the correlation of output, con-
sumption and investment. Furthermore, the correlation between (changes)
in the real exchange rate and (changes) in relative consumption are found to
be positive (though close to zero) in the model, as opposed to the negative
correlation found in the data. Finally, authors assess the contribution of
LCP and incomplete markets to the overall model fit. For this purpose, four
versions of the model are compared; these are obtained by switching on and
off these two features in turn. Marginal likelihood indicates a strong support
for the model with LCP and incomplete markets. Moreover, the model with
LCP performs better than any combination of LCP and producer currency
pricing (e.g. where the LCP producers are only a fraction of the total).
A smaller two-country model was designed by Kolasa (2009) to study
to what degree parameter estimates between Poland and the Euro area dif-
fer. These differences could account for divergence in economic institutions,
market competitiveness and resilience to external shocks. Her framework
combines the full set of closed economy features (i.e. standard real and
nominal rigidities) with more a simplified open economy side with respect
to Rabanal and Tuesta (2010). Specifically, in her model there are only two
type of firms, producing either tradable or non-tradable goods, while pro-
ducer currency pricing and perfect international risk sharing are assumed.
Results do not allow the author to draw any firm conclusion on the differ-
ence in deep parameters. At the same time, they provide strong evidence of
asymmetry in standard deviation of shocks and lack of business cycle syn-
fluctuations of the real exchange rates as well as of the price of foreign goods are not passed
on consumers. This effectively means that the price of the same good might temporarily
diverge in two the countries.
14For a general specification of the utility function, the real exchange rate is equal to
the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption across country under complete markets
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chronization between Poland and the Euro area. The in-sample fit of the
model appears acceptable.
2.2.3 Our model proposal
Our model will belong to the current generation of DSGE models which
have proved a good performance in accounting for in-sample dynamics and
in forecasting exercises. Given the need of capturing the interconnections
and feedback effects between Scotland and the rUK, our model will neces-
sarily include an endogenous rest of the UK, and will therefore belong to
the class of two-country models. Furthermore, each economy in our model
will need to be comprehensively modeled for adequately representing within-
country dynamics. In this respect, the model of Rabanal and Tuesta (2010)
(henceforth, RT ) appears to be the most suitable starting point. However,
to serve our purposes, this framework needs to be amended and integrated
along several lines. First, our model will represent the historical fiscal ar-
rangements within the UK and include the different levels of government;
i.e. the central government in Westminster as well as the devolved admin-
istration in Holyrood. Second, our framework should adequately represent
the nature of the economic linkages between Scotland and the rUK as part
of a fiscal and a monetary union. This means a unique central bank, strong
trade linkages and significant price pass-through both in the goods and in
the labour market. Third, our model will include an oil sector and account
for the tax receipts from oil. Even though this sector does not weight much
on the overall UK economy, it can be a key element in some scenarios for
future research, such as Scottish independence. Indeed, in an independence
scenario where oil is allocated between Scotland and the rUK according to
population or geographical share, its relevance for Scottish public finances
will be dramatic. Finally, to complete our open economy framework, the UK
economy will need to be opened to the rest of world, which we will represent
as exogenous and model it as a VAR. In the paragraphs below we discuss
these extensions and amendments in greater detail.
The public sector
A major application of our model is dealing with public finance and fiscal
devolution policy questions, such as: which fiscal instruments are most suit-
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able to be devolved? By how much should borrowing powers be adjusted for
managing the associated fiscal risk? How does the scope for a unique central
bank change when devolving different sets of fiscal instruments and borrow-
ing powers? In line with these objectives, our framework should necessarily
include two different levels of government, the devolved administration in
Scotland as well as the central government in Westminster. Differently from
RT , we will allow for a full set of distortative fiscal instruments, together
with fiscal rules for public spending. Furthermore, we will include a "Barnett
formula" dictating the evolution of transfers from Westminster to Holyrood,
which finance most of the Holyrood’s spending. For the purpose of the esti-
mation on historical data15, in our baseline model no fiscal instrument will
be devolved to Scotland. Once estimated the structural parameters, we will
be able to vary those fiscal settings and run a full set of fiscal experiments
and counter-factual exercises.
Price pass-through modeling
As part of a fiscal and a monetary union, Scotland and the rUK are
characterized by strong trade linkages and significant price pass-through both
in the goods and in the labour market. This a crucial aspect our model
will need to account for. Trade linkages within the UK, together with the
fact that Scotland is small relative to the rUK, imply that the baskets of
consumption and investment goods in Scotland are largely composed by
rUK produced goods. Importantly, over these goods a significant price pass-
through take place. RT ’s model is not suitable to reproduce this feature
since it is meant to represent the trade between the US and the EU where
price pass-through is limited16. Indeed, they assume segmented markets
(i.e. LCP), implying that exporters price differently goods in the foreign
markets with the respect to the domestic one. This assumption is unlikely to
work well for the UK, where stores and chains selling UK-wide, e.g. Tesco,
Boots etc, tend to charge the same prices across the country. We shall
assume instead that markets are non-segmented, letting goods imported from
the rUK to be acquired at the same price rUK consumers pay. This will
15Our sample will run from 1998:Q4 to 2007:Q4, as discussed later.
16Specifically, limited price pass-through is necessary for the model to match the dy-
namics of the real exchange rate in the data.
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effectively imply that a significant share of the Scottish price index is lead
by the rUK prices. A similar issue arises in the labour market. Again, much
of the wage dynamics in Scotland are likely to be influenced by the ones
in the rUK, for a number of jobs (e.g. public sector) see their pay growing
uniformly within the country, often even paying the same wage rate. To deal
with price pass-through in the labour market, we will assume that a share of
workers in Scotland are "non-local". Non-local workers are such since they
receive the same wage set in the rUK, as opposed to "local" workers whose
wage is set in line with Scottish labour market idiosyncratic conditions.
The oil sector
As previously discussed, we are interested in modeling the tax receipts
generated from oil. These are raised by the government in Westminster
mainly by taxing the profits of companies operating in the North Sea. At
the same time, we will not deal with oil price formation, optimal resources
extraction or production technology. Accordingly, we will approach the mod-
eling of oil through a few exogenous processes governing the dynamics of key
oil variables as in Bodenstein et al. (2011), e.g. price, marginal costs etc.
These processes will in turn govern the generation of tax receipt we are inter-
ested in. Since most of oil companies operating in the North Sea are foreign,
we will assume that oil fields are drilled by foreign companies. Therefore,
in our model oil tax receipts will enter the income component of the UK
primary balance. As discussed in the introduction, such an approach to the
design of the oil sector is admittedly stylized. Indeed, while it captures the
rent generated by oil and its impact over public finances, it abstracts from
the effect - quantitatively relevant - that oil price shocks are likely to have
on the private sector in Scotland. Such a simplifying assumption is purely
made to limit the scale and the complexity of the model, which is, in its
current formulation, already significant.
Migration
Our model does not explicitly account for migration within the UK and
with rest of the world. We acknowledge that fiscal policy changes, particu-
larly those producing divergent fiscal regimes within the UK, might trigger
a migration response. Especially considering the large degrees of social and
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economic integration within a country such as the United Kingdom. At the
same time, there a number of reasons that motivate this choice. Firstly,
migration is typically not a modeled feature in DSGE economies and its in-
troduction is not straightforward. Especially given the need of limiting the
size and the complexity of the model, which is already significant. Secondly,
as observed by Mendoza et al. (2014), migration responses can still be partly
captured by the response of labour supply to changes in fiscal policy. In more
detail, an increase in income tax will generate incentives for households to
substitute labour with leisure. Such a reduction in aggregate hours worked
will, in turn, map - at the micro level- into phenomena such as a decrease
in labour force participation or migration from one country to the other.
However, since such mapping is not specified by the model, this results in a
reduced form representation of the phenomena17. Thirdly, migration statis-
tics currently available are very limited18, for they do not cover any period
involving income tax changes in Scotland with respect to the rUK. Our sim-
plifying assumption over migration might be revised in future once newer
data become available; meantime, it remains a limitation of the model.
17As such, it involves limitations such as the lack of model predictions on the exact
extent of one response with respect to the other, e.g. migration response as opposed to,
say, a reduction of labour force participation.
18Available series from ONS are provided on an annual basis and only cover the time-
span 2001-2016.
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2.3 The model
Below we outline the model we developed for the Scottish economy and
the rest of the UK. As discussed, we built our framework using Rabanal and
Tuesta (2010)’s model as a starting point. Such model is then amended to
appropriately account for the economic linkages between Scotland and the
rUK, as well as extended to allow for a number of features which are relevant
for the policy exercises we aim to run in future.
2.3.1 The economic environment
The model includes three countries of different size: Scotland, the rest
of the UK (rUK, henceforth) and the rest of the world (ROW, henceforth).
The first two countries are endogenous, i.e. DSGE economies, whereas the
ROW is modeled as an exogenous VAR. In particular, Scotland and the
rUK economy are (quasi) symmetric blocks which together form the UK,
a small open economy with international linkages with the ROW. We will
refer to Scotland as the ’Home’ country (or simply ’H’) and to the rUK
as the ’Foreign’ country (or simply ’F’). All economies in our model are
linked to each other by the means of trade in intermediate goods, indexed
by h ∈ [0, 1] in the home country, f ∈ [0, 1] in the foreign and row in the rest
of the world. In the DSGE economies, imported and domestically produced
intermediate goods are then combined to produce a final good which is used
for consumption, investment, and government spending. In what follows we
present the problem for households, intermediate good producers, and final
good producers in Scotland. The expressions for the rUK are analogous
unless otherwise stated. We use the convention that variables and parameters
with an asterisk denote the rUK counterparts, whereas a double asterisk will
stand for the ROW. Also, variables for Scotland and the rUK are expressed
in per capita terms and need to be weighted by the respective population
shares, $ and 1−$, when adding them up to produce UK aggregates.
2.3.2 Households
Households utility
In Scotland and in the rUK there are a continuum of infinitely lived
households in the unit interval that obtain utility from consuming the final
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good and disutility from supplying hours of labour. In the home country
households are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and their lifetime utility function is:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtDc,t
log (Cjt − bCt−1)−Dn,t
(
N jt
)1+η
1 + η
 (2.1)
the utility function displays external habit formation, b ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
importance of the habit stock given by the last period aggregate consumption
Ct−1. η > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real
wage; whereas, N jt , is the labour supply of the agent. Dc,t and Dn,t denote,
respectively, inter-temporal and intra-temporal preference shocks. These
shocks evolve as follows:
log (Dc,t) = ρclog (Dc,t−1) + 
c,d
t (2.2)
log (Dn,t) = ρnlog (Dn,t−1) + 
n,d
t (2.3)
Households budget constraint
Markets are complete within each country and incomplete at the interna-
tional (and UK) level. We allow for two type of assets: the first, Bt, which is
issued by the UK government and costs the inverse of the rUK interest rate;
the other, Dt, which is instead traded internationally and denominated in
the ROW currency. We do not allow for a within-country asset as, given the
complete market assumption, this asset would be redundant. The budget
constraint of home-country household is given by:
Pt
(
(1 + τ ct )C
j
t + I
j
t
)
+
Bjt
R∗tΨ
(
Bt
YtPt
) + StDjt
R∗∗t Ψ
(
StDt
YtPt
) + PtΥt =
Bjt−1 + StD
j
t−1 +
(
1− τ lt
)
W jt N
j
t +
(
1− τkt
)
PtR
k
tm
j
tK
j
t−1 + Π
j
t + Tt + ξ
j
t
(2.4)
where Bjt and D
j
t denote holdings of the UK and ROW bonds, whereas R∗t
and R∗∗t are, respectively, the rUK and the ROW gross nominal interest
rate. The households face an insurance cost to secure the unit return over
the UK and ROW bond which is captured by the function Ψ (·) and it is
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increasing in the amount of asset held19. Since this function depends on the
aggregate real holding of the asset, it is taken as given by individuals20. St is
the exchange rate expressed in units of domestic currency needed to buy one
unit of ROW currency21. Pt is the price of the final good and, ξ
j
t , denotes
the pay-off from engaging in the trade of state-contingent securities. Tt are
government transfers, whereas Υt represents the lump-sum tax used by the
Westminster government to balance its budget in the long-run. Consumers
obtain labour income from supplying labour to intermediate goods produc-
ers, for which they receive a nominal wage, W jt ; furthermore they receive
profits, Πjt , from intermediate and wholesale final goods producers as well as
the financial intermediary which they own. The model includes sticky wages,
and hence the wage received by each household is specific to that household
and depends on the last time the wage was re-optimized. However, the as-
sumption of complete markets within each country allows us to separate the
consumption/saving decisions of the household from their labour supply de-
cision. Furthermore, households rent capital, Kjt−1, to the intermediate good
firms at a real rental rate of Rkt . Capital utilization, 0 ≤ mjt ≤ 1, can be
varied across periods; the more intense is the capacity utilization (i.e. the
higher mjt ) the higher is the rate of capital depreciation δ
(
mjt
)
. Capital
accumulation dynamics are given by the following expression:
Kjt =
(
1− δ
(
mjt
))
Kjt−1 + Vt
[
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)]
Ijt (2.5)
where, It indicates investment, whereas S (·) represents the adjustment cost
function which is increasing and convex (i.e S’(), S”()>0)22. The S (·) func-
tion summarizes the technology that transforms current and past investment
into installed capital. This expression also includes an investment-specific
technology shock, Vt, that evolves according to:
log (Vt) = ρvlog (Vt−1) + vt (2.6)
Finally, following a standard convention, we define:
19This cost induces stationarity in the assets position of Scotland and rUK
20The financial intermediary faces no production costs and it is assumed to return its
profits to the household.
21Under the UK monetary union, this is equal for Scotland and rUK.
22In steady state it will be the case that Sˆ = Sˆ′ = 0 and Sˆ′′ > 0.
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δ
(
mjt
)
= χ0
mjt
χ1
χ1
(2.7)
Household consumption/saving decision
When allocating their income among consumption, investment and sav-
ing alternatives (i.e. domestic and foreign bonds), households face the fol-
lowing program:
arg max
{Ct,It,Bt,Dt,Kt,mt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtDc,t
log (Cjt − bCt−1)−Dn,t
(
N jt
)1+η
1 + η

subject to (1) Bjt−1 + StD
j
t−1 +
(
1− τ lt
)
W jt N
j
t +
(
1− τkt
)
PtR
k
tm
j
tK
j
t−1 − PtΥt+
Πjt + ξ
j
t = Pt
(
(1 + τ ct )C
j
t + I
j
t
)
+
Bjt
R∗tΨ
(
Bt
YtPt
) + StDtj
R∗∗t Ψ
(
StDt
YtPt
) − Tt
(2) Kjt =
(
1− δ
(
mjt
))
Kjt−1 + Vt
(
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
))
Ijt
(2.8)
Taking FOCs and substituting away Lagrangian multipliers we get the fol-
lowing set of conditions23:
the Euler equation representing the trade-off between today’s and tomor-
row’s consumption,
1 = R∗tΨ
(
Bt
YtPt
)
βEt
(
Ct − bCt−1
Ct+1 − bCt
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
Pt
Pt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
(2.9)
the choice of capital determining the value of installed capital Qt24,
Qt = βEt
{(
Ct − bCt−1
Ct+1 − bCt
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)[(
1− τkt+1
)
Rkt+1mt+1 +Qt+1 (1− δ (mt+1))
]}
(2.10)
23note that, since perfect risk sharing is assumed, there is a representative agent and
we can drop the j from the agent choice since all agents are identical and face the same
marginal utility of consumption.
24Qt can be interpreted as the shadow price of investment in terms of the consumption
good.
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and its capacity utilization,
(
1− τkt
)
Rkt = Qtδ
′ (mt) (2.11)
the investment decision,
1−QtVt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− It
It−1
S
′
(
It
It−1
)]
=
βEt
(
Ct − bCt−1
Ct+1 − bCt
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
Qt+1Vt+1
[(
It+1
It
)2
S
′
(
It+1
It
)] (2.12)
the acquisition of the foreign bond,
1 = βR∗∗t Ψ
(
StDt
YtPt
)
Et
(
Ct − bCt−1
Ct+1 − bCt
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
St+1
St
Pt
Pt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
. (2.13)
Furthermore, we define the real exchange rate with respect to the ROW, as
the ratio between price indexes expressed in common currency:
RERH,rowt =
StP
∗∗
t
Pt
(2.14)
and similarly, we define the real exchange rate with respect to the rUK as:
RERH,Ft =
P ∗t
Pt
(2.15)
The wage decision
By assumption any household is a monopoly supplier of a differentiated
labour service, N jt . The household sells this service to a competitive firm that
transforms it into an aggregate labour input that is used by the intermediate
goods producers. Thus, one effective unit of labour that an intermediate
goods producer firm, h, uses for production is given by:
Nt (h) =
[∫ 1
0
(
N jt (h)
) w−1
w dj
] w
w−1
(2.16)
Labour packer profit maximization, gives rise to the following demand sched-
ule:
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N jt =
(
W jt
Wt
)−w
Nt (2.17)
and from the zero-profit condition, we obtain the following wage index:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
(
W jt
)1−w
dj
] 1
1−w
(2.18)
In the home country (i.e. Scotland), households belong to two categories:
the local workers, in proportion θL, and the non-local workers, in proportion
1−θL. Local workers (whose wage index isWL) have their wages set accord-
ing to home labor market dynamics; we can imagine them to be workers of
local SMEs. Non-local workers (whose wage index isWNL) instead are those
that, despite being employed in Scotland, have their salary set according to
rUK wages; we can imagine them to be employed in public or private sector
UK-wide organizations. Local workers set wages in a staggered way with
Calvo pricing restriction: in each period, only a fraction of these households,
1 − θW , can re-optimize their nominal wage whereas the remaining, θW ,
will index their past wage to the previous period local-wage inflation (i.e,
WLt
WLt−1
); the extent of such an indexation is regulated by the parameter, λw25.
Non-local workers, instead, will earn in any period the rUK wage index, i.e.
WNL = W ∗. Since the foreign country (i.e. rUK) is large with respect to
the home economy, we assume that its wages are not influenced by Scottish
labour market dynamics and therefore we let its workers to be all locals.
Consider a local worker resetting its wage in period t, and let Wˆt the
newly set wage. The household will choose Wˆt by solving:
25When λw = 1, indexation is perfect and non-re-optimizing workers see their salary
growing at the same rate of wage inflation. When λw = 0, no indexation takes place.
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argmax
Ŵt
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
kDc,t+k
log (Cjt+k − bCt+k−1)−Dn,t+k
(
N jt+k|t
)1+η
1 + η

s.t. (1) Pt+k
(
(1 + τ ct )C
j
t+k + I
j
t+k
)
+
Bjt+k
R∗t+kΨ
(
Bt+k
Yt+kPt+k
) + St+kDjt+k
R∗∗t+kΨ
(
St+kDt+k
Yt+kPt+k
) − Tt+k +$PtΥt
= Bjt+k−1 + St+kD
j
t+k−1 +
(
1− τ lt
)
ŴtN
j
t+k|t +
(
1− τkt
)
Pt+kR
k
t+km
j
t+kK
j
t+k−1 + Π
j
t+k + ξ
j
t+k
(2) N jt+k|t =
[
Ŵt
Wt+k
(
WLt+k−1
WLt−1
)λw]−w
Nt+k
(2.19)
where Nt+k|t denotes labor supply in period t + k of a household that last
reset its wage in period t. Taking FOCs and re-arranging we obtain the
following wage-setting equation:
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k Nt+k|tDc,t+k
Ct+k − bCt+k−1
{(
1− τ l
1 + τ c
)
Ŵt
Pt+k
− w
w − 1Dn,t+kN
η
t+k|t (Ct+k − bCt+k−1)
}
= 0
(2.20)
where Nt+k|t =
(
Ŵt
Wt+k
(
WLt+k−1
WLt−1
)λw)−w
Nt+k. To be noted that we have re-
moved the j subscript because, in presence of complete market (i.e. complete
risk sharing), every agent is facing the same marginal utility of consumption
in any period. Therefore, given the opportunity of re-optimizing, it is choos-
ing the same wage (i.e. there is a representative worker).
Consistently with our discussion, we define local workers and non-local
workers wage indices as follows:
WLt = (1− θwt ) Ŵt + θwt WLt−1
(
WLt−1
WLt−2
)λw
(2.21)
WNLt = W
∗
t (2.22)
and derive the aggregate wage index, Wt, in Scotland:
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Wt =
[∫ 1
0
(
W jt
)1−w
dj
] 1
1−w
=[∫ 1−θL
0
(
W jt
)1−w
dj +
∫ 1
1−θL
(
W jt
)1−w
dj
] 1
1−w
=
[(
1− θL) (WNLt )1−w + θL (WLt )1−w] 11−w =[(
1− θL) (W ∗t )1−w + θL(∫ 1−θw
0
WL,jt dj +
∫ 1
1−θw
WL,jt dj
)1−w] 11−w
=
(1− θL) (W ∗t )1−w + θL
(1− θw) Wˆt + θwWLt−1
(
WLt−1
WLt−2
)λw1−w
1
1−w
(2.23)
whereas in the rUK the wage index will simply read:
W ∗t =
[∫ 1
0
(
W j
∗
t
)1−∗w
dj
] 1
1−∗w
=
(1− θ∗w) Ŵ ∗t 1−∗w + θ∗w
(
W ∗t−1
(
W ∗t−1
W ∗t−2
)λ∗w)1−∗w 11−∗w
(2.24)
2.3.3 Firms
Final good producers
It is assumed that the production of the final good is performed in two
stages. Firstly, a continuum of wholesale firms purchase a composite of inter-
mediate home goods, YH,t, and a composite of intermediate foreign-produced
goods, YF,t and Yrow,t, to produce a differentiated final good product, Yt (i).
Secondly, retail firms purchase the differentiated final goods from wholesale
firms, and produce a homogeneous final good, Yt, that is used for consump-
tion, investment and government spending. Both firms operate under flexible
prices, but the wholesale firms are assumed to be monopolistically compet-
itive whereas the retail sector is perfectly competitive and inhabited by a
representative firm. Furthermore, the price of the final good, Pt, can fluc-
tuate over its real marginal cost due to the presence of exogenous mark-up
shocks, µf,t =
f,t
f,t−1 . In the following we illustrate retail and wholesale firms’
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problems.
Retail firm
The retail firm acts as a competitive good packer, with the following
technology:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt (i)
f,t−1
f,t
] f,t
f,t−1
(2.25)
which implies the following demand function for the wholesale good i:
Yt (i) =
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]−f,t
Yt (2.26)
Wholesale firms
The continuum of wholesale firms purchase a composite of intermediate
home goods, YH,t, and a composite of intermediate foreign-produced goods,
YF,t and Yrow,t, to produce a differentiated final good product, Yt (i), in the
unit interval:
Yt (i) =
[
ωH1
1
θY
(θ−1)
θ
H,t + ω
H
2
1
θY
(θ−1)
θ
F,t +
(
1− ωH1 − ωH2
) 1
θ Y
(θ−1)
θ
row,t
] θ
(θ−1)
(2.27)
Where ω1 denotes the weight of Scottish-produced goods used in the pro-
duction of the final good, ω2 the weight of the rUK-produced good and
1 − ω1 − ω2 the weight of ROW-produced goods; θ, instead, denotes the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. From firm’s
cost minimization we obtain the following schedules:
YH,t =
(
PH,t
MCyt
)−θ
ωH1 Yt (i) (2.28)
YF,t =
(
PF,t
MCyt
)−θ
ωH2 Yt (i) (2.29)
Yrow,t =
(
StProw,t
MCyt
)−θ (
1− ωH1 − ωH2
)
Yt (i) (2.30)
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whereMCyt =
[
ωH1 (PH,t)
1−θ + ωH2 (PF,t)
1−θ +
(
1− ωH1 − ωH2
)
(StProw,t)
1−θ
] 1
1−θ
is the marginal cost. Note that foreign produced good prices are expressed
in the producer currency; this is due to the Producer Currency Pricing as-
sumption we make for the exporting firms, which is discussed below.
From the profit maximization problem, under optimized marginal costs,
we can then derive the price-setting equation. In particular, any wholesale
firm will face the following program:
argmax
Pt(i)
(Pt (i)−MCyt )Yt (i)
subject to Yt (i) =
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]−f,t
Yt
(2.31)
taking FOCs, we obtain the following price-setting equation:
Pt (i) =
f,t
f,t − 1MC
y
t = µf,tMC
y
t (2.32)
where µf,t =
f,t
f,t−1 is a time varying mark-up whose process takes the fol-
lowing form:
log (µf,t) = log
(
f,t
f,t − 1
)
= log
(
f
f − 1
)
+ µ
f
t = log (µf ) + 
µf
t (2.33)
where µ
f
t is the mark-up shock.
Finally, intermediate goods involved in wholesale firms’ production are
in turn an aggregate of heterogeneous intermediate goods produced by the
monopolitistically competitive sector described below and aggregated by a
competitive good packer according to the following technology:
YH,t =
[∫ 1
0
YH,t (h)
p−1
p dh
] p
p−1
(2.34)
YF,t =
[∫ 1
0
YF,t (f)
p−1
p df
] p
p−1
(2.35)
Yrow,t =
[∫ 1
0
Yrow,t (w)
p−1
p dw
] p
p−1
(2.36)
from which we can derive the following demand schedules:
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YH,t (h) =
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t
]−p
YH,t (2.37)
YF,t (f) =
[
PF,t (f)
PF,t
]−p
YF,t (2.38)
Yrow,t (w) =
[
Prow,t (w)
Prow,t
]−p
Yrow,t (2.39)
and price indexes (obtained by imposing zero profit conditions):
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
PH,t (h)
1−pdh
] 1
1−p
(2.40)
PF,t =
[∫ 1
0
PF,t (f)
1−pdf
] 1
1−p
(2.41)
Prow,t =
[∫ 1
0
Prow,t (w)
1−pdw
] 1
1−p
(2.42)
where p > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between types of interme-
diates goods. Note that YH,t (h) denotes home intermediate goods whereas
YF,t (f) and Yrow,t (w) denote imported intermediates goods used by a home
wholesale firm.
Intermediate good firms
The continuum of intermediate firms operate in a monopolistically com-
petitive market, producing differentiated goods for domestic consumption
and export, pricing a` la Calvo with partial indexation. They feature a Cobb-
Douglas production technology over capital services (i.e. mtKt−1) and labour
(Nt), which reads:
YH,t (h)+
1−$
$
Y ∗H,t (h)+Y
∗∗
H,t (h) = [mtKt−1 (h)]
α [AtNt (h)Xt]
1−α (2.43)
where YH,t represents the goods produced for the home market (Scotland)
whereas, Y ∗H,t, represents those produced for the rUK and, Y
∗∗
H,t, those pro-
duced for the ROW. The production function features two different types of
labour-augmenting technical progress. These include a stationary process,
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At, capturing the idiosyncratic technological progress in each country; as
well as a UK-wide non-stationary technological process, Xt, which is com-
mon to Scotland and the rUK. They evolve according to the following laws
of motion:
log (At) = ρ
alog (At−1) + at (2.44)
and
log (Xt) = log (Xt−1) + xt (2.45)
We begin by considering the choice of inputs that minimize costs for firm
h, having in mind that those conditions will be symmetrical for all firms in
this sector:
min
Nt(h),Kt−1(h)
TCt = R
k
t PtmtKt−1 (h) +WtNt (h)
s.t YH,t (h) +
1−$
$
Y ∗H,t (h) + Y
∗∗
H,t (h) = [mtKt−1 (h)]
α [AtNt (h)Xt]
1−α
(2.46)
From the problem in (2.46), we can derive firm optimal demand for labour
and capital, which underpins the following expression for the optimised real
marginal cost MCt:
MCt =
Rkt
α
(
Wt
Pt
)1−α
At
α−1
Xt
1−α (1− α)1−α αα (2.47)
Having derived marginal costs, we can move to the second stage of the inter-
mediate firm’s problem which is choosing a price for its destination markets:
the domestic and the foreign markets. We assume that intermediate good
firms set prices in order to maximize discounted profits subject to a Calvo-
type restriction with partial indexation. Since rUK and Scotland share the
same currency, there is no difference between producer and local currency
pricing regime26. Nevertheless, the literature typically further distinguishes
between segmented and non-segmented markets: under the former, exporting
firms are allowed to charge different prices in home and in foreign markets;
26This, clearly, will not hold true for the ROW. However, since ROW is modeled to be
exogenous, this aspect will not play any relevant role (e.g the main difference is likely to
show up in the correlation between exchange rate and UK export).
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under the latter, they are instead forced to apply the same price at home
and abroad. We assume non-segmented markets in our model, accordingly
each firm sets a unique price for all the markets in which it operates (both
domestic and foreign). The reason for this assumption is to allow for a part
of Scottish prices not to adjust in response to asymmetric shocks to the Scot-
tish economy. We can imagine this to be the result of companies selling and
pricing UK-wide27. Similarly, we assume that UK companies selling to the
ROW set prices in their home currency (PCP) and sell their goods at home
and abroad at the same price. Admittedly, as far as the ROW is concerned,
this assumption is partially counter-factual28. This is operated for the pur-
pose of maintaining the pricing model symmetrical, at this stage. Moreover,
we do not anticipate this assumption to significantly impact the analysis our
model is meant to address, i.e. fiscal federalism within the UK, for the ROW
mainly constitutes a source of exogenous demand shock in our model29.
In each period a fraction 1−θH of firms will change optimally their price,
whereas the remaining will adjust theirs according to an indexation rule:
PH,t (h)
PH,t−1 (h)
= (ΠH,t−1)λH (2.48)
where 0 < λH < 1. For each intermediate good firm, the demand schedule
can be derived from equation 2.37, assuming symmetry with the rUK and
the ROW. Specifically, the demand at time t + k for an intermediate good
firm h which last reset its price at t will be:
27This mechanism will also work in the opposite direction. A part of rUK prices will
respond to Scottish dynamics rather than to rUK ones. However, the magnitude of this
effect will be negligible given the small size of the Scottish economy relative to the rUK
one.
28Note that PCP and non-segmented markets assumption will generate a form of ’law of
one price’, as individual good h will be sold at the same price in both countries. However,
since the final good is produced using different combinations of intermediate goods in all
countries (home bias), and because of idiosyncratic shocks to the mark-up rate of wholesale
firms, the price of the consumption and investment basket will differ across countries.
29Furthermore, looking at Rabanal and Tuesta (2010), who assumes instead Local Cur-
rency Pricing in their two-country model of the EU and US, it can be appreciated how our
framework can be easily extended in future to relax PCP assumption. Specifically, this
can be done by a simple revision of the intermediate good firms price-setting problem (i.e.
by allowing for a price-setting equation for each market in which domestic firms operate).
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YH,t+k|t (h) =
[
PH,t+k|t (h)
PH,t+k
]−p
YH,t+k =
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH]−p
YH,t+k
(2.49)
With this at hand, we are ready to describe the intermediate firm’s profit-
maximization problem:
arg max
PH,t(h)
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθh)
k Λt,t+k
[
PH,t (h)
Pt+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH
−MCt+k
]
×(
YH,t+k|t (h) +
1−$
$
Y ∗H,t+k|t + Y
∗∗
H,t+k|k
)
subject to YH,t+k|k (h) =
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH]−p
YH,t+k
Y ∗H,t+k|k (h) =
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH]−p
Y ∗H,t+k
Y ∗∗H,t+k|k (h) =
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH]−p
Y ∗∗H,t+k
(2.50)
Taking the FOC, we can derive the following price-setting equation:
PˆH,t (h)
PH,t
=
p
p − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 (βθH)
k Λt,t+kMCt+k
(
PH,t
PH,t+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH)−p (
YH,t+k +
1−$
$
Y ∗H,t+k + Y
∗∗
H,t+k
)
Et
∑∞
k=0 (βθH)
k Λt,t+k
(
PH,t
PH,t+k
)1−p (PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH(1−p) PH,t+k
Pt+k
(
YH,t+k +
1−$
$
Y ∗H,t+k + Y
∗∗
H,t+k
)
(2.51)
Furthermore, using equations 2.40 and 2.41, we can derive the intermediate
goods price index in Scotland:
PH,t =
(1− θH) Pˆ 1−pH,t + θH
(
PH,t−1
(
PH,t−1
PH,t−2
)λH)1−p 11−p (2.52)
2.3.4 Oil sector
We allow for a stylized oil sector generating the revenues accruing to the
UK government in the form of taxes on profits from oil production. In more
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detail, we imagine oil reserves being exploited by a number of ROW firms
which then pay a tax on their profits to the government in Westminster.
These profits depend on oil price, extracted quantity and marginal costs
which are all modeled as an AR(1) processes in logs:
log
P ot
P ∗t
= ρpo log
P ot−1
P ∗t−1
+ (1− ρpo) log po + pot (2.53)
log
Qot
Xt
= ρqo log
Qot−1
Xt−1
+ (1− ρqo) logQo + qot (2.54)
and
log
MCot
P ∗t
= ρmco log
MCot−1
P ∗t−1
+ (1− ρmco) logmco + mcot (2.55)
This simple modeling strategy is close in spirit to the one of Bodenstein
et al. (2011)30. This crucially means that, differently from other models ex-
plicitly dealing with the energy sector in the UK (e.g. Aminu (2018)), we
abstract from the feedback effects that oil has on the private sector. Fur-
thermore, we abstract from the resource (mis-)allocation problem following
booms and windfalls from oil volumes and prices, which are studied by the
New Dutch Disease literature (see among others: Benkhodja (2011) and Al-
legret and Benkhodja (2011)). In the context of our model, oil will simply
be an exogenous rent in the hand of the Westminster government.
2.3.5 Fiscal sector
The design of the fiscal sector in Scotland and in the rUK is meant
to represent the historical arrangements within the UK. Accordingly, we
assume all tax revenues generated in the UK to accrue to the government
in Westminster. Those revenues are then in turn employed to finance public
expenditure in the rUK, whether devolved or not, together with non-devolved
expenditure and transfers to Scotland. Scotland will in turn use transfers
from Westminster to finance its devolved expenditure as well as transfers to
households. When constructing the public sector balance sheet, we have to
30However, since we do not explicitly model an international market for oil, we let oil
price to be exogenous too.
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account for Scotland and the rUK populations differing in size.
Westminster
The UK government balance sheet will read:
BUKt
R∗t
+$τkt mtPtR
k
tKt−1 + (1−$) τkt m∗tP ∗t Rk∗t K∗t−1 +$τ ltWtNt+
(1−$) τ ltW ∗t N∗t +$τ ct PtCt + (1−$) τ ct P ∗t C∗t + TOt + PtΥt = BUKt−1 + (1−$)P ∗t Gdev∗t+
$PtGnodevt + (1−$)P ∗t Gnodev∗t + (1−$)P ∗t T ∗t +$PtTsct
(2.56)
On the left hand side, Bukt represents the UK bond held by household in
Scotland (Bt) and in the rUK (B∗t ), whereas $ and (1−$) represent Scot-
land and rUK population weights. TOt, instead, are the tax revenues from
oil. On the right hand side, Gdev∗t represents devolved expenditures in the
rUK, while Gnodev∗t , Gnodevt the non-devolved ones in, respectively, the
rUK and Scotland, Tsct are transfers to Scotland and T ∗t transfers to the
rUK households. Oil revenues are derived from a flat rate of tax, τ ot , over oil
profits:
TOt = (P
o
t −MCot )Qot τ ot (2.57)
Finally Υt represents a lump-sum tax evolving according to:
Υt = ρ
Υ
(
bUKt − b¯
)
+
(
1− ρΥ) Υ¯ (2.58)
This lump-sum tax ensures that the Debt-GDP ratio, bUKt 31, will eventually
approach its long-run value b¯. As we assume that Lump-sum taxes have zero
mean, this condition simply goes down to:
Υt = ρ
Υ
(
bUKt − b¯
)
(2.59)
Holyrood
Scottish government’s balance sheet will then simply read:
31We define bUKt =
BUKt
P∗t Y ∗t
. Similarly, Scottish households bond holding with respect to
(Scottish) GDP will read bt = BtPtYt ; whereas for rUK households this will read b
∗
t =
B∗t
P∗t Y ∗t
.
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Tsct = Gdevt + Tt (2.60)
On the LHS, Tsct represents total transfers or grants from the UK central
government to the Scottish devolved administration. These grants are used
to finance Holyrood’s devolved expenditure, Gdevt, and transfers to Scot-
tish households, Tt, on the RHS of the equation. As we discuss below, the
devolved expenditure in Scotland will evolve endogenously according to the
Barnett formula, whereas transfers to households will follow an exogenous
process.
Barnett formula
The devolved administration in Scotland receives grants, amounting to
Tsct, from the UK government which fund its spending. The Barnett for-
mula determines how the largest of these grants -the block grants, which in
our model finances the whole of the devolved expenditure Gdevt - changes
from one year to the next32. It should be noted that the formula does not
determine the total amount of the block grant, just the yearly change. The
main idea behind the Barnett formula is to give the same pounds-per-person
change in funding for comparable government services in the rUK: for in-
stance, if the funding for education in the rUK increases of £200 per person,
the Scottish administration block grant will increase by £200 per person, as-
suming education is a fully devolved subject. More specifically, the Barnett
formula takes the change in the rUK devolved expenditure and applies two
factors: the first accounts for the relative size of its population (population
proportion), whereas the second accounts for the extent to which the specific
service is devolved (comparability percentange). In our model, this will be
represented through the following processes for Gdevt:
Gdevt = Gdevt−1 (1 + ggt) (2.61)
32More in detail, UK public expenditure is divided between Departmental Expenditure
Limits (DEL) and Annually Managed Expenditure (AME). The former are departmen-
tal expenditures responding to strict budget limits (covering, for example, resources and
services running costs), whereas the latter involves spent on demand lead areas whose
budget is less strict as harder to be forecast (covering for example, tax credit smf public
pensions). The Barnett formula determined block grant makes up the majority of the
devolved administrations DEL, whereas the AME allocations are provided in separately
negotiated grants.
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ggt =
Gdev∗t −Gdev∗t−1
Gdev∗t−1
∗DDt (2.62)
DDt =
Gdev∗t
Gdevt
(2.63)
and
Gdevt = Gdevt exp(
Gdev
t ) (2.64)
Where equation 2.61 represents the process for the block grant to Scotland
which grows according to a rate, ggt, consistent with the Barnett formula.
Equation 2.62 represents then the Barnett formula itself determining the per-
period per-capita growth of the block grant received by Scotland. The latter
depends upon the growth of the rUK devolved expenditure per capita33,
Gdev∗t−Gdev∗t−1
Gdev∗t−1
, as well as a comparability factor or devolution degree DDt.
Furthermore, equation 2.63 establishes how the comparability factor changes
over time: this has been designed so that per-capita devolved expenditure
in the rUK and in Scotland converge over time. Note that the rate of con-
vergence is faster in presence of economic growth34. Finally, given that our
Barnett formula is somehow stylized and aggregated, we allow for stochas-
tic deviations from this rule, Gdevt , in equation 2.64. We expect allowing
for such stochastic deviations to be useful for the matching data (i.e. when
estimating the model).
Public expenditure composition
Total government consumption, both in Scotland and in the rUK, is given
by the sum of the devolved and of the non-devolved government spending
purchased within each country. Therefore, the definition of government con-
sumption in Scotland reads:
Gt = Gdevt +Gnodevt (2.65)
33It is worth noting that this is an approximation. In reality, Scottish devolved ex-
penditure grows in line with the English one. That means, Wales and Northern Ireland
spending should be excluded.
34To see why this is the case, just notice that Gdev∗t grows at the rate of technological
change.
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Furthermore, we define the non-devolved component of public consumption,
respectively in Scotland and in the rUK, as follows35:
Gnodevt = ςGnodev
uk
t (2.66)
Gnodev∗t = ς
∗Gnodevukt (2.67)
where ς and ς∗ are the shares of non-devolved expenditure spent in each coun-
try (with respect to the UK average), and Gnodevukt is total non-devolved
spending per-capita in the UK. As such, any time that ς 6= 1 we will have
that more/less no-devolved spending is purchased in Scotland with respect
to rUK (in per-capita basis). Furthermore, aggregation consistency requires
that $ς + (1−$) ς∗ = 1. Finally, the non-devolved expenditure in the UK
evolves according to the following AR(1) process in logs:
log
(
Gnodevukt
)
= ρgnodev log
(
Gnodevukt−1
)
+(1− ρgnodev) log
(
Gnodev
uk
)
+gnodevt
(2.68)
2.3.6 Monetary policy
Finally, it is assumed that the Bank of England follows a monetary policy
rule that targets deviations of domestic CPI inflation and real GDP growth
from their steady state values, that are normalized to zero:
R∗t
R
=
(
R∗t−1
R
)ϕR [(
$
Pt
Pt−1
+ (1−$) P
∗
t
P ∗t−1
)ϕpi (
$
GDPt
GDPt−1
+ (1−$) GDP
∗
t
GDP ∗t−1
)ϕy]1−ϕR
exp (m∗t )
(2.69)
2.3.7 Market clearing conditions
Final good (national) market:
Market clearing in the final good market requires:
35It is worth noting that, a controversial aspect in the accounting of transfers and
subsidies within the UK, is the allocation of the non-devolved spending. Indeed, while the
amount spent on the behalf of each country reflects its population share, the amount spent
within each country does not have to.
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Yt = Ct + It +Gt (2.70)
UK government bond market:
The bonds issued by the UK government are held by, both, the Scottish
and the rUK households. Market clearing requires, therefore, bond holdings
from households (weighted by the population share of each country) to equal
the total supply from the UK government:
Bukt = (1−$)B∗t +$Bt (2.71)
International markets:
The evolution of the UK external position is determined by aggregating
the trade balance of Scotland (TBt) and of the rUK (TB∗t ) and then adding
the tax paid by ROW firms on oil profits. The latter is, in essence, the result
of an ’oil export’ from the UK government to the ROW. The UK government
lets foreign firms exploiting national oil fields while taxing their profits in
return.
StD
uk
t
R∗∗t
− StDukt−1 = $TBt + (1−$)TB∗t + TOt (2.72)
where
TBt =
1−$
$
PH,tY
∗
H,t + PH,tY
∗∗
H,t − PF,tYF,t − StProw,tYrow,t (2.73)
TB∗t =
$
1−$PF,tYF,t + PF,tY
∗∗
F,t − PH,tY ∗H,t − StProw,tY ∗row,t (2.74)
finally we require the UK external position, e.g. Dukt , to be consistent with
the sum of the Scottish and rUK individual positions. Namely:
Dukt = $Dt + (1−$)D∗t (2.75)
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2.3.8 Rest of the world
We let the rest of the world being exogenous and we model it as a VAR(1)
in the following variables: output (Y ∗∗t ), inflation (pi∗∗t ) and interest rate
(R∗∗t ),
Ft+1 = AFt + 
row
t (2.76)
where Ft = [Y ∗∗t ,Π∗∗t , R∗∗t ]
We then link ROW output to Scottish and rUK export by imposing
symmetric demand schedules to the ones of the DSGE economies:
Y ∗∗row,t
Y ∗∗F,t
=
ωrow1
1− ωrow1 − ωrow2
(
StProw,t
PF,t
)−θ
(2.77)
Y ∗∗row,t
Y ∗∗H,t
=
ωrow1
1− ωrow1 − ωrow2
(
StProw,t
PH,t
)−θ
(2.78)
Y ∗∗t =
[
ωrow1
1
θY
∗∗ (θ−1)
θ
row,t + (1− ωrow1 − ωrow2 )
1
θ Y
∗∗ (θ−1)
θ
F,t + (1− ωrow1 − ωrow2 )
1
θ Y
∗∗ (θ−1)
θ
H,t
] θ
(θ−1)
(2.79)
Finally (as it is standard in the literature) we assume that ROW exported
good price equals ROW CPI
P rowt = P
∗∗
t (2.80)
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2.4 Recursive stationary equilibrium conditions
In this section we normalize the model and we re-express it in a form
useful to be input in standard software for solution and simulation (e.g.
Dynare). We begin by scaling growing variables for the level of technology
and transforming the model in real terms. We then rewrite in recursive terms
all equations involving infinite forward summations and integrals. Finally,
we make explicit functional form assumptions for adjustment costs processes
(e.g. investment adjustment costs, bold holding costs etc.). At the end of this
section, we then present the system of stationarized, recursive equilibrium
conditions.
2.4.1 Technology scaling
Our model assumes that the technological process in the UK, Xt, fea-
tures a unit root. This implies that real output, consumption, capital, in-
vestment, real wages, and the level of government spending inherit the same
property and, therefore, they are not stationary in levels. In order to ob-
tain stationarity, we divide them by the level of technology. We denote with
"tilde" variables which have been normalized, e.g C˜t = CtXt . We then define,
gx,t =
Xt
Xt−1 , as the gross growth rate of technology in the UK.
2.4.2 Real prices and inflation
In order to induce stationarity, we need to re-write the model in real
terms. That requires re-expressing nominal prices in terms of relative prices
or price growth. For this end, we define the following variables:
PH,t
PH,t−1
= ΠHt ,
PˆH,t
PH,t
= pˆH,t,
PH,t
Pt
= pH,t,
Pt
Pt−1
= Πt, RER
H,F
t =
P ∗t
Pt
(2.81)
we then replace the corresponding expressions everywhere in the model.
Furthermore, when operating such substitutions, the following definitions
are to be added:
pH,t =
ΠHt
Πt
pH,t−1, RER
H,F
t =
Π∗t
Πt
RERH,Ft−1 (2.82)
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2.4.3 Recursive transformation
For the purpose of inputting the model in solution software (e.g Dynare),
equations involving infinite forward summations and integrals need to be
transformed in recursive terms. Specifically, that requires to transform the
following set of conditions: (i) the price setting equation, (ii) the wage setting
equation and (iii) the price dispersion index. We deal with each of them in
a separate subsection below.
Price setting
Begin recalling that the price setting equation reads:
PˆH,t
PH,t
=
p
p − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 (βθH)
k Λt,t+kMCt+k
(
PH,t
PH,t+k
(
PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH)−p Xt+k
Xt
(
Y˜H,t+k +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t+k + Y˜
∗∗
H,t+k
)
Et
∑∞
k=0 (βθH)
k Λt,t+k
(
PH,t
PH,t+k
)1−p (PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)λH(1−p) PH,t+k
Pt+k
Xt+k
Xt
(
Y˜H,t+k +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t+k + Y˜
∗∗
H,t+k
)
(2.83)
Now, just note that the numerator can be expressed as:
F 1t = MCt
(
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
+βθHΛt,t+1gx,t+1
(
PH,t
PH,t+1
)−p ( PH,t
PH,t−1
)−pλH
F 1t+1
(2.84)
Similarly, the denominator can be expressed as:
F 2t =
(
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
PH,t
Pt
+βθHΛt,t+1gx,t+1
(
PH,t
PH,t+1
)1−p ( PH,t
PH,t−1
)λH(1−p)
F 2t+1
(2.85)
We can therefore re-express equation 2.83 as follows:
PˆH,t
PH,t
=
p
(p − 1)
F 1t
F 2t
(2.86)
Wage setting
Let us now derive the recursive wage-setting equation. Recall that wage-
setting reads:
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Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k
(
˜̂
Wreal,t
W˜real,t+k
Pt
Pt+k
(
W˜Lreal,t+k−1
W˜L
real,t−1
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)λw)−w [
Xt
Xt+k
(
Xt+k−1
Xt−1
)λw]−w
Nt+kDc,t+k
C˜t+k − bC˜t+k−1 1gt+k
{ 1− τ
l
1 + τ c
˜ˆ
Wreal,t
Xt
Xt+k
Pt
Pt+k
− w
w − 1Dn,t+k
 ˜̂W real,t
W˜real,t+k
Pt
Pt+k
(
W˜Lreal,t+k−1
W˜Lreal,t−1
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)λw−wη ×
[
Xt
Xt+k
(
Xt+k−1
Xt−1
)λw]−wη
Nηt+k
(
C˜t+k − bC˜t+k−1 1
gt+k
)
} = 0
(2.87)
first note that we can re-write the above as follows:
1− τ l
1 + τ c
˜̂
W
1+η
real,t =
w
w − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 (βθw)
k A˜1+ηt+k|t
(
Nt+k
W˜−real,t+k
)1+η
Dc,t+kDn,t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 (βθw)
k
A˜t+k|t
Nt+k
W˜−
real,t+k
Dc,t+k
Xt
Xt+k
Pt
Pt+k(
C˜t+k−bC˜t+k−1 1gt+k
)
(2.88)
where: A˜t+k|t =
(
Pt
Pt+k
(
W˜Lreal,t+k−1
W˜Lreal,t−1
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)λw)−w [
Xt
Xt+k
(
Xt+k−1
Xt−1
)λw]−w
Now, just note that the numerator of equation 2.88 can be re-expressed in a
recursive form as follows:
Z1t =
(
Nt
W˜−real,t
)1+η
Dc,tDn,t + βθwA˜
1+η
t+1|tZ
1
t+1 (2.89)
Similarly we can re-write the denominator of equation 2.88 as follows:
Z2t =
(
1
W˜real,t
)−w
NtDc,t(
C˜t − bC˜t−1 1gx,t
) + βθwA˜t+1|t 1gx,t+1 PtPt+1Z2t+1 (2.90)
Therefore equation 2.88 can be re-written as:
1− τ l
1 + τ c
˜̂
W
1+wη
real,t =
w
w − 1
Z1t
Z2t
(2.91)
where A˜t+1|t =
(
Pt
Pt+1
(
W˜Lreal,t
W˜Lreal,t−1
Pt
Pt−1
)λw)−w [
gλwx,t
gx,t+1
]−w
.
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Due to the absence of non-local workers in the rUK, the corresponding
condition for A˜t+1|t will not be symmetrical. Instead, it will read:
A˜∗t+1|t =
 P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(
W˜ ∗real,t
W˜ ∗real,t−1
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
)λ∗w−∗w [ gλ∗wx,t
gx,t+1
]−∗w
(2.92)
Price dispersion
Finally we deal with the infinitesimal summation in the left hand side of
the (aggregate) production function, namely:
∫ 1
0
YH,t (h)+
1−$
$
Y ∗H,t (h)+Y
∗∗
H,t (h) dh = (mtKt−1)
α (AtNtXt)
1−α (2.93)
We begin by summing up the demand schedules for the domestic and ex-
ported goods produced by firm h, from which we obtain:
Y˜H,t (h)+
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t (h)+Y˜
∗∗
H,t (h) =
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t
]−p (
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
(2.94)
At this point, we can define a price dispersion index PDH,t as follows:
PDH,t =
∫ 1
0
[
PH,t (h)
PH,t
]−p
dh =
∫ 1−θH
0
(
PˆH,t
PH,t
)−p
dh+
∫ 1
1−θH
[
PH,t−1 (h)
PH,t
(
PH,t−1
PH,t−2
)λH]−p
dh = (1− θH)
(
PˆH,t
PH,t
)−p
+
θH
(
PH,t−1
PH,t−2
)−pλH (PH,t−1
PH,t
)−p
PDH,t−1
(2.95)
The infinitesimal summation in the equation 2.93 can then be substituted
with the right hand side of the equation below:
∫ 1
0
Y˜H,t (h)+
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t (h)+Y˜
∗∗
H,t (h) dh = PDH,t
(
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
(2.96)
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2.4.4 Functional forms specification
In the following we make explicit functional form assumptions on the
investment adjustment costs function and foreign debt holding costs. We
start with the investment adjustment costs function, S. This is an increasing
and convex function (i.e. S′ (·), S′′ (·) > 0) satisfying in the steady state
S¯ = S¯′ = 0 and S¯′′ > 0. Consistently with these requirements, we impose
the functional form below:
S
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t
)
=
φ
2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t − 1
)2
=
φ
2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t − 1
)2
(2.97)
where φ > 0. Then:
S
′
(·) = ∂S (·)
∂I˜t
=
1
I˜t−1
gx,tφ
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t − 1
)
(2.98)
Let us now move to the risk premium function, Ψ (·). Recall that Ψ (·) has
to be differentiable and decreasing in the neighborhood of zero, furthermore
Ψ (0) = 1. Consistently with these requirements, we impose the functional
form below:
Ψ (dt) = 1− χd
(
dt − d¯
)
(2.99)
Ψ (bt) = 1− χb
(
bt − b¯
)
(2.100)
where χd, χb are calibrated to be positive.
2.4.5 The system of stationary recursive equilibrium condi-
tions
In the following we report the system of stationary recursive equilibrium
conditions. Given the (quasi) symmetric structure of our model, most of the
conditions describing the Scottish and the rUK economy are symmetrical.
For convenience, we therefore report the conditions for Scotland only, list-
ing those for the rUK where symmetry does not apply (e.g. ’wage-setting’
equation).
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Households saving and consumption decision
From the Scottish households problem of consumption and saving, we
have the following set of conditions:
• the aggregate budget constraint,
bt
R∗t
− bt−1
Πt
Y˜t−1
Y˜t
1
gx,t
− 1−$
$
RERH,Ft
(
d∗t
R∗∗t
Y˜ ∗t
Y˜t
− d
∗
t−1
Π∗∗t
RERF,rowt
RERF,rowt−1
Y˜ ∗t−1
Y˜t
1
gx,t
− T˜B
∗
real,t
Y˜t
− T˜Oreal,t
(1−$) Y˜t
)
+
T˜Rreal,t − G˜t − T˜t + Υ˜t
Y˜t
= 0
(2.101)
together with definition of the total tax burden the households are
subject to,
T˜Rreal,t = τ
cC˜t + τ
l
tW˜real,tNt + τ
k
t R
k
tmtK˜t−1
1
gx,t
(2.102)
• the Euler equation representing the choice between today and tomor-
row’s consumption (and investment in the UK asset),
1 = R∗t
[
1− χb (bt − b¯)]βEt( gx,tC˜t − bC˜t−1
gx,t+1C˜t+1 − bC˜t
1
gx,t
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
(2.103)
• the Tobin’s q,
Qt = βEt{
(
gx,tC˜t − bC˜t−1
gx,t+1C˜t+1 − bC˜t
1
gx,t
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)[(
1− τkt+1
)
Rkt+1mt+1 +Qt+1 (1− δ (mt+1))
]
}
(2.104)
• the investment decision in physical capital,
1−QtVt
1− φ
2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t − 1
)2
− I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,tφ
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t − 1
) =
βEt
(
gx,tC˜t − bC˜t−1
gx,t+1C˜t+1 − bC˜t
1
gx,t
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)
Qt+1Vt+1
( I˜t+1
I˜t
gx,t+1
)2
φ
(
I˜t+1
I˜t
gx,t+1 − 1
)
(2.105)
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• the investment decision in the foreign asset,
1 = βR∗∗t Et
(
gx,tC˜t − bC˜t−1
gx,t+1C˜t+1 − bC˜t
1
gx,t
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
RERH,rowt+1
RERH,rowt
1
Π∗∗t+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
)[
1− χd (dt − d¯)]
(2.106)
• the choice of capacity utilization,
(
1− τk
)
Rkt = Qtδ
′ (mt) (2.107)
• the law of motion of capital,
K˜t = (1− δ (mt)) K˜t−1 1
gx,t
+ Vt
1− φ
2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
gx,t − 1
)2 I˜t (2.108)
Households labour supply decision
From the Scottish households labour supply problem we have the follow-
ing set of conditions:
• the wage-setting equation,
1− τ l
1 + τ c
˜̂
W
1+wη
real,t =
w
w − 1
Z1t
Z2t
(2.109)
• the recursive definition of the numerator of the wage-setting equation,
Z1t =
(
Nt
W˜−real,t
)1+η
Dc,tDn,t + βθwA˜
1+η
t+1|tZ
1
t+1 (2.110)
• the recursive definition of the denominator of the wage-setting equa-
tion,
Z2t =
(
1
W˜real,t
)−w
NtDc,t(
C˜t − bC˜t−1 1gx,t
) + βθwA˜t+1|t 1gx,t+1 1Πt+1Z2t+1 (2.111)
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• an auxiliary condition entering the wage-setting equation,
A˜t+1|t =
 1
Πt+1
(
W˜Lreal,t
W˜Lreal,t−1
Πt
)λw−w [ gλwx,t
gx,t+1
]−w
(2.112)
• the aggregate wage index in Scotland,
W˜real,t =[
(
1− θL) (W˜ ∗real,tRERH,Ft )1−w + θL((1− θw) ˆ˜Wreal,t+
θwW˜Lreal,t−1
(
gx,t−1λw
gx,t
)
Πλwt−1
Πt
(
W˜Lreal,t−1
W˜Lreal,t−2
)λw
)1−w ]
1
1−w
(2.113)
• the local workers wage index in Scotland,
W˜Lreal,t = (1− θwt ) ̂˜W real,t+θwt W˜Lreal,t−1 Πλwt−1Πt
(
gx,t−1λw
gx,t
)(
W˜Lreal,t−1
W˜Lreal,t−2
)λw
(2.114)
Intermediate good firm production and pricing
From the intermediate good firms problem of cost minimization and
price-setting we have the following set of conditions:
• the optimal combination of production factors,
Nt
mtK˜t−1
=
1− α
α
(
Rkt
W˜real,t
)
1
gx,t
(2.115)
• the marginal production costs,
M˜Ct =
Rkt
α
(
W˜real,t
)1−α
At
α−1
(1− α)1−α αα (2.116)
• the production function,
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PDH,t
(
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
=
(
mtK˜t−1
)α
(gx,t)
−α (AtNt)1−α
(2.117)
• the price dispersion index,
PDH,t = (1− θH) (pˆH,t)−p + θH
(
ΠHt−1
λH
ΠHt
)−p
PDH,t−1 (2.118)
• the price-setting equation,
pˆH,t =
p
(p − 1)
F 1t
F 2t
(2.119)
• the recursive definition of the numerator of the price-setting equation,
F 1t = MCt
(
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
+βθHΛt,t+1gx,t+1
(
ΠHt
λH
ΠHt+1
)−p
F 1t+1
(2.120)
• the recursive definition of the denominator of the price-setting equa-
tion,
F 2t =
(
Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t
)
pH,t+βθHΛt,t+1gx,t+1
(
ΠHt
λH
ΠHt+1
)1−p
F 2t+1
(2.121)
• the intermediate goods price index,
1 =
(1− θH) (pˆH,t)1−p + θH (ΠHt−1λH
ΠHt
)1−p 11−p (2.122)
• the intermediate goods price definition,
pH,t =
ΠHt
Πt
pH,t−1 (2.123)
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Wholesale good firm production and pricing
From the wholesale good firm problem of cost minimization and price-
setting we have the following set of conditions:
• the production function,
Y˜t =
[
ωH1
1
θ Y˜
(θ−1)
θ
H,t + ω
H
2
1
θ Y˜
(θ−1)
θ
F,t +
(
1− ωH1 − ωH2
) 1
θ Y˜
(θ−1)
θ
row,t
] θ
(θ−1)
(2.124)
• the optimal demand of rUK-produced intermediate goods,
Y˜H,t
Y˜F,t
=
ωH1
ωH2
(
pH,t
pF,t
1
RERH,Ft
)−θ
(2.125)
• the optimal demand of ROW-produced intermediate goods,
Y˜H,t
Y˜row,t
=
ωH1
1− ωH1 − ωH2
(
pH,t
RERH,rowt
)−θ
(2.126)
• the price-setting equation,
1 = µf,t
[
ωH1 (pH,t)
1−θ + ωH2
(
RERH,Ft pF,t
)1−θ
+
(
1− ωH1 − ωH2
)(
RERH,rowt
)1−θ] 11−θ
(2.127)
Public sector
From the public sector we have a number of conditions establishing the
composition of the public finance aggregates as well as setting out the budget
constraints faced by the different fiscal authorities, including:
• the definition of total public consumption in Scotland,
G˜t = G˜devt + ςG˜nodev
uk
t (2.128)
• the definition of total transfers to Scotland,
T˜ sct = G˜devt + T˜t (2.129)
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• the growth of non-devolved expenditure in Scotland,
ggt =
G˜dev
∗
t gx,t − G˜dev
∗
t−1
G˜dev
∗
t−1
∗DDt (2.130)
• the evolution of the comparability factor for the Barnett formula,
DDt =
G˜dev
∗
t
G˜devt
(2.131)
• the Barnett formula,
G˜devt = G˜devt−1 (2.132)
• the deviations from the Barnett formula,
G˜devt = G˜devt exp(
Gdev
t ) (2.133)
• the Westminster budget constraint,
bUKt
R∗t
+$τkt mtR
k
t gx,t
K˜t−1
Y˜ ∗t
RERF,Ht + (1−$) τkt m∗tRk∗t gx,t
K˜∗t−1
Y˜ ∗t
+
$τ lt
W˜real,t
Y˜ ∗t
NtRER
F,H
t + (1−$) τ lt
W˜ ∗real,t
Y˜ ∗t
N∗t +$τ
c
t
C˜t
Y˜ ∗t
RERF,Ht +
(1−$) τ ct
C˜∗t
Y˜ ∗t
+
T˜Oreal,t
Y˜ ∗t
+
Υ˜t
Y˜ ∗t
= bUKt−1 + (1−$)
G˜dev
∗
t
Y˜ ∗t
+
ς$RERF,Ht
G˜nodev
uk
t
Y˜ ∗t
+ (1−$) ς∗ G˜nodev
uk
t
Y˜ ∗t
+ (1−$) T˜
∗
t
Y˜ ∗t
+$RERF,Ht
T˜ sct
Y˜ ∗t
(2.134)
• the tax revenues from oil,
T˜Oreal,t = (p
o
t −mcot ) Q˜ot τ ot (2.135)
• the debt stabilizing, lump sum tax rule,
Υ˜t = ρ
Υ
(
bUKt − b¯
)
(2.136)
97
• the monetary rule,
R∗t
R
=
(
R∗t−1
R
)ϕR [
($Πt + (1−$) Π∗t )ϕpi
(
$
GDPt
GDPt−1
+ (1−$) GDP
∗
t
GDP ∗t−1
)ϕy
(gx,t)
ϕy
]1−ϕR
exp (m∗t )
(2.137)
Market clearing conditions
Equilibrium requires domestic and international markets to clear. This
is ensured by the following conditions:
• the final good market clearing,
Y˜t = C˜t + I˜t + G˜t (2.138)
• the UK’s capital market clearing,
bukt = (1−$) b∗t +$bt
Y˜t
Y˜ ∗t
RERF,Ht (2.139)
• the international market clearing,
dukt
R∗∗t
−d
uk
t−1
Π∗∗t
RERF,rowt
RERF,rowt−1
Y˜ ∗t−1
Y˜ ∗t
1
gx,t
= $
T˜Breal,t
Y˜ ∗t
RERF,Ht +(1−$)
T˜B
∗
real,t
Y˜ ∗t
+
T˜Oreal,t
Y˜ ∗t
(2.140)
together with the definition of the Scottish balance of trade,
T˜Breal,t = pH,t
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t+pH,tY˜
∗∗
H,t−RERH,Ft pF,tY˜F,t−RERH,rowt Y˜row,t
(2.141)
and the balance of trade in the rUK,
T˜B
∗
real,t = pF,t
$
1−$Y˜F,t+pF,tY˜
∗∗
F,t−RERF,Ht pH,tY˜ ∗H,t−RERF,rowt Y˜ ∗row,t
(2.142)
• the international capital market clearing,
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dukt = $dtRER
F,H
t
Y˜t
Y˜ ∗t
+ (1−$) d∗t (2.143)
RUK non-symmetrical conditions
In the rUK, equations 2.113 and 2.112 will not be symmetrical. In par-
ticular:
• the wage index will depend only on local workers wage,
W˜ ∗real,t = [(1− θ∗w) ˜̂W ∗
1−∗w
real,t+
θ∗w
W˜ ∗real,t−1
(
g
λ∗w
x,t−1
gx,t
)
Π∗t−1
λ∗w
Π∗t
(
W˜ ∗real,t−1
W˜ ∗real,t−2
)λ∗w1−∗w ] 11−∗w (2.144)
• the auxiliary condition will not include local workers wage,
A˜∗t+1|t =
 1
Π∗t+1
(
W˜ ∗real,t
W˜ ∗real,t−1
Π∗t
)λ∗w−∗w [ gλ∗wx,t
gx,t+1
]−∗w
(2.145)
Rest of the world
The rest of world is exogenously modeled as a VAR(1), including ROW
GDP, inflation and interest rate. Furthermore, symmetric demand schedules
for imported goods to those of Scotland and the rUK are imposed. This is
represented by the following set of conditions:
• the VAR,
Ft+1 = AFt + 
row
t (2.146)
where Ft = [Y ∗∗t , pi∗∗t , R∗∗t ]
• the ROW demand for the rUK-produced intermediate goods,
Y ∗∗row,t
Y ∗∗F,t
=
ωrow1
1− ωrow1 − ωrow2
(
RERF,rowt
pF,t
)−θ
(2.147)
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• the ROW demand for the Scottish-produced intermediate goods,
Y ∗∗row,t
Y ∗∗H,t
=
ωrow1
1− ωrow1 − ωrow2
(
RERH,rowt
pH,t
)−θ
(2.148)
• the ROW production function,
Y ∗∗t =
[
ωrow1
1
θY
∗∗ (θ−1)
θ
H,t + ω
row
2
1
θY
∗∗ (θ−1)
θ
F,t + (1− ωrow1 − ωrow2 )
1
θ Y
∗∗ (θ−1)
θ
row,t
] θ
(θ−1)
(2.149)
Remaining definitions
The model further contains a few definitions, including:
• the stochastic discount factor,
Λt,t+1 = Et
Dc,t+1
Dc,t
1
gx,t
(
gx,tC˜t − bC˜t−1
)
(
gx,t+1C˜t+1 − bC˜t
) (2.150)
• the GDP,
GDPt = Y˜H,t +
1−$
$
Y˜ ∗H,t + Y˜
∗∗
H,t (2.151)
• the real exchange rate between Scotland and the rUK,
RERH,Ft =
Π∗t
Πt
RERH,Ft−1 (2.152)
• the inverse of the real exchange rate between Scotland and the rUK,
RERF,Ht =
1
RERH,Ft
(2.153)
Exogenous processes
Finally, the model contains a large set of exogenous processes whose law
of motion is reported below. These includes:
• the discount factor shock,
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log (Dc,t) = ρ
c log (Dc,t−1) + 
c,d
t (2.154)
• the intra-temporal preference shock,
log (Dn,t) = ρ
n log (Dn,t−1) + 
n,d
t (2.155)
• the investment technology shock,
log (Vt) = ρ
v log (Vt−1) + vt (2.156)
• the gross rate of growth of UK technology,
log (gx,t) = 
x
t (2.157)
• the temporary productivity shock,
log (At) = ρ
a log (At−1) + at (2.158)
• the mark-up shock,
log (µf,t) = log (µf ) + 
µf
t (2.159)
• the price of oil,
log (pot ) = ρ
po log
(
pot−1
)
+ (1− ρpo) log po + pot (2.160)
• the oil extracted quantity (in the UK),
log
(
Q˜ot
)
= ρqo log
(
Q˜ot−1
)
+ (1− ρqo) logQo + qot (2.161)
• the oil marginal production costs (in the UK),
log (mcot ) = ρ
mco log
(
mcot−1
)
+ (1− ρmco) logmco + mcot (2.162)
• the government transfers,
log T˜t = ρ
tr log T˜t−1 +
(
1− ρtr) T˜ + trt (2.163)
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• the devolved expenditure in the rUK,
log G˜dev
∗
t = ρgdev log G˜dev
∗
t + (1− ρgdev) log G˜dev
∗
+ gdevt (2.164)
• the non-devolved expenditure in the rUK,
log
(
G˜nodev
uk
t
)
= ρgnodev log
(
G˜nodev
uk
t−1
)
+(1− ρgnodev) log
(
G˜nodev
uk
)
+gnodevt
(2.165)
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2.5 Concluding remarks
The objective of this chapter was to develop a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model to be employed for carrying out fiscal devolution analysis
within a macroeconomic framework. The model is designed considering the
case of Scotland and the rUK economy. We began by reviewing the literature
on DSGE models developed in recent years in academia and in central banks.
The framework of Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) has been identified as a suitable
starting point for developing our framework. We have then amended and
extended this model to adequately represent the economic linkages between
Scotland and the rUK. In particular, we have revisited key aspects such as
the price pass-through and the structure of the public sector. Finally, we
have transformed this model into stationary, recursive terms and presented
the set of equilibrium conditions of our economy. This version of the model
is suitable to be input into standard software for the purpose of solution and
simulation.
The next chapter of this thesis will deal with the estimation of the model
and its simulation. Together with shedding light on the dynamics of the
economic adjustment within the UK, such an exercise will also provide an
important source of model validation. Specifically, it will offer an insight on
the model ability to replicate theory predictions, while accounting for the
dynamics in the data.
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Chapter 3
DSGE model for Scotland and
the rUK: a Bayesian
investigation
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we developed a DSGE model of the Scottish
and rUK economy for the analysis of fiscal devolution arrangements within
the UK. However, for this model to be able to produce quantitative predic-
tions we need to assign values to its parameters. Specifically, we need to
parametrize our model for it to reproduce the main features of the Scottish
and of the rUK economy. There are various possible approaches in param-
eter selection, offering alternative trade-off among the information which is
conveyed from the data, the statistical treatment of the model and, not least,
the overall robustness of the procedure. In the context of a large and densely
parametrized model such as ours, this is a key aspect to be addressed. In
particular, we aim to select a procedure able to satisfy a number of mini-
mum requirements, namely: (i) to be able to reproduce most of the data
features; (ii) to be able to suit alternative uses of the model (i.e. from policy
analysis to academic research) and (iii) to be robust. We therefore begin
this chapter by reviewing possible approaches in parameters selection and
discuss their main features. For reasons to be discussed next, we will opt for
estimating our model using Bayesian likelihood-based techniques. Bayesian
estimation is based on a combination of statistical results, solution algo-
rithms and powerful simulation techniques which have become a cornerstone
in macroeconomics. Given the centrality and the complexity of this estima-
tion technique, we provide a full description of its central aspects (e.g priors
elicitation) as well as the derivation of the main statistical results (e.g. the
Kalman filter) that underpin its foundation.
We will then proceed to estimate our model. This will require choosing a
sample of macro-variables and appropriately transforming them to be linked
to the their model counterparts. Estimation results will provide us with a
first assessment of our framework. Specifically, parameter estimates which
are economically meaningful, and broadly in line with the wider literature,
will provide a first source of validation to our model.
Once estimated the model, we will explore its main quantitative predic-
tions, for example: how a demand shock originating in the rUK propagates
to Scotland? How does an increase in the interest rate from the Bank of
England affect Scotland through its direct and indirect (e.g. feedback from
rUK) effects? The study of the Impulse Response Functions will allow us to
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address these questions. This exercise, furthermore, will provide a second
source of validation to our framework, whenever the dynamics produced by
the model are largely consistent with the theory and with the literature.
We begin by reviewing the alternative approaches for parametrizing DSGE
models, in section 3.2, where we will further discuss the theory behind the
Bayesian estimation techniques. We will then move to estimate the model,
documenting the passages involved in our estimation procedure and its re-
sults in section 3.3. Finally, in section 3.4, we will analyze the impulse
response functions produced by our model and study the mechanic of the
economic adjustment in Scotland and in the rUK. Few concluding remarks
will then follow.
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3.2 Parameters selection in DSGE models:
estimation and other approaches
As discussed in the introduction, there are various possible approaches
in parameter selection, offering alternative trade-off among the information
which is conveyed from the data, the assumptions required on the model
shocks and the statistical treatment of the model. In the context of a large
and densely parametrized model such as ours, the choice a parameter selec-
tion procedure it is not an obvious one. We therefore review below the main
approaches in parameters selection and discuss their central features. As we
select Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate our model, we then discuss
in detail the features and derive the main statistical results underpinning this
approach.
3.2.1 Alternative approaches in parameters selection: Cali-
bration Versus Estimation
A first characterization of the alternative approaches to parameter se-
lection is the separation between the practice of calibration and estimation
techniques. The main difference between these two consists in the statisti-
cal treatment of the model. In particular, calibration is substantially based
on the denial of any probabilistic interpretation: since models constitute an
abstraction of reality, they are necessarily false and any statistical test is
expected to reject them. Moving from this premise, the calibration proce-
dure aims at parametrizing models to ensure relevant stylized facts from the
observed economy are replicated, without attempting to provide any proba-
bilistic foundation. The procedure typically requires solving the model pa-
rameters as a function of endogenous variables in ratios at their steady state
(e.g capital-output ratio, consumption-out ratio etc). Parameter values are
then pinned down by setting these ratios to match the empirical ones (for a
detailed description refer to Cooley and Prescott (1995)). Model evaluation
is then carried out on the basis of an informal assessment of the model ability
to match relevant characteristics of the data. The main critique researchers
attach to calibration, is that it does not provide a framework for assessing
the uncertainty surrounding model predictions; this is a serious impediment
to the evaluation of the empirical performance of competing models. For
this reason, calibration has been progressively overtaken by estimation tech-
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niques. Estimation, on the other hand, is a collection of procedures providing
statistical foundation to the model and employing statistical inference tools,
such as hypothesis testing and model likelihood. The set of procedures em-
ployed depend on the particular estimation technique selected. We survey
below the main estimation techniques used in the DSGE literature.
3.2.2 Alternative approaches in model estimation: GMM,
SMM, Classical ML, Bayesian approach
Standard textbooks (among others: DeJong and Dave (2011) and Canova
(2007)) tend to characterize estimation techniques on the basis of two main
criteria. The first involves the type of information which is used by the
estimation procedure, distinguishing between Full information and Partial
information. Partial information methods use only some of the information
available in the sample for estimating the parameters of the model. The
most widespread and well known technique in this category is the General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM henceforth). Under GMM, model param-
eters are estimated to minimize the weighted distance between some model
and sample moments. A slight variation over this approach is represented
by the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM henceforth), which relies on
the same moment matching procedure as GMM. However, SMM is applied
in cases where the orthogonality conditions cannot be assessed analytically
and relies on simulation instead1. On the contrary, full information methods
exploit all the information available in the sample. In this category, maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) estimation represents a cornerstone. ML targets the
whole distribution of empirical variables, not only some of their moments.
This is reflected in the likelihood principle stating that, in parameter infer-
ence based on an observed sample, all the relevant information is contained
in the likelihood function. When compared to partial information methods,
this property constitutes at the same time the strength and the weakness of
this methodology. Indeed, while not disregarding any of the information in
the sample, likelihood-based methods require parametric assumptions over
the distribution of the model’s structural shocks carrying the risk of mis-
1More precisely, SMM exploits the fact that the asymptotic properties of the resultant
testing procedure are retained when we replace the estimator derived analytically with
the one obtained by simulation.
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specification. The same does not occur with GMM and SMM which, not
being parametric methods, do not require any parametric assumption. On
the other hand, the problem with limited information methods is that infer-
ence may depend on the choice of the moments to be matched2.
A second criterion used to characterize estimation procedures is by the
type of statistical analysis employed, distinguishing between the Classical
and the Bayesian approach. Following the treatment in main macroeco-
nomics textbooks, we consider here the differences between the Classical and
the Bayesian approach only in the context of full information methods. In
classical analysis, model parameters are interpreted as fixed (but unknown),
whereas the sample is interpreted as a random draw from the model likeli-
hood. Parameter estimates are obtained through likelihood maximization,
namely by selecting those values that maximize the probability of a given
sample realization. Uncertainty surrounding point estimates derives from
the sample at hand representing only a realization among all possible draw-
ings, and it is conveyed through the use of standard errors. Inference is
then pursued through classical hypothesis-testing, under the null hypothesis
that a given parametrization of the model corresponds to the data gener-
ating process, we assess the probability of observing our sample. If this
probability lies within a certain threshold, then the null hypothesis is not
rejected, otherwise it is. In the Bayesian approach, instead, parameters are
interpreted as random and the sample as fixed. The objective is to find the
posterior distribution of parameters, in light of the observed data and of
prior beliefs/knowledge about parameters values. Typically point estimates
will be provided by the mean or mode of the posterior distribution, and un-
certainty surrounding them will be measured by the standard deviation. In
the Bayesian process of inference, competing models are assessed on the ba-
sis of their relative probability conditional on the observed sample, without
maintaining any of them as the null hypothesis. This is an attractive feature;
indeed, given that all models are necessarily false, the practice of Classical
test of working under the imposition of one model as the true data generating
process is somehow unsatisfactory. Moreover, another appealing property of
the Bayesian techniques is that, being based on Bayes rule, it is coherent
2For a performance comparison between Full-information and Limited information pro-
cedures refer to Ruge-Murcia (2007).
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with rational decision making and updating following new information ac-
crual3. Furthermore, note that the use of priors in the Bayesian approach
allows us to exploit pre-sample information that are often extraordinary rich.
This extra source of information may become crucial when facing identifica-
tion problems, since priors may induce curvatures along dimensions of the
likelihood function that are, otherwise, nearly flat. Finally, it should be con-
sidered that, often, likelihood maximization could be an hard task and the
results may be not entirely robust. For all these reasons, in recent times
Bayesian estimation has become the prominent approach in the DSGE esti-
mation. In the following we present the main concepts and the tools needed
for its implementation.
3.2.3 Bayesian estimation
Basic ingredients
The core task in Bayesian estimation is to obtain and to evaluate the
so called "posterior distribution" of model parameters given the series of
observed data. The posterior distribution combines the information from
the model likelihood, given data, and pre-sample knowledge (the so called
"prior"). The theoretical result underpinning this approach is the Bayes
theorem:
P (B|A) = P (A|B)P (B)
P (A)
(3.1)
To show how this results is transposed in DSGE models estimation, the
following items are defined:
• The observed data series, Z≡ {zt}Tt=1 ∈ RN×T
• The parameter set, Θ ∈ RK
• The likelihood function, f (Z|θ): RN×T ×Θ→ R+
• The prior distribution, pi (θ) : Θ→ R+
3Note that Classical (or Frequentist) approach works ex-ante, defining a procedure
that has certain properties on repeated sampling: e.g, in the 95% of samples the mean
will fall within some interval. Instead, the Bayesian approach is entirely ex-post: we find
the posterior distribution of our variable of interest, updating our prior knowledge on the
basis of the observed sample (with no role for samples that have not been observed).
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From items above, the following relations can then be derived:
• The joint distribution of data and parameters, f (Z, θ) = f (Z|θ)pi (θ)
• The marginal distribution of data, P (Z) =
∫
f (Z, θ) dθ=
∫
f (Z|θ)pi (θ) dθ
• The posterior distribution of parameters given data, pi (θ|Z) = f(Z|θ)pi(θ)∫
f(Z|θ)pi(θ) dθ
As anticipated, the goal of our estimation procedure will be to character-
ize the posterior distribution of parameters given data. For this purpose, the
definition of the posterior distribution itself traces the road map of problems
we need to deal with:
• how to specify the prior?
• how to evaluate the likelihood function?
• how to explore the likelihood function?
We address these questions below; before that, however, a remark is due.
While dealing with the concepts of joint, marginal and posterior distribution,
one should never forget that they are all conditional on the particular model
under consideration. Accordingly we could rename our likelihood function
as f (Z|θ, i) where i ∈M represents a particular model specification among
the set of all possible model specifications M . Throughout this chapter such
index is dropped for the sole purpose of easing notation.
Priors elicitation
Prior distributions are meant to reflect subjective beliefs, as well as in-
formation derived from other data sources (not included in the estimation
sample) such as micro-level data and pre-sample information. As observed
by An and Schorfheide (2007), priors play an important role in model estima-
tion since: "they might downweigh regions of the parameter space that are
at odds with observations not contained in the estimation sample. They may
also add curvature to a likelihood function that is (nearly) flat in some di-
mensions of the parameter space and therefore strongly influence the shape
of posterior distribution". In general, priors elicitation is a delicate task
involving a number of issues which are briefly reviewed here. A first prob-
lem is how "loose" or "tight" priors should be, given that a loose prior will
imply the posterior is largely dominated by the likelihood, and vice versa.
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In this regard, Fernández-Villaverde (2010) suggests adopting different ap-
proaches depending on the model application. For policy making, it is better
to adopt tighter priors which will guide the model toward more "reasonable"
parametrizations whereas, for academic research, a looser prior will allow us
to learn more about the model properties. A second issue is whether pa-
rameter priors should be chosen in isolation or on a joint basis and whether
they should be model invariant. Typically, and for the sake of simplicity, it
is assumed that model parameters are independent, this simplification how-
ever has important drawbacks. Indeed, the resulting joint distribution may
end up assigning non-negligible probability mass to regions of the parameter
space determining model predictions which are at odds with theory and em-
pirical evidence. Furthermore, priors are often chosen to be invariant across
competing model specifications. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), how-
ever, observe that identical parametrization of exogenous shocks may lead
to very different dynamics through alternative models; therefore the use of
the same set of priors may implicitly penalize some models while favouring
others. To overcome these problems they propose a systematic approach for
priors elicitation based on the division of parameters in three subsets: the
steady states governing parameters, parameters governing the propagations
of exogenous shocks (correlations, standard deviations etc..) and parameters
governing endogenous propagation mechanisms (including taste, technology
and policy parameters). They propose to calibrate the first group through
"great ratios" (namely, long run averages for macro-economic variables in
accordance with business cycle literature), while priors for the second ones
are (jointly) selected through a quasi-likelihood function constructed on the
basis of a set of endogenous variables and an approximated version of the
model. For the last group, instead, no special procedure is necessary since
typically researchers have beliefs originating from other sources of informa-
tion (e.g. microeconomic studies). This procedure, while providing a sys-
tematic approach for prior elicitation, allows the attainment of two goals:
(group of) priors distributions are jointly derived, and the priors of parame-
ters governing the propagation of exogenous shocks are not model invariant.
Finally, another issue to be aware of regards the use of other data sources
for setting priors. Take, for example, micro-level data. As observed by
Fernández-Villaverde (2010), translating micro-level data into macro models
can often be less obvious than what one might think. Indeed, micro-data
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are estimated from a sub-population of individuals whereas the correspon-
dent macro-model parameters are meant to represent the characteristics of
an agent who is stand-in for the economy. Since the aggregation from micro
to macro is far from trivial, one should be careful in operating such a trans-
lation as the classical example of the elasticity of labour supply suggests.
At the same time, micro-estimates constitutes a natural reference point and
departures from those, especially if big, should be appropriately justified.
Similarly, the use of parameters estimates from other countries should be
undertaken with care. This is a common practice and it is coherent with the
idea, somewhat pervasive in economics, that individuals from all parts of
the world are substantially the same, even though economical and cultural
conditions may affect their attitudes. Taking the example of the discount fac-
tor, admittedly cultural differences, as well as differences in financial market
development, may change its value from one country to another. Nonethe-
less, evidence from other countries constitute a source of information which
should be taken into account, especially because those differences typically
tend to be small.
Evaluating the likelihood function
Once priors have been elicited, the first step in exploring the posterior
distribution is to evaluate the model likelihood at different points, θ, of the
parameter space. In DSGE estimation this is done by employing the tools of
state space representation and filtering theory. We discuss this below follow-
ing closely the conceptual steps proposed by Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
From the solution of the DSGE model we can get the law of motion of states
in the state space representation consisting of:
• A transition equation, Xt = f (Xt−1,Wt; θ), where Xt is the vector
of states, Wt is the vector of shocks and θ is the set of structural
parameters;
• A measurement equation, Zt = g (Xt, Vt; θ) where Zt are the observed
variables and Vt a vector of shocks defined over them (which typically
have an interpretation in terms of measurements errors).
The transition equation results from the model solution and specifies the
law of motion of states, Xt, whereas the measurement equation relates the
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set of observed data series, Zt, to such states. These two equations allow
us to link data and model variables whose joint distribution will in turn
depend on the chosen parametrization, θ. This is the core mechanism at
the basis of the model likelihood we derive below. Before that, a couple of
aspects are worth noticing. The first one is that the number of variables
in the measurement equation has to be lower or equal than the number of
shocks (given by dim (Wt + Vt)). Whenever this condition is not satisfied the
model suffers from stochastic singularity and its likelihood will be zero with
probability one4. The second aspect involves the choice of observables. Since
the condition over their number is the only restriction researchers face, this
leaves many degrees of freedom. Such choice, nonetheless, should be treated
carefully since variable selection may significantly affect inference, as shown
by Guerron-Quintana (2010)5. In this regards, it is typically recommended to
pick the series that are more relevant for the purpose of the model (e.g hours
worked and wages should be included in a model of the labour market).
Going back to model likelihood, note that given the knowledge of shocks
distribution:
• from Xt = f (Xt−1,Wt; θ), we can get p (Xt|Xt−1; θ);
• from Zt = g (Xt, Vt; θ), we can get p (Zt|Xt; θ):
• by plugging Xt = f (Xt−1,Wt; θ) into Zt = g (Xt, Vt; θ), we obtain
Zt = g (f (Xt−1,Wt; θ) , Vt; θ) from where we can get p (Zt|Xt−1; θ)
All these conditional probabilities are used in computing the likelihood, even
though they enter in a kind of disguised way. In particular, given our state
4What would happen, in fact, is that extra observables would be a deterministic func-
tion of model endogenous variables. Since the probability of model variables to match
exactly data series is zero, then the whole likelihood will be zero.
5In particular this author shows that the omission of some observables may dramati-
cally influence the mode of certain parameters, affecting model prediction and forecasting
performance. On the other hand, the introduction of observables for which the model has
not be designed may complicate the estimation of structural parameters (although the
usage of measurement errors may ameliorate this problem).
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representation we can write our likelihood function p
(
zT |θ) as follows6:
p
(
zT |θ) = p (z1|θ) T∏
t=2
p
(
zt|zt−1; θ
)
=
∫
p (z1|X1; θ) dX1
T∏
t=2
∫
p (zt|Xt; θ) p
(
Xt|zt−1; θ
)
dXt
(3.2)
Note that we only need the knowledge of
{
p
(
Xt|zt−1; θ
)}T
t=1
for assessing
the likelihood of the model (since p (zt|Xt; θ) is given by the measurement
equation). For this task we rely on filtering theory, which is the branch
of mathematics concerned with finding the sequence of states conditional
distributions given noisy observations. We will take a recursive filtering
approach where data are processed sequentially within a procedure consisting
of two stages: Prediction and Update. The prediction stage uses the model
to predict the state pdf one period ahead with respect to the measurement
time. This stage relies on the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation:
p
(
Xt+1|zt; θ
)
=
∫
p (Xt+1|Xt; θ) p
(
Xt|zt; θ
)
dXt (3.3)
Whereas the update operation uses the latest measurement to modify the
prediction pdf. This is achieved using Bayes theorem, which is the mecha-
nism for updating knowledge about states in the light of extra information
from new data:
p
(
Xt|zt; θ
)
=
p (zt|Xt; θ) p
(
Xt|zt−1; θ
)
p (zt|zt−1; θ) (3.4)
where,
p
(
zt|zt−1; θ
)
=
∫
p (zt|Xt; θ) p
(
Xt|zt−1; θ
)
dXt (3.5)
is the conditional likelihood. Then, by recursive application of forecasting
and updating we can generate the whole sequence p
(
Xt|zt−1; θ
)T
t=1
. However
the problem of such a procedure is that involves the computation of a large
number of integrals, making in many cases the whole process unfeasible. To
6In the following we use the standard Markov notation where zt indicates the variable
realization occurred at time t, whereas zt is a vector of length t indicating the sequence
of realizations occurred up to time t, namely zt = {z0, z1......, zt}
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solve this problem we have basically two routes:
• The Kalman filter (based on restrictive assumptions that make an an-
alytic solution available);
• The Particle filter (which relies on simulation).
In most cases, medium to large scale DSGE models are solved by log-
linearizing around their deterministic steady-state and their shock distribu-
tion is assumed to be Gaussian. The resulting model is therefore linear and
its likelihood function is known. Under these conditions, which apply in the
context of our model, Kalman filter can be applied. Below, we will therefore
focus on this approach.
The Kalman filter
The Kalman Filter is based on the assumptions that the measurement
and transitional equations are linear and that shocks are normally distributed.
Let us then define:
• Transition equation:
xt+1 = Fxt +Gωt+1, ωt+1 ∼ N (0, Q) (3.6)
• Measurement equation:
zt = Hxt + vt, vt ∼ N (0, R) (3.7)
where xt are the states and zt are the observables. Our goal is to write and
to evaluate the likelihood function for zt ≡ {zt}Tt=1 at any point θ of the
parameter space, namely:
L
(
zT |θ) = T∏
t=1
L
(
zt|zt−1, θ
)
(3.8)
Given the Gaussian structure of the shocks, we will be able to rely on
few properties:
• The likelihood of zt is normal;
• the sequence of all conditional distributions p
(
zt|zt−1, θ
)
is normal;
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• given normality, we will need to track only first and second central
moments.
we can then develop the likelihood in equation 3.8 accordingly 7:
logL
(
zT |θ) = T∑
t=1
logL
(
zt|zt−1, θ
)
=
−
T∑
t=1
[
n
2
log2pi +
1
2
log
∣∣Ωt|t−1∣∣+ 12vt′Ω−1t|t−1vt
] (3.10)
where:
vt = zt − zt|t−1 = zt −H ′xt|t−1 and Ωt|t−1 = H ′Σt|t−1H +R (3.11)
To understand the first group of equalities in equation 3.11, consider that:
zt|t−1 = E(zt|zt−1) = H ′xt|t−1 = H ′E
(
xt|zt−1
)
(3.12)
where the first and last equality comes from arbitrary notational choice,
whereas the second is derived from the measurement equation (see eq. 3.7).
Finally note that:
Ωt|t−1 = E
[(
zt − zt|t−1
) (
zt − zt|t−1
)′|zt−1] (3.13)
and
Σt|t−1 = E
[(
xt − xt|t−1
) (
xt − xt|t−1
)′|zt−1] (3.14)
Then, from straightforward calculations, we can get the second group
7Note that this passage is straightforward once we note that the conditional distribution
of a multivariate normal is normal itself. Then its density will be of the form:
f
(
zt|zt−1, θ
)
=
1√
(2pi)n|Ωt|t−1|
exp
(
−1
2
(
zt − zt|t−1
)′
Ω−1t|t−1
(
zt − zt|t−1
))
(3.9)
where zt|t−1 and Ωt|t−1 are respectively the conditional mean and the conditional variance
whose expressions, as mentioned later in the text, are known. By taking the logarithm of
this density function we easily get into eq. 3.10.
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of equalities in 3.118. As stated above, given normality assumption (and
linearity of our equations), in order to assess L
(
zT |θ), we just need the
sequence of all first and second central moments (vt and Ωt|t−1,) from t = 0
to T . Therefore the solution of our problem (evaluating the likelihood at a
given θ) reduces to the following logical steps:
• start with xt|t−1 and Σt|t−1 (forecast or initial condition9);
• observe a new zt;
• obtain xt|t and Σt|t (update);
• noting that xt+1|t = Fxt|t and Σt+1|t = FΣt|tF ′ + GQG′, we will be
able to come back to the first step and wait for zt+1 (new forecast).
Repeating this procedure from t = 0 to T return us with the sequence of all
first and second moments we are looking for; once we obtain them, evaluating
the likelihood is just straightforward. Accordingly, our key question is how
to get xt|t and Σt|t from xt|t−1, Σt|t−1 and zt. For this task, we rely once
more on the Gaussian structure of our processes. Recall that:
xt |zt−1
zt
 ∼ N ([ xt|t−1
H ′xt|t−1
] [
Σt|t−1 Σt|t−1H
H ′Σt|t−1 H ′Σt|t−1H +R
])
(3.16)
then we can write:
xt|zt, zt−1 = xt|zt ∼ N
(
xt|t,Σt|t
)
(3.17)
8 For this purpose, just note that
E
[(
zt − zt|t−1
) (
zt − zt|t−1
)′|zt−1] ≡
E
[
H ′
(
xt − xt|t−1
) (
xt − xt|t−1
)′
H + vt
(
xt − xt|t−1
)′
H +H ′
(
xt − xt|t−1
)
v′t + vtv
′
t|zt−1
]
=
H ′Σt|t−1H +R
(3.15)
9The first iteration of the algorithm will run with x0 and Σ0 which are the (known)
initial conditions.
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where10:
xt|t = xt|t−1 + Σt|t−1H
(
H ′Σt|t−1H +R
)−1 (
zt −H ′xt|t−1
)
(3.18)
and
Σt|t = Σt|t−1 − Σt|t−1H
(
H ′Σt|t−1H +R
)−1
H ′Σt|t−1 (3.19)
Note that by defining theKalman gain at time t,Kt = Σt|t−1H
(
H ′Σt|t−1H +R
)−1,
equations 3.18 and 3.19 can be re-written respectively as:
xt|t = xt|t−1 +Kt
(
zt −H ′xt|t−1
)
(3.20)
and,
Σt|t = Σt|t−1 −KtH ′Σt|t−1 (3.21)
This provides us with intuition about the updating mechanism of the state
variable predictor xt|t, whe new information zt arrives. Kt acts as (an opti-
mal11) weight defining the balance between past informations xt|t−1 and the
new information arriving a time t, zt. In this regard, note that:
• Whenever the uncertainty associated with forecasting with past in-
formation, xt|t−1, is large (Σt|t−1 is large) this procedure gives higher
weight to the new information (Kt is large);
• If the new information tend to be noisy (R is large) we give more weight
to the old prediction (Kt is small).
To conclude, notice the link between the procedure described here for the
Kalman filter and the procedure described above for recursive filtering. Given
the Gaussian assumption, we can determine the objects needed for comput-
ing the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation and the Bayes theorem, namely:
• P
(
xt|zt−1; θ
)
= N
(
xt|t−1,Σt|t−1
)
• P
(
xt|zt; θ
)
= N
(
xt|t,Σt|t
)
• P
(
xt+1|zt; θ
)
= N
(
xt+1|t,Σt+1|t
)
10Note that eq. 3.18 and 3.19 come from the properties of conditional mean and condi-
tional variance of a multivariate normal distribution.
11It can be shown that Kt is such that it minimizes the variance of Σt|t. A proof of this
is provided by Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
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Exploring the likelihood function
The instruments derived and described so far allow us to evaluate the
model posterior distribution at any θ up to a constant, namely: pi
(
θ|zT ) ∝
f
(
zt|θ)pi (θ). Now, our issue is how to characterize this distribution in the
parameter space Θ, given that we do not know its functional form. For this
task we will rely onMarkov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation (hereafter McMc)
and on the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm which permits its implementation.
To get into the core of this technique, note that typically a major concern
in Markov chain theory is to determine the conditions under which there
exists an invariant distribution λ and iterations of the transition probabilities
P (x, y) converges to it. The invariant distribution satisfies:
λ (y) =
∫
P (x, y) dλ (x) (3.22)
McMc methods turn the theory around: the invariant distribution is known
and it is the target density from which samples are desired (in our case the
posterior distribution) but the transitional probabilities are not known (we
don’t know how to generate the chain). Accordingly to generate a sample
from λ (·) the method finds and utilizes a transition function P (x, y) whose
n-th iterate converges to λ (·) for large n. After this large number, the dis-
tribution of the observations generated from the simulation is approximately
the target distribution (namely our posterior distribution). The Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm provides us with a constructive methods for specifying
the chain12. Further technical details can be found in Chib and Greenberg
(1995), here we provide the main intuition on the functioning of the algo-
rithm: starting with an initial value for θ, we draw from a proposed density
a new value and we evaluate the posterior at this point. If the posterior is
greater at the new θ, we keep this value for the next iteration; if not, we
reject it with a probability lower than one. This procedure allow us to travel
towards the "higher probability region" of the likelihood function but also to
explore, with some probability, lower regions. This avoid us to get trapped
in local maxima. Algorithm 1 provides us a plain version of the pseudo-code
for implementing Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as proposed by Fernández-
12In practice, what the Metropolis-Hasting does is to exploit a sufficient condition called
"reversibility" for p (x, y) to generate an invariant distribution
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Villaverde (2010). The acceptance/rejection mechanism implied by step 3
Algorithm 1 Random Walk Metropolis-Hasting
1: Step 0, Initalization: Set i = 0 and an initial θi. Evaluate pi (θ) and
p
(
zt|θi
)
. Set i = i+ 1.
2: Step 1, Proposal draw: Get a draw θ∗i from a proposal density
q (θi−1, θ∗i ).
3: Step 2, Proposal evaluation: Evaluate pi (θ∗i ) and p
(
zt|θ∗i
)
.
4: Step 3, Accept/Reject: Draw χi ∼ U (0, 1). if χi ≤
p(zT |θ∗i )pi(θ∗i )q(θi−1,θ∗i )
p(zT |θi−1)pi(θi−1)q(θ∗i ,θi−1,)
, set θi = θ∗i ; otherwise θi = θi−1.
5: Step 4, Iteration: if i < M , set i = i+ 1 and go to step 1. Otherwise
stop.
is the one discussed above: once noting that max (χi) = 1 then, whenever
p
(
zT |θ∗i
)
pi (θ∗i ) q (θi−1, θ
∗
i ) > p
(
zT |θi−1
)
pi (θi−1) q (θ∗i , θi−1, ), θi = θ
∗
i with
probability one. However, when the opposite holds θi = θi−1 with proba-
bility less the one (which is higher, the lower is probability associated with
theta∗i ). Finally, note that algorithm 1 requires us to specify a proposal
density q (·, ·); the standard practice is to choose a random walk proposal
(from where the name "Random Walk Metropolis Hasting"), θ∗i = θi−1 +κi,
κi ∼ N (0,Σκ), where Σκ is a scaling matrix that researchers choose to obtain
an appropriate acceptance ratio.
The next step: estimating our model
Having set out the main statistical results underpinning Bayesian esti-
mation, as well as the computational techniques necessary for its implemen-
tation, we are now ready to move to the actual estimation of our model. We
do this in the next section.
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3.3 Model estimation
In this section we present the estimation of the model and discuss its
results. We begin by introducing the main elements of our estimation pro-
cedure, i.e. from the summary of the structural shocks entering the model,
to the observables variables employed and their treatment. Following the
literature, we then calibrate a number of parameters which are typically
poorly identified, and estimate the remaining. Finally, estimation results
are discussed.
3.3.1 Structural shocks
The model contains 23 structural shocks. 7 of them are present in each of
the two endogenous economies (i.e. Scotland and rUK), these are: (i) Tem-
porary productivity shock; (ii) Inter-temporal preferences shock; (iii) Invest-
ment technology shock; (iv) Intra-temporal preference shock; (v) Mark-up
shock; (vi) Government transfers shock and (vii) Devolved public spending
shock. Each of these shocks enters twice the model, therefore they amount to
14 in total. We should then add 6 UK-wide structural shocks (including oil
related shocks), namely: (i) Monetary policy shock; (ii) Non-devolved public
spending shock; (iii) UK technology (unit root) shock; (iv) Oil price shock;
(v) Oil production (in UK) shock;(vi) Oil marginal costs (in UK) shock. Fi-
nally there are 3 shocks associated with the ROW VAR block, these are: (i)
ROW GDP shock; (ii) ROW inflation shock; (iii) ROW Interest rate shock.
Table 3.1 summarizes the list above.
Country specific (x2) UK-wide and oil ROW
Temporary productivity Monetary policy Inflation (VAR)
Intertemporal preference Non-devolved public spending GDP (VAR)
Investment technology Technology unit root Interest rate (VAR)
Intratem preference Oil marginal costs
Mark-up Oil price
Gvt Transfers Oil production
Gvt spending
Table 3.1: Model structural shocks
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3.3.2 Observables
We estimate the model using 22 quarterly time-series, for the period
1998:Q1 to 2007:Q413. These can be grouped in a similar fashion as the
structural shocks discussed above. In more detail, 7 observables are specific
to each of the two endogenous economies, these are: (i) GDP; (ii) Consump-
tion; (iii) Investment; (iv) Government transfers to household; (v) Price
inflation; (vi) Wage rate and (vii) Government spending. As these observ-
ables are introduced for any of the two DSGE economies, they amount to
a total of 14. To this, we should 5 UK-wide (and oil related) observables,
namely: (i) Interest rate; (ii) Devolved public spending; (iii) Oil price; (iv)
Oil production (in UK); (v) Oil marginal costs (in UK). Finally there are 3
series associated with the ROW VAR block, these are: (i) ROW GDP; (ii)
ROW inflation; (iii) ROW Interest rate. Table 3.2 synthesizes the list above.
Country specific (x2) UK-wide and oil ROW
GDP Interest rate Inflation
Consumption Devolved public spending GDP
Investment Oil marginal costs Interest rate
Gvt Transfers Oil production
Gvt Spending Oil price
GDP deflator
Wages
Table 3.2: Observables
Variables construction and sources are discussed in greater detail be-
low. Meantime, a few words on the choice of the observables are due. As
Guerron-Quintana (2010) showed, this choice is indeed crucial as it might
affect estimation results and the inference around model’s parameters. We
followed three core principles to inform our observables selection: consis-
tency with the literature, coherency with model purposes and data avail-
ability. Our observables selection is largely consistent with the estimation
of closed-economy (i.e. Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007)) and open-economy
(Adolfson et al. (2007, 2008), Rabanal and Tuesta (2010), Bhattarai and
Trzeciakiewicz (2017)) models for the UK and comparable countries. How-
13The choice of the sample period has been dictated, on the lower end, by the beginning
of the Scottish national quarterly accounts (dating back only until to 1998:Q1) and, on
the upper end, by the beginning of the financial crisis (which we exclude as our model is
not equipped to account for it).
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ever, few exceptions are to be noted. Firstly, differently from some of the
open economy literature we do not use trade data series. That is because
rUK-Scottish import flows are not reliably measured. Secondly, and for sim-
ilar reasons, we use the GDP deflator for measuring inflation whereas much
of the literature employs CPI. This is dictated by the absence of CPI series
for Scotland. Thirdly, having a rich fiscal sector, we allow for a number of fis-
cal variables (e.g. Gvt devolved spending and Gvt transfers) and oil related
variables (e.g. oil price prices, UK oil production etc) which are typically
not present in other studies14.
3.3.3 Data treatment and measurement equation
All time series15 have been transformed in real per capita terms to be
consistent with their model counterparts. In particular they have all been
deflated using GDP deflator and divided by working age population (i.e.
population aged 16-64). Resulting series have then been expressed in growth
rates by first differencing their natural logarithms; growth rates series, finally,
have been demeaned (as in Rabanal and Tuesta (2010)).
To understand why demeaning is applied, just recall the law of motion
of our non-stationary technological process:
lnXt = lnXt−1 + xt (3.23)
Under such a specification, UK-wide technological change follows a random-
walk without drift in its natural logarithm. That means economic growth
follows a stochastic process with zero mean. In what follows we present the
measurement equation linking observables to model variables. Given the rel-
ative large size of our model, for representation purposes we find it convenient
to break the set of measurement equations into three groups. Grouping is
undertaken following the logic above i.e. Country specific variables, UK-wide
(and oil related) variables and ROW variables. The following conventions
apply: ’d ln’ indicates the first differences of the natural logarithm, ’˜’ indi-
14One notable exception is given by Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2017)’s model for the
UK, which features a full-blow public sector and, therefore, includes an unusual number
of fiscal variables (i.e. government consumption, government investment, transfers, and
effective tax revenue from consumption, labour and capital) in the estimation.
15With the exception of: hours worked, inflation, interest rate and oil related variables.
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cates (consistently with our model notation) normalized model variables16,
’µg’ indicates the average rate of growth of a given time-series over the time
period in our sample (i.e. 1998:Q1 to 2007:Q4). Before entering the actual
description of the measurement equation(s), is worth remembering that the
model is input in its non-linear form. Therefore each model variable should
be interpreted as the level of its real per capita data counterpart, scaled by
the innovations to the unit root technological process in equation 3.23.
Country specific observables
Country specific variables are introduced for, both, Scotland and the
rUK. Given they enter symmetrically in the model; we only report here the
Scottish ones. Equation 3.24 below presents the measurement equation and
displays, on the LHS, actual data (whose definition is provided below) and,
on the RHS, model variables. Note that model variables have been scaled by
unit-root technology and therefore the associated shock enters in the RHS
of the measurement equation.
d ln
GDP sct
Popsct ∗Defsct − µgy
d ln
PrivConssct
Popsct ∗Defsct − µgc
d ln
PrivInvestsct
Popsct ∗Defsct − µgi
d ln
Wagessct
Hourssct Def
sc
t
− µgw
ln GvtTransf
sc
Popsct ∗Defsct − µgt
d lnDefsct − µpi
ln GvtSpend
sc
Popsct ∗Defsct − µgg

=

d ln G˜DPt + 
x
t
d ln C˜t + 
x
t
d ln I˜t + 
x
t
d ln W˜real,t + 
x
t
d ln T˜t + 
x
t
Πt − 1
d ln G˜t + 
x
t

(3.24)
Time series descriptions, together with their sources, are reported below.
All series are in current prices, seasonally adjusted and refer to the onshore
economy.
16Normalization is done by dividing growing variables for the level of technology, Xt.
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GDP sc
Gross Domestic Product in Scotland (onshore): Expenditure Approach. Source:
QNAS.
PrivConssc
Final Consumption Expenditure of Households and Non-Profit Institutions Serving
Households in Scotland (onshore). Source: QNAS.
PrivInvestsc
Gross fixed capital formation in Scotland (onshore), all sectors17. Source: QNAS.
Wagessc
Compensation of employees in Scotland (onshore). Source: QNAS.
Hourssc
Weekly average hours worked. Source: Labour Productivity Statistics.
GvtTransfsc
Government transfers to household in Scotland (onshore). Source: NiGem.
GvtSpendsc
Government consumption in Scotland (onshore). Source: QNAS.
Defsc
Implied GDP deflator in Scotland (onshore). Source: QNAS.
Popsc
Population aged 16-64 in Scotland. Source: Regional labour market stastics.
UK-wide and oil related observables
UK-wide and oil related observables refer to the UK as a whole and,
therefore, enter the model only once. Among those, devolved public spending
is the series of public spending in Scotland which is managed by the local
government; arguably, that series can be regard as more "Scottish specific"
than "UK-wide". We, nonetheless, found it convenient to include it here
and keep the country-specific block above fully symmetric between Scotland
and the rUK. Finally it is worth noticing that, consistently with their model
counterpart, total oil production costs are transformed in per unit basis by
dividing them for oil revenues. Measurement equation for these variables is
reported below in equation 3.25.
17Government investment is subtracted. That is, in fact, accounted for within public
spending.
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
IntRateukt
400 − µR
d ln
DevSpendingsct
Popsct ∗Defsct − µGdev
d ln BrentPricet
Defukt
− µpo
d lnOilProdukt − µpo
d ln
OilCostukt
UkOilProdukt ∗BrentPricet
− µmco

=

R∗t −R∗
d ln G˜devt + 
x
t
d ln pot
d ln qot + 
x
t
d lnmcot

(3.25)
Time series descriptions, together with their sources, are reported below.
All series are in current prices and refer to the onshore economy.
IntRateuk
Quarterly average rate of discount, 3 month treasury bills, sterling. Source: Bank
of England.
DevSpendingsc
Scottish Gvt devolved consumption expenditure. Source: NiGEM/OCEA.
Defuk
Implied GDP deflator in UK. Source: ONS.
Popsc
Population aged 16-64 in Scotland. Source: Regional labour market stastics.
BrentPrice
Europe Brent Spot Price. Source: US Energy Information Administration.
OilProduk
Crude oil production in UK. Source: US Energy Information Administration.
OilCostuk
Oil and gas production operating expenditure plus Oil and gas production capital
expenditure. Source: Scottish Government, Oil and production statistics.
ROW block
Rest of the world variables are constructed as weighted average of main
trading partners of U.K., U.S. and Eurozone countries, using their (total)
trade shares as weights18. We report in equation 3.26 below the measurement
18Total trade is given by the sum of import and export. Trade shares are $us = 21%
for US and 1 −$us = 79% for Eurozone countries and are calculated averaging over the
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equation for these variables; all rest of the world variables are constructed
to be consistent with the UK counterparts.

d ln
GDPusreal,t∗$us+GDP eureal,t∗(1−$us)
(Popust ∗$us+Popeut ∗(1−$us)) − µgy
IntRateust ∗$us+IntRateeut ∗(1−$us)
400 − µR∗∗
ln (Defust ∗$us +Defeut ∗ (1−$us))− µpi∗∗

=

d ln G˜DP ∗∗t
R∗∗t −R∗∗
Π∗∗t − 1

(3.26)
GDP eureal
Euro Area real GDP. Source: AWM database.
Defeu
Euro Area GDP deflator. Source: AWM database.
IntRateeu
Short term interest rate. Source: AWM database.
GDPusreal
US real GDP. Source: FRED.
Defus
US GDP deflator. Source: FRED.
IntRateus
Federal funds rate. Source: FRED.
$us
Import and Export data (goods and services) for UK. Source: ONS.
3.3.4 Calibrated parameters
Following the literature, a number of parameters are calibrated. These
parameters typically identified long-run ratios (e.g. income share of capital)
and are not well identifiable by the estimation procedure. The list of param-
eters, their calibrated values, as well as the calibration strategy adopted in
each case, are reported in table 3.3. Again, given the large size of our model,
we find it convenient to split parameters in different groups according to the
feature of the model they affect. The description of our approach to cali-
bration for each parameter in these groups, is provided in the subsections
below. It is worth noting here that the model has been parametrized such as
sample period 1999:2007 (we actually start from 1999 and not from 1998 because that’s
where ONS dataset starts)
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Scotland, rUK and ROW steady states are symmetric19 in aggregate/total
terms20.
Trade and oil
Scotland’s share of UK population, $, is set in line with its historical
average over the sample period and equals 0.085. Inter and intra-UK trade
are regulated by the trade shares, ω2, ω1, ω2∗, ω1∗; given Scotland’s popula-
tion share, these are pinned down by matching Scotland imports share of
GDP from rUK, 36%, and UK exports share to ROW, 25%, and assuming
balanced trade within UK and with the rest of the world. The oil block is
associated with exogenous auto-regressive processes over the real price of oil
(pot ), its real production cost (mcot ) and its total produced quantity (Q˜ot ).
Auto-regressive coefficients and standard deviations are estimated, whereas
their steady state (Qo,mco, po) are calibrated to match long-run targets.
In particular, we use the series of Europe Brent Spot prices21 to calculate
the long run real price of oil (po). We then employ Scottish Government
statistics on Oil and Gas Production in Scotland and rUK to calculate the
production costs as a share of oil revenues22. Finally, by multiplying the so
obtained series of cost shares by the real price oil, we obtain the series of
real production costs in per unit terms of which we take the long-run mean
(mco). The long-run oil quantity (Qo) is instead set to match the empirical
ratio ’oil revenues to UK GDP’ (over the period in question this averages to
1.29%). Given oil price, quantity and production costs we then determine
the rate of tax on oil profits such as tax receipts match the observed share
of UK GDP (over the period in question this averages 0.43%). This implies
a rate of tax of 52%. Finally, we let the foreign asset position be determined
residually from the Balance of Payments: under our balanced trade assump-
tion, this effectively means that foreign asset position is set to sustain the
19Steady state symmetry implies Y = Y ∗ = GDP = GDP ∗, a property which we
largely exploit while normalizing and calibrating the model.
20Whereas they are not necessarily symmetric in per-capita terms. The most prominent
case being trade: for it to be balanced, given the small size of Scotland relative to the rUK,
it has to be the case that the Scottish household imports/exports significantly more/less
in per capita terms than its rUK counterpart.
21As for estimation, this series was converted in pounds and transformed it in real terms
using the GDP deflator
22This is done dividing production costs (calculated as the sum of operational and
capital costs)by total revenues from sales.
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current account surplus induced by the oil tax receipts. This gives rise to a
foreign asset position of −11% of UK GDP, versus an empirical counterpart
of −17%.
Technology and preferences
From the depreciation function, δt = χ0m
χ1
t , we calibrate χ0 and χ1 to
ensure full capital utilization in steady state, i.e. m = 1, as well as steady
state depreciation, i.e. δ¯ = χ0, to match the long run rate of investment.
In more detail, using Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) data from AMECO, we
calculate δ¯ for IK to match sample average, implying δ = 0.02. Then, by
normalizing m = 1, the above value above for δ¯ immediately implies χ1 =
1.51 and χ0 = 0.03. In the production function, we set α = 0.32 to match
the average labour share of income as provided by the OECD (Real Unit
Cost of Labour). Finally, we set β = 0.99 to match a steady state quarterly
interest rate of 1%, a value in line with the quarterly average rate of discount
in UK for the period under consideration.
Public sector
The public sector block is composed by the Westminster and the Holy-
rood governments. We adopt the standard approach of calibrating all ele-
ments of their balance sheets according to historical averages, leaving gov-
ernment transfers to be determined residually to ensure long-run budget
balance. Begin with government final consumption in Scotland and in the
rUK (i.e. Gt, G∗t ). These represent the sum of devolved (Gdevt, Gdev∗t )
and non-devolved (Gnodevt, Gnodev∗t ) spending in Scotland and in the rUK,
each driven by an associated exogenous process. As for oil, auto-regressive
coefficients and standard deviations associated with these processes are esti-
mated, whereas their steady states (Gdev,Gdev∗, Gnodev,Gnodev∗) are set
to match calibration targets. In particular, we match the government con-
sumption share of GDP amounting to 18% over the sample period in UK
(assuming this share is same in Scotland and in the rUK), as well as the
share of devolved spending over total public spending in Scotland, of about
85%23 (assuming this share is same in the rUK). It is worth noting here,
23To calculate this share, we employ the NiGEM series ’Scottish public consumption’
(SCGC) and ’Holyrood consumption’ (SCHGC) which are in turn based on OCEA cal-
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this implies the non-devolved spending administered by the government in
Westminster is allocated, in per-capita terms, equally among Scotland and
the rUK, i.e. ζ = 1. Furthermore, we set the debt/gdp ratio in UK to match
the sample average amounting to 38% of GDP24. On the revenue side, we
adopt the procedure proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994) to calculate aggre-
gate tax rates on labour, capital and consumption. Using Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011)’s dataset, we adjust the tax rates they originally calculated for
the UK for them to cover our sampling period, 1998-2007. We find τ c = 0.17,
τ l = 0.28 and τk = 0.47. Finally, we set fiscal rule coefficient, ρup = 0.09, to
ensure equilibrium stability.
Market structure and competitiveness
Most of the parameters in this group are estimated; we follow the litera-
ture in calibrating the ones which are typically poorly identified. In particu-
lar, p and w, regulating the long-run degree of mark-up in the intermediate
good and in the labour market sectors, are set to p = 11 and w = 6, fol-
lowing a standard convention in the DSGE literature25. Similarly, we set
µ¯ = µ¯∗ = 1, so as the mark-up in the final good sector - which comes on top
of the one in the intermediate good sector - is normalized to be absent in
steady state while fluctuating over the transitional dynamics in response to
its own shock realizations. The elasticity of substitution between domesti-
cally produced and imported goods, θ, is set to 0.94 in line with Rabanal and
Tuesta (2010). Finally, we set the coefficients regulating the risk premium,
χb and χd, both equal to 0.005; this value was chosen to ensure equilibrium
uniqueness/stability.
Table 3.3: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value Calibration strategy
Trade & oil:
$ Scot population share 0.085 Population data
(Continued on next page)
culations. Taking the ratio between these two and averaging over our sample period, we
find a devolved expenditure share of about 85%.
24This is calculated using the series of general government consolidated gross debt,
which is consistent with Maastricht requirements.
25See, among others, Rabanal and Tuesta (2010).
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Table 3.3: (continued)
Parameter Description Value Calibration strategy
ω2 Scot import from rUK 0.36 Export data & balanced trade
ω1 Scot cons of domestic good 0.39 Export data & balanced trade
ω2∗ rUK import from Scot 0.03 Export data & balanced trade
ω1∗ rUK cons of domestic good 0.72 Export data & balanced trade
D¯uk
4Y ∗ UK asset position -0.11 Residually determined
¯TO
Y ∗ Oil tax receipt -0.0043 Gvt revenues data
τo Tax on oil profits 0.52 Set to match TO
Technology & Preferences:
β Discount factor 0.99 Set to match R = 1.01
α Capital income share 0.32 Income share data
δ (m¯) Depreciation rate in ss 0.02 Set to match I
K
χ0 δ (·) coefficient 0.03 set to yield δ (m¯) = 0.02
χ1 δ (·) exponent 1.50 set to yield m¯ = 1
Public sector:
¯BUK
4Y ∗ Debt/GDP in UK 0.38 Gvt debt data
G
Y
Gvt cons over GDP 0.18 Quarterly national account
Gdev
G
share of devolved gvt cons 0.85 NiGEM/OCEA calculations
ζ Pc non-devolved gvt cons 1 rUK-Scot steady-state symmetry
T
Y
Gvt transfers over GDP 0.24 Budget balance
τ c Consumption tax 0.17 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
τ l Labour tax 0.28 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
τk Labour tax 0.47 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
ρup Fiscal rule 0.09 Equilibrium stability
Markets & Competitiveness:
w Elast of subst between types of labor 6 Rabanal and Tuesta (2010)
p Elast of subst between types of good 11 Rabanal and Tuesta (2010)
µ¯ Final good mark-up 1 Normalization
θ Elast of subst between goods 0.94 Rabanal and Tuesta (2010)
χb Uk bond holding cost 0.005 Equilibrium stability
χd Uk bond holding cost 0.005 Equilibrium stability
3.3.5 Estimation results
We estimate the model using the Bayesian, likelihood-based, approach
previously described. This procedure requires us, firstly, to assign a prior
distribution to the parameters to be estimated and, then, to obtain and to
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evaluate their posterior. Such a posterior distribution combines the informa-
tion from the model likelihood, given data, and the pre-sample knowledge
represented by the priors. We begin by setting parameter priors to be largely
consistent with the relevant literature, among others Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007), Justiniano and Preston (2010) and Rabanal and Tuesta (2010).
Specifically, we employ diffuse priors over parameters governing model exoge-
nous processes and shocks (i.e. standard deviations and persistence), given
we own little information about those, i.e. they are largely model-specific
as noted by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008). On the other hand, we im-
pose more informative priors over deep parameters such as the elasticity of
labour supply and calvo lotteries for which we own significant evidence com-
ing from related studies (e.g. DSGE models estimated for other countries),
as well as from other pieces of literature (e.g. micro-level studies)26. We then
approximate the mode of the posterior distribution by maximizing the log
posterior function. Successively, we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
to explore the posterior distribution using a markov chain formed by 500,000
draws, the first 100,000 of which are dropped. Our acceptance rate of 23%
is broadly in line with the optimal acceptance rate of 0.234 calculated by
Roberts et al. (1997). Finally we test convergence of the Markov chain to
its stationary distribution using the Brooks and Gelman (1998) diagnostic;
this test suggests convergence is achieved.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.4, for model parameters, and
Table 3.5, for the standard deviations of structural shocks. Note that deep
parameters are imposed to be symmetric between Scotland and the rUK.
This is a quite common strategy in densely parametrized, medium-to-large
scale, two-country models such as ours. In our model, this strategy appears
even more appropriate once considering the short length of Scottish time-
series27. On the other hand, shock processes (i.e. standard deviations and
persistence) are country specific.
26In all cases, however, we maintain fairly diffuse priors in line with the positive purpose
of this work.
27We have also considered experiments where deep parameters were allowed to be asym-
metric between Scotland and the rUK. Results from these exercises suggested that the
estimation of those parameters might, indeed, differ. This is an aspect worth of further
future investigation. Differences in, say, the elasticity of labour supply could affect the
economic adjustment within the UK and the policy implications of the model. At the same
time, an even more densely parametrized structure can pose threats to mode optimization,
as well as to parameters identification.
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Stochastic processes
Begin by analyzing the estimation results for the shocks processes looking
at their auto-regressive coefficients, reported in table 3.4, and their standard
deviation, reported in table 3.5. It is typically the case that the size of shocks
is larger in Scotland (with the exception of the consumption shock), whereas
at the same time, those shocks tend to die out quicker in Scotland than in
the rUK. Looking at the unconditional variances of the associated stochas-
tic processes, in table 3.6, it appears that their volatility for Scotland and
for the rUK are largely comparable. All in all, this seems to suggest that,
being in a currency and fiscal union, those countries experience about the
same volatility. However, smaller and less diversified parts of the union (i.e.
Scotland) are more likely to be exposed to larger shocks which are quickly
absorbed, thanks to the risk-sharing within the UK. On the contrary, shocks
hitting larger parts of the union (i.e. the rUK) tend to be smaller in size
but appear generally more persistent, likely because of the reduced extent of
risk-sharing. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the standard deviation
of the labour supply shock in Scotland is of a larger magnitude compared to
the rest. This could in principle occur for a number of reasons, from strong
volatility in the Scottish labour market, to a mis-specification of the model
along this dimension. It seems reasonable to believe that both factors are at
play. Indeed, in the current policy debate, it is acknowledge that the labour
market plays an important role in the economic adjustment of Scotland,
thanks to phenomena such as labour force migration between Scotland and
the rUK28, underemployment (e.g. involuntary part-time working) and wage
adjustment. These aspects are only partially captured by our model (e.g.
migration and underemployment indistinctly map into leisure). Therefore,
a large standard deviation of the Scottish labour supply shock may indicate
that a significant part of the adjustment occurs through the Scottish labour
market, as well as that our model is failing to capture in full the features
and the mechanisms at work there. Finally, let us consider the shocks to
28Statistics on migration seem to indicate that this phenomenon is of modest size, with
net migration typically involving less than 1% of the Scottish labour force on annual basis.
However, these statistics have a number of limitations. For example, they do not provide
information at quarterly frequency and they do not capture aspects such as people working
in the rUK during the week while maintaining the Scottish residence. As it is not clear at
this point how much these factors could weight, labour migration cannot be simply ruled
out.
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the exogenous block of the model, namely those associated with oil and the
ROW. Not surprisingly oil processes are strongly volatile, reflecting the wide
movements in this market over the last 30 years. As for the ROW, it is im-
portant to recall that the associated VAR(1) is estimated in a reduced-form
fashion and, therefore, its coefficients do not have a structural interpretation.
For this reason, parameters such as ayr and apr representing, respectively,
the response of output and inflation to an increase in the interest rate, do
not have the sign economic theory would suggest. VAR(1) shocks appear to
be small.
Deep parameters
Let us now move to analyze the estimation of deep parameters in table
3.4. Estimated parameters appear to be broadly consistent with the DSGE
literature considered so far. This is certainly the case for the Taylor rule
coefficients, the inverse elasticity of labour supply with respect to wage and
calvo lotteries for prices. On other hand, calvo lotteries for wages, as well
habits, are somehow lower than in other studies29. Finally, consider the
share of local workers in Scotland, θL. This parameter has no obvious coun-
terpart in related studies and it was introduced to capture a feature of the
interrelations between Scotland and the rUK. Our estimation indicates that
this share is about 60%, meaning that 40% of workers in Scotland earn the
wage prevailing in the rUK.
29When estimating the model letting deep parameters differing across Scotland rUK,
calvo lottery parameters (both for prices and wages) are found to be lower in the Scotland
than in the rUK. Typically they take, in the rUK, values which are very close to the ones
from other estimated model for the UK, such as Harrison and Oomen (2010). On the
other hand, when restricting them to be the same, they appear to be closer to the rUK
ones (not surprisingly given the larger weight it has in the model) while, however, being
lower than when estimating them for the rUK only (because of Scotland being factored
in).
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Table 3.4: Estimation results (parameters)
Parameter Prior Posterior
Name Description Dist. Mean Stdev Mode Stdev
ρc consumpt shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.8666 0.0912
ρn labour supply shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.2443 0.1276
ρv investment shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.4478 0.1915
ρa technology shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.8940 0.0750
ρtr gvt transfers shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.8917 0.1153
ρc
∗ consumpt shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.9839 0.0105
ρn
∗ labour supply shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.4082 0.1424
ρv
∗ investment shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.4937 0.2111
ρa
∗ technology shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.9659 0.0119
ρgdev
∗ gvt dev spend shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.9445 0.0825
ρ∗tr gvt transfers shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.8930 0.0531
ρpo oil price shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.9593 0.0249
ρmco oil mg costs shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.9236 0.0583
ρqo oil production shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.9967 0.0051
ρGnodev gvt non-dev spend shock beta 0.700 0.2000 0.8444 0.0719
ayy ROW VAR(1), y on y norm 0.800 0.2000 0.9626 0.0502
ayp ROW VAR(1), pi on y norm 0.000 0.3000 -0.3979 0.2120
ayr ROW VAR(1), r on y norm 0.000 0.3000 0.1735 0.1781
app ROW VAR(1), pi on pi norm 0.500 0.2000 0.2069 0.1471
apy ROW VAR(1), y on pi norm 0.000 0.3000 0.0047 0.0312
apr ROW VAR(1), r on pi norm 0.000 0.3000 0.0016 0.1645
arr ROW VAR(1), r on r norm 0.900 0.2000 0.8079 0.059
ary ROW VAR(1), y on r norm 0.000 0.3000 -0.0122 0.0137
arp ROW VAR(1), pi on r norm 0.000 0.3000 0.1570 0.0912
θL share of local workers beta 0.660 0.2000 0.5959 0.1440
ϕR Taylor rule, interest beta 0.500 0.2500 0.7716 0.0398
ϕpi Taylor rule, inflation norm 1.500 0.2500 1.8605 0.1455
ϕy Taylor rule, output norm 1.000 0.2000 1.1583 0.1405
b Habit Sc beta 0.500 0.2000 0.2215 0.0797
η Inv. elast. of labour gamm 1.000 0.2500 0.4856 0.1522
(Continued on next page)
136
Table 3.4: (continued)
Parameter Prior Posterior
Name Description Dist. Mean Stdev Mode Stdev
θw Calvo, wages beta 0.600 0.2500 0.2927 0.0986
θH Calvo, prices beta 0.600 0.2500 0.6980 0.0544
λH Price indexation beta 0.500 0.2500 0.0229 0.0319
λW Wage indexation beta 0.500 0.2500 0.0832 0.1172
φ Investment adj costs Sc norm 1.000 0.5000 0.3912 0.1278
Table 3.5: Estimation results II (std structural shocks)
Parameter Prior Posterior
Name Description Dist. Mean Stdev Mode Stdev
c std consumpt shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0123 0.0022
n std labour shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.1501 0.0726
v std investment shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0175 0.0063
a std technology shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0460 0.0121
tr std transfers shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0120 0.0018
µ std mark-up shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0127 0.0015
gdev std dev speding shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0091 0.0028
c∗ std consumpt shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0300 0.0158
n∗ std labour shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0343 0.0142
v∗ std investment shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0127 0.0040
a∗ std technology shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0310 0.0071
tr
∗ std transfers shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0193 0.0024
µ∗ std mark-up shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0041 0.0007
gdev
∗ std dev speding shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0106 0.0016
x std unit root shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0125 0.0017
m∗ std taylor rule shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0026 0.0004
gnodev std non-dev speding shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0426 0.0049
po std oil price shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.1323 0.0151
(Continued on next page)
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Table 3.5: (continued)
Parameter Prior Posterior
Name Description Dist. Mean Stdev Mode Stdev
mco std oil mg cost shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.1436 0.0163
qo std oil production shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0396 0.0046
y∗∗ std ROW y shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0033 0.0004
Π∗∗ std ROW pi shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0021 0.0002
R∗∗ std ROW r shock invg 0.010 Inf 0.0016 0.0002
Stochastic process Description Unconditional variance
Dct Intertemporal shock (Scotland) 0.0006
Dc∗t Intertemporal shock (rUK) 0.0282
Dnt Intratemporal shock (Scotland) 0.0240
Dn∗t Intratemporal shock (rUK) 0.0014
Vt Investment shock (Scotland) 0.0003
V ∗t Investment shock (rUK) 0.0002
At Productivity shock (Scotland) 0.0105
A∗t Productivity shock (rUK) 0.0143
µt Mark-up shock (Scotland) 0.0001
µ∗t Mark-up shock (rUK) 0.0000
Tt Gvt transfers shock (Scotland) 0.0007
T ∗t Gvt transfers shock (rUK) 0.0018
Gdevt Gvt devolv. spending (Scotland) 0.0000
Gdev∗t Gvt devolv. spending (rUK) 0.0010
Table 3.6: Unconditional variances
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3.4 Structural shocks in the UK economy
Having estimated the model, we now turn to analyse its quantitative
properties in this section. In particular, we study the dynamics implied by a
number of structural shocks to the Scottish and the rUK economies by assess-
ing the associated IRFs produced by our model. In particular, we consider
a shock to the following processes: (i) temporary productivity in Scotland,
(ii) monetary policy in the UK, (iii) demand in the rUK, (iv) investment in
the rUK, and (v) labour supply in Scotland. In each case we consider the
response to one standard deviation innovation to the associated shock30. It
should be recalled here that our model has been solved by linearizing around
the non-stochastic steady state; the resulting IRFs should be interpreted ac-
cordingly. For any shock for which the dynamics are analysed, we present
five different figures which can be broadly categorized as follows. First two
figures describe the dynamics of Scottish specific variables, second two re-
port their rUK correspondent, finally the last one looks at the movements of
UK-wide aggregates.
3.4.1 Temporary productivity shock
We discuss below the effect of a temporary labour-augmenting technology
shock affecting the Scottish Economy in an idiosyncratic manner.
Start with Figure 3.1 for Scotland. Consumption (C) increases whereas
labour supply (N) falls, most likely as a results of a wealth effect and because
of the increase in wages. As tobin-q is correctly anticipated to increase,
investment increases and capital accumulates during the transition. Marginal
costs of intermediate good firms (MC) fall and so does their price inflation
(Pih). This dynamic is broadly in line with the one of Smets and Wouters
(2003).
Figure 3.2 presents remaining set of Scotland-specific variables. Final
good inflation (Pi) falls, as a result of falling intermediate good inflation.
Similarly, because of the fall in the intermediate goods prices, real exchange
rates with respect to the rUK (RER) and ROW (RERrow) both depreci-
ate boosting exports toward the rUK (Yhstar) and the ROW (Yhstarstar);
30The standard deviations of these shocks, as well as the persistence of the associated
forcing processes, are reported in tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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Figure 3.1: IRFs from temporary productivity shock - 1 (Scotland)
10 20 30 40
−4
−2
0
x 10−3 Pi
10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
x 10−3 RER
10 20 30 40
2
4
6
8
x 10−3 RERrow
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
x 10−3 Yh
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
x 10−4 Yhstar
10 20 30 40
2
4
6
x 10−3 Yhstarstar
10 20 30 40
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 TB
10 20 30 40
−0.01
0
0.01
bb
10 20 30 40
−0.01
0
0.01
d
Figure 3.2: IRFs from temporary productivity shock - 2 (Scotland)
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at the same time, domestic consumption of intermediate good increases as
well. Since the productivity shock boosts both consumption (which includes
imports) and exports, the effect on the trade balance is mixed resulting in
fluctuating behaviour. A similar mixed behaviour is displayed by domestic
and foreign denominated assets (i.e. ’bb’ and ’d’) for similar reasons.
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Figure 3.3: IRFs from temporary productivity shock - 3 (rUK)
Figure 3.3 presents Figure 3.1 counterparts for rUK variables. Since Scot-
land is relatively small with respect to the rUK, many feedback effects are
small and their impact on rUK variables is negligible. Production of inter-
mediate goods in the rUK increases, as a result of a greater demand from
Scotland, boosting marginal costs, wages, investment and consumption in
rUK. On the other hand, intermediate goods inflation appears mainly insen-
sitive to these movements. This happens because lower prices in Scotland
forces rUK firms to reduce their mark-up to maintain competitiveness.
Figure 3.4 presents the counterparts for rUK variables of figure 3.2 for
Scotland. Inflation in rUK slightly reduces as a results of cheaper import
from Scotland. However, as noticed above, the real exchange rate with re-
spect to Scotland appreciates (RERstar) since the fall in Scottish CPI is of
much larger magnitude. Imports into Scotland fluctuate, however this has a
negligible impact on the rUK trade balance given the relative small size of
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Figure 3.4: IRFs from temporary productivity shock - 4 (rUK)
Scotland.
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Figure 3.5: IRFs from temporary productivity shock - 5 (UK)
Finally, figure 3.5 displays the behaviour of UK aggregates. Since both
Scottish and rUK GDP increase, so does UK GDP (GDPuk). However, the
GDP response is much stronger in Scotland which weighs little in the Taylor
rule and is accompanied by a decrease in price inflation; as a result, the
interest rate response is negligible. The dynamics of the UK foreign asset
position (duk) suggests that the the UK overall trade balance is somewhat
142
countercyclical, though fluctuating. Finally, the productivity shock boosts
tax revenues during the transition, temporarily reducing government debt.
3.4.2 Monetary policy shock
We now turn to analyze the effect of a monetary policy shock hitting the
UK Economy.
10 20 30 40
−2
−1
0
x 10−3 C
10 20 30 40
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
x 10−3 N
10 20 30 40
−10
−5
0
x 10−3 K
10 20 30 40
−2
−1
0
x 10−3 m
10 20 30 40
−20
−10
0
x 10−4 I
10 20 30 40
−2
−1
0
x 10−4 Rk
10 20 30 40
−3
−2
−1
0
x 10−3 W
10 20 30 40
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−3 MC
10 20 30 40
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−3 Pih
Figure 3.6: IRFs from monetary policy shock - 1 (Scotland)
Start with Figure 3.6 for Scotland. Consistently with the literature (again
see Smets and Wouters (2003) as well as Christiano et al. (2005)) our model
predicts that, following an increase in the interest rate, consumption, invest-
ment and employment all fall. A higher interest rate induces households to
save (i.e. postpone consumption), and increases the user-cost of capital, re-
ducing therefore investment and, consequently, capital during the transition.
The real rental rate of capital initially decreases due to the fall of employ-
ment to subsequently recover as capital decumulates (and its productivity
increases); for similar reasons, wages initially increases to then decrease.
Altogether, this implies a reduction in marginal costs and consequently of
intermediate goods price inflation.
Figure 3.7 presents the remaining set of Scottish variables. CPI infla-
tion falls as a result of falling intermediate goods inflation, however since
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Figure 3.7: IRFs from monetary policy shock - 2 (Scotland)
Scotland and rUK are broadly symmetrically affected by this shock, the real
exchange rate within UK remains largely unaffected. On the other hand, the
real exchange rate with respect to the ROW appreciates on impact, coher-
ently with the Uncover Interest Rate Parity (UIP) condition. UIP, indeed,
requires an expected depreciation to balance the interest rate differential to
ensure international financial markets equilibrium. The fall in consumption
in Scotland and rUK, as well as the exchange rate appreciation with respect
to ROW, causes intermediate goods production both for export and domes-
tic market to fall. The trade balance initially improves then deteriorates,
while capital is attracted from abroad (i.e. ’d’ rises) and Scottish households
save more (i.e. ’bb’ increases).
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 present rUK counterparts of 3.6 and 3.7. As expected,
responses in rUK are qualitatively similar to those in Scotland though some-
how more pronounced. The main difference occurs in the dynamics of the
trade balance, which in the rUK diplays a more significant improvement on
impact and, subsequently, a much milder deterioration.
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Figure 3.8: IRFs from monetary policy shock - 3 (rUK)
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Figure 3.9: IRFs from monetary policy shock - 4 (rUK)
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Figure 3.10: IRFs from monetary policy shock - 5 (UK)
Finally figure 3.10 presents UK-wide variables. UK GDP falls in response
to the monetary policy shock, causing tax revenues to follow suit. As a result,
government debt accumulates in the short run and so does foreign debt.
3.4.3 Demand (discount factor) shock
The next shock we consider is a demand shock hitting the rUK economy
in an idiosyncratic manner.
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Figure 3.11: IRFs from demand shock in rUK- 1 (Scotland)
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Start with figure 3.11 for Scotland. A demand shock in rUK feeds back to
the Scottish economy via exported goods. As rUK is large relative to Scot-
land, an increase in rUK demand for Scottish exports substantially increases
Scottish production causing an increase in marginal costs and therefore in
prices. Contemporaneously, consumption falls as monetary policy responds
(see figure 3.15) raising interest rates. On the other hand, investment and
labour display an fluctuating behaviour which tracks the one in Scottish GDP
(again, see figure 3.15). Such oscillating behaviour is in turn the result of
contrasting forces: on the one hand an expansionary effect due to increased
demand for Scottish exports from the rUK, on the other a contractionary
one caused by the Bank of England’s response (which depresses consumption
etc.).
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Figure 3.12: IRFs from demand shock in rUK- 2 (Scotland)
Figure 3.12 presents the remaining set of Scottish variables. Raising
intermediate goods inflation causes their demand to fall at home and in the
ROW; on the other hand, their export toward the rUK increases. Overall, the
Scottish balance of trade exhibits a prolonged surplus. Meantime, Scottish
households accumulate UK and ROW denominated assets as the increase
in the interest rate positively affects their propensity to save. Finally, the
Scottish real exchange rate with respect to the rUK depreciates indicating
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that inflation is raising faster in the rUK, where the demand shock originates.
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Figure 3.13: IRFs from demand shock in rUK- 3 (rUK)
In figure 3.13, rUK variables displays a similar pattern to their Scottish
counterpart in figure 3.11, though the magnitude of their deviations from
steady state appears stronger. The main exception is consumption which,
contrary to the Scottish case, increases on impact. This is the result of the
demand shock itself, i.e. a shock to the discount factor, affecting the rUK
in an idiosyncratic manner. The latter increases the relative importance of
utility today (adjusted for habits), pushing rUK households to consume more
in the near term while sacrificing future consumption.
Because of the rise in rUK inflation (rising faster than in Scotland) and
because of the BoE raising interest rate, the real exchange rate in the rUK
appreciates both with respect to Scotland and with respect to the ROW.
As a result, exports towards both regions fall and trade balance displays
an initial, sustained deficit which is financed by borrowing from abroad.
This is then subsequently offset by modest but prolonged surpluses which
lead to debt repayment (see figure 3.14). This dynamic is consistent with
the intertemporal approach to the trade balance discussed by Uribe (2014).
Namely, households in the rUK use borrowing from abroad for optimally
adjusting their inter-temporal consumption profile in response preference
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Figure 3.14: IRFs from demand shock in rUK- 4 (rUK)
shocks affecting their economy in an idiosyncratic manner.
10 20 30 40
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 GDPuk
10 20 30 40
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
duk
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
20
x 10−3 buk
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
x 10−4 Piuk
10 20 30 40
2
4
6
8
10
x 10−4 Rstar
Figure 3.15: IRFs from demand shock in rUK- 5 (UK)
Finally, figure 3.15 shows the dynamics of main UK aggregates. There we
can appreciate that the overall international asset position of UK deteriorates
during the transition, for the rUK asset responses dominate the Scottish
ones. Similarly government debt increases during the transition in response
to public finance deficits due to falling tax revenues.
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3.4.4 Investment technology shock
We now consider the effect of an investment technology shock hitting the
rUK economy (household) in an idiosyncratic manner. Such a shock has the
consequence of making the production of investment goods (capital) more
efficient for a prolonged time.
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Figure 3.16: IRFs from investment shock in rUK- 1(Scotland)
Start with figure 3.16 for Scotland. An investment shock in rUK feeds-
back to the Scottish economy mainly via exported goods. As in the case of
a demand shock, an increase in the rUK demand for Scottish exports sub-
stantially increases Scottish production causing an increase in marginal costs
and prices. However, differently from a demand shock, the increase in price
inflation reverses since technological improvements in rUK makes imported
goods cheaper over time, reducing the cost of final goods in Scotland too.
Furthermore, consumption increases since the monetary policy response is
far milder than for the case of a demand shock (i.e. compare figure 3.15
with figure 3.20). Therefore, the positive effect over consumption of greater
economic activity dominates the depressing one of an increased interest rate.
On the other hand, investment falls on impact due to the raised user cost of
capital, whereas labour supply and wages increase following an increase in
labour demand from firms.
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Figure 3.17: IRFs from investment shock in rUK- 2 (Scotland)
Figure 3.17 presents the remaining set of Scottish variables. The initial
rise in intermediate goods inflation causes their demand to fall at home and
in the ROW while their export towards the rUK increases. As inflation starts
to fall, so does trade in intermediate goods; the asset position follows suit.
Finally, thw Scottish real exchange rate with respect to the rUK appreciates
whereas the one with respect to the ROW depreciates.
In figure 3.18, rUK variables display somehow a similar pattern to their
Scottish counterpart in figure 3.16. However, in the rUK households initially
substitute away from consumption to investment causing the former to fall
and the latter to increase (i.e. in Scotland the opposite occurs). Meanwhile,
the technological innovation in investment production allows capital to in-
crease faster and marginal costs to fall. Despite the fall of marginal costs at
home, intermediate goods inflation initially rises driven by an initial increase
in final good inflation which is in turn driven by more expensive imports from
Scotland.
Figure 3.19 shows the remaining set of rUK variables. The real exchange
rate with respect to Scotland and the ROW both depreciate. In the first
case, this is due to inflation rising faster in Scotland than in the rUK; in the
latter, this is driven by the nominal exchange rate more than compensating
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Figure 3.18: IRFs from investment shock in rUK- 3 (rUK)
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Figure 3.19: IRFs from investment shock in rUK- 4 (rUK)
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the opposite movement in prices. Following the resultant real exchange rate
depreciation and increased internal absorption (investment increases more
than compensate initial fall in consumption) both rUK imports and exports
increase. The balance of trade indicates that imports increase initially pre-
vails until, subsequently, the opposite occurs.
10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
x 10−3 GDPuk
10 20 30 40
−10
−5
0
x 10−3 duk
10 20 30 40
−1
0
1
2
x 10−3 buk
10 20 30 40
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−4 Piuk
10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
8
x 10−4 Rstar
Figure 3.20: IRFs from investment shock in rUK- 5 (UK)
Finally, figure 3.20 shows UK GDP increases as a result of a GDP in-
crease in both Scotland and in the rUK. Consequently, tax revenues rise
and government debt is temporarily reduced. Meanwhile, the UK’s interna-
tional position temporarily worsens because of the initial increase in internal
absorption. the monetary policy response is, as previously mentioned, rela-
tively mild.
3.4.5 Labour supply shock
We comment below on the effect of an intra-temporal preference shock
hitting the Scottish economy in an idiosyncratic manner. Such a shock has
the consequence of temporarily increasing the disutility of labour, and there-
fore the cost for the household of supplying it.
As shown in figure 3.21, following such a shock, labour supply in Scotland
falls while wage rate increases. Consumption and investment fall as produc-
tion and disposable income are reduced. Meantime, higher wages drive up
marginal costs and intermediate goods inflation in Scotland.
From figure 3.22, we can appreciate how intermediate goods inflation
drives CPI inflation up, which in turn induces the real exchange with rUK
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Figure 3.21: IRFs from labour supply shock in Scotland- 1 (Scotland)
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Figure 3.22: IRFs from labour supply shock in Scotland- 2 (Scotland)
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and ROW to appreciate. Altogether this drives down the demand and pro-
duction of Scottish intermediate goods for internal consumption and export.
As Scottish imports fall as well, the final effect over the balance of trade
is mixed: trade balance fluctuates along the transient dynamics and assets
accumulation follows suit.
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Figure 3.23: IRFs from labour supply shock in Scotland- 3 (rUK)
Figures 3.23 and 3.24 show that feedback to the rUK is, as expected,
marginal. Looking at the scale of rUK endogenous variables responses, it is
immediately apparent how the only variables displaying a significant impact
are the real exchange rate with respect to Scotland, which depreciates, and
the exports of intermediate goods, again toward Scotland, which increase.
Given the relative small size of Scotland, however, the latter have a very
small propagation over the rUK economy.
Finally, figure 3.25 shows that the fall in Scottish GDP does not translate
into a UK-wide GDP fall as expected.
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Figure 3.24: IRFs from labour supply shock in Scotland- 4 (rUK)
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Figure 3.25: IRFs from labour supply shock in Scotland- 5 (UK)
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3.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have reviewed the main approaches for parametrizing
the DSGE models, and have selected the Bayesian likelihood-based tech-
niques for estimating our model. This procedure has several advantages.
Firstly, being a full-information method, it exploits all of the relevant infor-
mation available in the sample and not only some of its moments. Secondly,
the Bayesian approach allows us to inform estimation with the pre-sample
information coming from related studies and economic theory, which is often
very rich. Prior distributions assigned to parameters, furthermore, tend to
induce curvature to regions of the likelihood function which are otherwise
flat, helping the identification and allowing for a more conservative stance for
policy making. Thirdly, the Bayesian techniques rely on the "exploration"
of parameters’ posterior distribution, instead of attempting to maximize the
likelihood function as in the classical ML. As discussed, the former approach
is significantly more robust.
We then moved to estimate the model. We found that the modes of the
estimated parameters are broadly in line with those found by most of the
DSGE literature, providing a first validation to our framework. At the same
time, we noted that the Calvo lottery for wage is relatively small, while the
labour supply shock in Scotland tends to be quite large. There are a few
reasons which could account for this. Scottish series tend to be more volatile
than the ones from larger advanced economies over which these models are
typically estimated. This, in turn, can be due to a larger measurement error
in Scottish statistics as well as to the greater volatility smaller countries, such
as Scotland, are likely to experience. Furthermore, it is generally believed
that with a reduced scope for monetary and fiscal policy responses to Scottish
idiosyncratic shocks, much of the adjustment in Scotland may occur through
the labour market.
Finally, we analyzed the impulse response functions produced by our
estimated model and studied the propagation of shocks and the dynamics
of the economic adjustment in Scotland and in the rUK. We found that
the dynamics produced by our model are well in line with what suggested
by economic theory, and consistent with the classic predictions from DSGE
models. This provides a further validation to the design of our model and
to its estimation.
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Future research will employ this framework to address a large set of
policy relevant questions on alternative devolution settings for Scotland, as
well as on the assessment of its current fiscal framework. For example: what
are welfare costs/benefits of the current devolution settlements? Can we
decompose them across individual policy measures e.g. with and without
the control of income tax? By how much should the borrowing powers be
extended to manage the fiscal risk in Scotland? What are the costs/benefits
of Scottish independence? Etc. Together with informing the policy debate
in Scotland, this line of research could more generally contribute to the
literature on the optimal design of fiscal federalism, a branch of economics
increasingly relevant to policy makers and surprisingly subdued.
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